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From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V Torek)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: What is morality anyways?
Message-ID: <1456@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 31-Aug-85 17:42:34 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1456
Posted: Sat Aug 31 17:42:34 1985
Date-Received: Mon, 2-Sep-85 04:26:35 EDT
References: <1542@pyuxd.UUCP> <27500117@ISM780B.UUCP>
Reply-To: flink@maryland.UUCP (Paul V Torek)
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 57

In article <27500117@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes:
>I disagree.  I find it useful; you claim it isn't; why should I care what
>you claim without argument?  At the very least, you should
>explain what "desirable behavior" means, since that was my grounds for
>rejecting "craving" as a sufficient definition.  

"Desirable behavior" means "good behavior"; the relationship between the
meanings of the words "desirable" and "desire" is not as close as their 
common root might suggest.

>You say individual benefit but you talk about lack of physical bodily harm;
>while the latter can be objectified, I have not seen anything indicating that
>the former can. 

To put it simply:  if you are wondering whether a certain sexual caress will
promote your individual benefit, there is a straightforward and
paradigmatically empirical method of finding out.  If you mean "verifiable by
anyone" by "objective", you have a point -- of course this allows only
the person involved to directly experiment.  But others can, in principle,
use the empirical evidence of your bodily construction to predict whether
the sexual caress will benefit you (you might have to be dissected, but hey!
that's life).

>[...]  Of course all moral judgements are statements about empirical
>realities, but there is no empirical evidence for goodness or badness itself.
>We have to *decide* (or, more often, *believe*, since morality is primarily
>acquired, not chosen) that harming others is bad.  

As far as behavior toward others -- morality, narrowly defined -- I can't
refute your position (tho I have doubts).  But your statement "there is no
empirical evidence for goodness or badness itself" is wrong (see above).

>this [relativism] does not lead me to reject my morality or live for 
>"self-interest"; I find that accepting my personal morality, which
>involves such empathy with and protection of other humans, is very rewarding
>and beneficial and in my true self-interest, whereas acquisition of goods or
>power, while of some value, is much the lesser in terms of providing
>satisfaction.

This brings up an interesting point:  even where behavior toward others is
concerned, there may be reasons to prefer some moral viewpoints to others.
The self-defeating nature of a morality of "self-interest"-as-you-describe-
it is an example.

>I agree that good and bad are "out there" in the sense that you cannot
>simply decide what to view as good and what to view as bad, though you can
>come to feel differently [...].  But while they may not be "in here"
>in the mind and subject to simple manipulation, they are no further
>"out there" than in your brain; your good and bad are not out there in the
>"real world" in some absolute form where they control any mind but yours.

Hmm.  The good and bad of individual benefit and harm do not control any
mind but yours; but still they are more than just a matter of opinion,
bias, etc.; they must be *discovered*.

--Paul V Torek, moving soon to U of MI, but mail to umcp-cs!flink will
reach me.