Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: External Influences Message-ID: <1637@pyuxd.UUCP> Date: Tue, 3-Sep-85 20:00:33 EDT Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1637 Posted: Tue Sep 3 20:00:33 1985 Date-Received: Thu, 5-Sep-85 02:44:14 EDT References: <3518@decwrl.UUCP> <1451@pyuxd.UUCP> <661@psivax.UUCP> <1555@pyuxd.UUCP> <675@psivax.UUCP> <1607@pyuxd.UUCP> <492@spar.UUCP> Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week Lines: 163 >>Hardly. Since the current configuration of the mind is determined (more >>than just slightly) by external experiences, is that not an external >>constraint? I'd really like to know why you can so easily dismiss this >>by saying "oh, but that's in the past, we're talking about right now", >>as if it was somehow exempt. [Rosen] > But the past DOES NOT EXIST any more. The past has turned into the > present moment. [ELLIS] I find it amazing that you quote science when it serves your purposes and deny it when it doesn't. How convenient. "The past doesn't exist any more" is a meaningless statement, and quite incorrect in the global >4-dimensional universe we live in. Whether you're a determinist or a many worldist or a whimsicalist. Furthermore, it "exists" in the same sense that other things whose existence you speak out for exist: in the mind. As surely as beauty and love exist in mind constructs, so does the past. And it's that very existence that determines current action, no? > You have not recognized that a phenomenon can be described in two > different ways: > (1) Instantaneously, as a time slice -- in which case, all past > experiences have been incorporated into the present moment, via > memories, structure, momentum, impinging causes etc. External in > this case can only mean that which is physically outside of the > entity in question, but entirely within the current timeslice > (assuming materialistic metaphysics). > (2) As a Godlike viewer, examining all events transpiring within > an interval of time, in which case, external means outside > of the entity's `world tube'. I think it's YOU who doesn't recognize this, since you asserted that the past "no longer exists". > Now Mr. Friesen is speaking in instantaneous terms; therefore, Rich, > your comments about past experiences are irrelevant, unless you > restate them in present-moment terms (eg - memories, habits, momentum, > impinging causes..). Which of course is exactly what I do. Had the past been different, you would be acting differently today. >>And even if it were, aren't there events >>going on right now in the external world that affect the current decision? >>How much light there is in the room. How hot it is. What sights, sounds, >>smells, etc. happen to be around you at the time. Don't those factors >>alter your choice of action? Is it really free? > Very good points. > The actual state of the environment does not directly affect me > until it encounters the causal nexus -- the point where cause meets > effect. Exactly where do we draw this arbitrary boundary where causal > chains cross from external to internal (or vice versa)? When they begin having effect. > Most input must pass from its initial neural encounter through many > transformations including some fairly high-level interpretations before > `I' actually become aware of it. Some knee-jerk items elicit immediate > and totally unwilled response -- and these are typically not considered > to be the actions of `free will'. And more strung out decisions and actions. In what way are they different except in that the process lasts longer. > The filtering of one's internal data structuring mechanisms is powerful. > For instance, a red ace of spades among normal cards is usually seen > as an ace of hearts. Preconceptions and low level sensory habits all > work to shield one's carefully evolved internal structures (intentions, > semantics, beliefs..) and thereby maintain psychological coherence. Congrats! You have hit upon the reason why subjective experience is discarded from analysis if it is not supported by evidence. > Most causal chains from the outside are dispersed or deflected before > they go very deep. We see what we want to see, thereby providing a > sanctuary from causality wherein internal entities can either evolve or > fossilize, relatively untouched from external constraint. > What kinds of entities? Not physical objects, but rather, externally > perceivable patterns of behavior that can be born, remain inflexible or > grow, and die, things like habits, preferences, purposes, etc. As > nonphysical entities, they are largely unaffected by most physical > forces. This is news to me. Such habits and such may become so ingrained as to stagnate, but it would seem that the way they got there in the first place is the issue here. > For example, I will probably like music until I die, whatever else may > happen. Brainwashing techniques could alter that. Taking advantage of > this vulnerability by force of self will, it is possible to plant, > encourage, or thwart the patterns and filters that create subjective > reality. Free will should at times resemble a self-modifying B.F.Skinner > in order to escape the constraints of habit and other unwanted relics > from the past. Interesting analogy. Grabbing on to such control of one's own mind in a Skinnerian is only a slight exaggeration of the type of self-control that Paul and I have described from time to time. But such a process is learned (or not) by people. And the degree to which it is learned (can anyone learn it perfectly?) determines the degree of control. Still, in what way is this an example of free will? I think (and I agree very strongly with the notion) that this is something we DO have (as opposed to free will as defined rigorously), and something EXTREMELY worth cultivating and utilizing. But why call it free will when the definition doesn't apply? Emotional attachment to the term? I think language usage takes priority over such things. > We are usually in autopilot, performing mundane rituals. I think free > will is normally a dormant trait, a kind of spontaneous integrity that > rises out from the depths, like the Russian legend Ilya Mourometz, who > awakes from literally monolithic slumber as necessary to alter destiny, > ideally with force appropriate to the severity of the decision at hand. Nice legend. Still, free will by the rigorous definition requires a means of control external to internal chemical makeup. If you believe that, fine. If not, then free will is a moot point. But R-E-A (or whatever better term might describe for self-modifying Skinnerizing) does exist and can be utilized. > Free will does NOT mean insensitivity to experience. On the contrary, it > means transforming impinging causes into creative action thereby > infusing one's character into causal chains that may well return as > future experiences. Consequently, we blend into our evolving feedback > loops, and, if we act in goodwill (whatever that is), external events > become healthy extensions of self. For example, the acts of close > friends and lovers are events I usually wish to be affected by. > Most importantly, free will entails the ability to explore unknown > regions where one is certain to be bombarded by external CAUSES, hardly > the same as CONSTRAINTS. Don't most people want to experience new > things? R-E-A (or some other term for self-modifying behavior modification... SBM?) has these characteristics and does exist. > Even a fatal blunderer who, falling from a cliff, faces immediate and > certain annihilation, can be totally free. With impeccable free will, > you would take care not to overlook the delicate beauty of any > fortuitously blossoming flowers you passed on the way down... What being able to notice the beauty of it all as you plummet to your death has to do with free will escapes me, Michael. > You see, with free will, all is possible! As with Santa Claus. Unfortunately, neither is for real. >>> And that same dictionary defines free will as "the power or >>> discretion to choose" and "man's choices are ... not determined by >>> *external* causes", which definitions clearly are based on the >>> definitions I am using, not the more restrictive one you are using. >>They're only "more restrictive" in that I don't nonchalantly exempt >>past external influences because they interfere with my conclusion. >>And given the other examples I offer above, they don't work even if >>you could just exempt the past. > The past does not exist. It has become the present. No it hasn't, Michael. It exists just as much as your beauty and love and music. Likewise, it cannot be touched. But it would seem that the past still exists, whether "currently" in a >4D universe or in its effects on the present. -- "iY AHORA, INFORMACION INTERESANTE ACERCA DE... LA LLAMA!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr