Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site mmintl.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka From: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: The Principle of Non-interference Message-ID: <637@mmintl.UUCP> Date: Thu, 5-Sep-85 21:26:36 EDT Article-I.D.: mmintl.637 Posted: Thu Sep 5 21:26:36 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 8-Sep-85 11:24:08 EDT References: <588@mmintl.UUCP> <1525@pyuxd.UUCP> <617@mmintl.UUCP> <1624@pyuxd.UUCP> Reply-To: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) Organization: Multimate International, E. Hartford, CT Lines: 38 Summary: In article <1624@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> The problem is that the principle of non-interference doesn't define >> ANYTHING. EVERYTHING interferes with other people. > >Is my breathing "interfering" with your typing? It seems that you have >as broad a definition of "interfere" as Wingate. If you have to see it >or hear about it (horrors!!!) that's interference. I don't buy that >for a second. Interference is preventing another person from doing what >he/she likes that is not done at the expense of another person (through >interference with that person). Yes, it's a self-referential, sort of >recursive definition. I think we're all intelligent enough to fathom >this notion. All I can get out of this principle, taken alone, is that anything one person wishes to do, which does not interfere with *anything* that *anyone* else wants, is permissable. This has some content, but not very much. It doesn't let you wear a red shirt in public, because someone may not like to see it. It doesn't even let you appear in public. Now, you may respond, "but my wearing a red shirt is clearly my right, and someone stopping me is clearly interfering." But it is only from a pre- existing moral system that you can make that claim. Thus you can't use the principle of non-interference to derive a moral system. While I'm at it, there's another problem with the principle. It is possible for person A to interfere with person B in a way that person B does not want, such that person B is better off for it. Your signatures indicate that you are very suspicious of actions undertaken with such reasons alleged. Well, surprise -- so am I. That doesn't mean that there aren't such cases. Particularly (but not exclusively) when dealing with children. Now if, as you seem to, you are arguing from a basically utilitarian point of view, you may argue that it is better off over all to apply the principle, at least to adults, since the errors of commision will override the errors of omission. This may be true, but it is far from obvious.