Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP
Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!epsilon!zeta!sabre!petrus!bellcore!decvax!genrad!panda!talcott!harvard!seismo!umcp-cs!mangoe
From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking
Message-ID: <1522@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 9-Sep-85 09:31:26 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1522
Posted: Mon Sep  9 09:31:26 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 11-Sep-85 08:18:52 EDT
References: <1115@mhuxt.UUCP> <1473@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1648@pyuxd.UUCP>
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 62

In article <1648@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:

>> I was objecting the persistent refusal to admit to the possibility that the
>> physical representation of the person may in fact be unimportant to their
>> identity.  I don't care to argue that the mind and body can be conceived of
>> in analogy to a program in a computer ( in fact, I doubt the truth of the
>> assertion); the point was that such a system can be conceptualized, and
>> therefore is a candidate hypothesis until it is disproven experimentally.
>>  [WINGATE]

>Tooth fairies can also be conceptualized.  But more importantly, when
>Charles states that "physical representation of a person may be unimportant
>to their identity", he is stating very clearly a belief in souls.  For what
>is a soul but a "something more" than a person's physical representation that
>is a part of that person?  I find it cute when people speak only of the
>conceptualizations that conform (ahem) to the notions they want to believe,
>rather than reasonable notions about reality.

Well, you've been claiming for months now that souls are supernatural.
Suddenly you've seemed to have switched your tune-- unless you are ready to
assert that computer programs, songs, and television programs are all
supernatural.  All these things clearly exist, so, since Rich asserts that
there is no supernatural, either they are not supernatural, or Rich should
admit its existence.

For my own part, I'm quite happy with the existence of non-supernatural
computer programs.  And while we're at it, let's deal with this tooth fairy
story that Rich always trots out when he has no objective basis for
criticism of a hypothesis.  Many netpeople are no doubt aware that Arthur
Conan Doyle was an ardent believer in the real physical existence of fairies.
He brought forth supposed photographic evidence of their existence.  These
photographs, examined by various sorts of experts, did not conclusively
demonstrate their existence; therefore, it was concluded that there was no
evidence.  Note the language: not "don't exist" but "no evidence".

In contrast, Rich is asserting that in the face of near total absence of
evidence and investigation, he can claim that conscious identity is purely
in the body.  Now, maybe ten years from now, he will have some basis for
this claim, but right now, he has none.

>> I brought this up in the first place because Rich and Padraig were rather
>> too dead-set on the physical body being the "identity".  If the Mind is the
>> identity, then one can obviously (at least in concept) execute it on some
>> other "machine", or copy, store it on tape, selectively alter it without
>> altering the body, and perhaps other transformations-- all this, and no
>> souls either.

>If you assert that mind is separate from the physical brain and body, you are
>again talking souls.  But if perchance you're not, what would it mean
>to have a disembodied mind or brain without exactly the same input and output
>devices (the rest of the body)?  The experience would be completely
>different, it would be a different person.

Would it?  How do you know?  Have you been disembodied lately?  Why wouldn't
it be the experience of a disembodied person?  Are physical sensations
really so important to the mind?  Is there any objective evidence on which
to base the claim?  Why is this paragraph composed entirely of questions?
Isn't it because we have nothing but hypotheses?  Or perhaps because we have
nothing but questions about the nature of consciousness?  Does anyone really
know anything?

Charley Wingate  umcp-cs!mangoe