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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking
Message-ID: <1668@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 10-Sep-85 23:42:47 EDT
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1668
Posted: Tue Sep 10 23:42:47 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 11-Sep-85 20:12:43 EDT
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>>*I was objecting the persistent refusal to admit to the possibility that the
>>*physical representation of the person may in fact be unimportant to their
>>*identity.  I don't care to argue that the mind and body can be conceived of
>>>in analogy to a program in a computer ( in fact, I doubt the truth of the
>>>assertion); the point was that such a system can be conceptualized, and
>>>therefore is a candidate hypothesis until it is disproven experimentally.
>>> [WINGATE]

>>Tooth fairies can also be conceptualized.  But more importantly, when
>>Charles states that "physical representation of a person may be unimportant
>>to their identity", he is stating very clearly a belief in souls.  For what
>>is a soul but a "something more" than a person's physical representation that
>>is a part of that person?  I find it cute when people speak only of the
>>conceptualizations that conform (ahem) to the notions they want to believe,
>>rather than reasonable notions about reality.

> Well, you've been claiming for months now that souls are supernatural.
> Suddenly you've seemed to have switched your tune-- unless you are ready to
> assert that computer programs, songs, and television programs are all
> supernatural.  All these things clearly exist, so, since Rich asserts that
> there is no supernatural, either they are not supernatural, or Rich should
> admit its existence.

Are you claiming that all these things do not have their identity in their
physical representation and organization?  How so?  What ARE you claiming?
By your own reasoning, since the program in the computer is defined by how
it is organized physically, so is the "mind" of your analogy.  Thus you
are not talking about things not represented physically.

> For my own part, I'm quite happy with the existence of non-supernatural
> computer programs.  And while we're at it, let's deal with this tooth fairy
> story that Rich always trots out when he has no objective basis for
> criticism of a hypothesis.  Many netpeople are no doubt aware that Arthur
> Conan Doyle was an ardent believer in the real physical existence of fairies.
> He brought forth supposed photographic evidence of their existence.  These
> photographs, examined by various sorts of experts, did not conclusively
> demonstrate their existence; therefore, it was concluded that there was no
> evidence.  Note the language: not "don't exist" but "no evidence".

So Charles believes in fairies now?  It's no longer clear what you believe
in.  Absence of evidence is a good reason to discard a notion as being
wishful thinking.  That IS most certainly an objective basis for
criticism:  absence of evidence indicates either a willingness to accept
bad evidence to draw conclusions (is THAT what you would support?) or a
series of preconceptions in which certain conclusions are desired and evidence
fabricated/rearranged/reinterpreted to account for the desired conclusion.

> In contrast, Rich is asserting that in the face of near total absence of
> evidence and investigation, he can claim that conscious identity is purely
> in the body.  Now, maybe ten years from now, he will have some basis for
> this claim, but right now, he has none.

It boils down to this:  which would be more reasonable to believe?  That
mind is part of the physical body, or that something else that allows your
conclusions to fall into place (that's all the "evidence" you have) exist,
despite the fact that you cannot describe its mechanisms or construction or
provide any evidence to support it?  The latter is nothing if not shoddy
analysis and wishful thinking.

>>> I brought this up in the first place because Rich and Padraig were rather
>>> too dead-set on the physical body being the "identity".  If the Mind is the
>>> identity, then one can obviously (at least in concept) execute it on some
>>> other "machine", or copy, store it on tape, selectively alter it without
>>> altering the body, and perhaps other transformations-- all this, and no
>>> souls either.

>>If you assert that mind is separate from the physical brain and body, you are
>>again talking souls.  But if perchance you're not, what would it mean
>>to have a disembodied mind or brain without exactly the same input and output
>>devices (the rest of the body)?  The experience would be completely
>>different, it would be a different person.

> Would it?  How do you know?  Have you been disembodied lately?  Why wouldn't
> it be the experience of a disembodied person?  Are physical sensations
> really so important to the mind?  Is there any objective evidence on which
> to base the claim?  Why is this paragraph composed entirely of questions?
> Isn't it because we have nothing but hypotheses?  Or perhaps because we have
> nothing but questions about the nature of consciousness?  Does anyone really
> know anything?

I sometimes wonder.  The point is, to assume that physical sensations are
not important (huh?) to the mind, that the mind can be disembodied without
regard to its physical composition, is to assert a non-physical (whatever
that is supposed to mean) component of the person's existence, a "soul", as it
were.  I don't know why this paragraph is composed entirely of declarative
sentences, but I expect it has something to do with Charles' lack of
substance in his assertions, which are merely stretching out and contorting
to reach a desired conclusion.
-- 
"Wait a minute.  '*WE*' decided???   *MY* best interests????"
					Rich Rosen    ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr