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From: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Sc--nce Attack (self-awareness)
Message-ID: <514@spar.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 11-Sep-85 11:58:42 EDT
Article-I.D.: spar.514
Posted: Wed Sep 11 11:58:42 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 12-Sep-85 23:52:24 EDT
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Reply-To: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis)
Organization: Schlumberger Palo Alto Research, CA
Lines: 77

>>>  Case in point: Turing's test for machine consciousness.
>>>  How can we determine if an entity actually has conscious awareness?
>>>  The only way to REALLY know is to ACTUALLY BE the entity in question...

>>If we can determine what it is withint the organization of our brains that
>>gives us conscious awareness (who are you to say that this is impossible?
>>isn't that dogmatic???) then we could see if that existed in the machine,
>>could we not?  Or would that make it "less beautiful"? [Rich]

>	I think you missed the catch in the question. In order to equate
>conscious awareness to any physical mechanism(s), you'd have to be able
>to distinguish between actual self awareness and a perfect counterfeit
>of it...
>	This is the big catch. As long as "self-awareness" isn't a link
>in any causal chains, then self-awareness *by* *definition* produces
>no measurable effects, and can't be detected scientifically. For all
>I really *know*, I am the only self-aware creature in the universe; all
>you other folks are just mindless automatons...
>	So, how could you *ever* determine, scientifically, whether my
>machine was truly self-aware, or only simulated self-awareness? [Kenn Barry]

I'd like to add more to Kenn's excellent arguments..

    Imagine futuristic experimenters somehow temporarily disabling various
    brain functions and using some standard criterion to test for awareness.
    But what objective criterion is there? Do we ask the subject if they are
    aware?  Or do we ask afterwards whether they recall events that
    transpired during the experiment? 
    
    Basically, how can we come up with a criterion to be used in the
    experiment that we know will not be vulnerable to the cases below:

        The subject has lost subjective awareness, but retains
        speech/memory/sensation/.. (or whatever the criterion may be)

        The subject still subjectively experiences awareness, despite
        loss of speech/memory/sensation/..

    I see no way around this problem, which is, incidentally, similar to the
    question "What kind of scientific evidence could there be for God ?"

    Regardless, let us suppose that our futuristic experimenters discover a
    definite mental structure that is responsible for the human subjective
    experience of awareness. Maybe it would even be implementable on digital
    computers, maybe not. (BTW, Searle has strong arguments to the contrary..)
    
    There is still no way whatsoever to demonstrate that some other
    radically different kind of structure might not also work as well --
    after all, the only aware entities we are certain of are humans --
    although I believe animals and maybe plants share this trait with us, to
    varying degrees. 
    
    How can we say for certain that an arbitrarily complex heap of chemicals
    is not subjectively experiencing conscious awareness (perhaps even
    qualitatively similar to our own) even though the result of structures
    profoundly different from anything found in ourselves?

    Awareness is only knowable by BEING the entity in question.
    
    This issue of kinds of knowledge -- objective vs subjective -- is where
    science SETS ITS OWN LIMITS of observation, and it is where I find
    strictly materialistic philosophical schemes inadequate for
    understanding my own human existence.

    Please note -- that I am not claiming that materialistic thinking
    is invalid; on the contrary, science would probably never have made any
    advances whatsoever unless subjectivism were discarded in the laboratory.
    Clearly research into the functioning of the brain will never go anywhere
    without the assumption that all explanations must be objective -- as
    rational relationships among physical entities.

    Philosophy, the love of wisdom, must never acquiesce to the axioms and
    definitions of any single viewpoint -- materialistic or otherwise.
    Instead, philosophy should be a tool for mutual comprehension of all
    modes of thought.

-michael