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From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking
Message-ID: <1552@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 11-Sep-85 21:51:08 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1552
Posted: Wed Sep 11 21:51:08 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 14-Sep-85 06:04:19 EDT
References: <1522@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1668@pyuxd.UUCP>
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 127

In article <1668@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:

>>>Tooth fairies can also be conceptualized.  But more importantly, when
>>>Charles states that "physical representation of a person may be unimportant
>>>to their identity", he is stating very clearly a belief in souls.  For what
>>>is a soul but a "something more" than a person's physical representation
>>>that is a part of that person?  I find it cute when people speak only of
>>>the conceptualizations that conform (ahem) to the notions they want to
>>>believe, rather than reasonable notions about reality.

>> Well, you've been claiming for months now that souls are supernatural.
>> Suddenly you've seemed to have switched your tune-- unless you are ready to
>> assert that computer programs, songs, and television programs are all
>> supernatural.  All these things clearly exist, so, since Rich asserts that
>> there is no supernatural, either they are not supernatural, or Rich should
>> admit its existence.

>Are you claiming that all these things do not have their identity in their
>physical representation and organization?  How so?  What ARE you claiming?
>By your own reasoning, since the program in the computer is defined by how
>it is organized physically, so is the "mind" of your analogy.  Thus you
>are not talking about things not represented physically.

No, no, no.  The question is NOT whether or not the thing is physically
represented-- if you can even talk about physically representing it, then
quite obviously the object in question is NOT the representation.  When I
take an Aretha Franklin song and copy it from my record to my cassette tape,
it remains the same song.

>> For my own part, I'm quite happy with the existence of non-supernatural
>> computer programs.  And while we're at it, let's deal with this tooth fairy
>> story that Rich always trots out when he has no objective basis for
>> criticism of a hypothesis.  Many netpeople are no doubt aware that Arthur
>> Conan Doyle was an ardent believer in the real physical existence of
>> fairies.  He brought forth supposed photographic evidence of their
>> existence.  These photographs, examined by various sorts of experts,
>> did not conclusively demonstrate their existence; therefore, it was
>> concluded that there was no evidence.  Note the language: not "don't
>> exist" but "no evidence".

>So Charles believes in fairies now?  It's no longer clear what you believe
>in.

Good.  Maybe you can start defending your beliefs rather than attacking what
you believe to be mine.

>  Absence of evidence is a good reason to discard a notion as being
>wishful thinking.  That IS most certainly an objective basis for
>criticism:  absence of evidence indicates either a willingness to accept
>bad evidence to draw conclusions (is THAT what you would support?) or a
>series of preconceptions in which certain conclusions are desired and
>evidence fabricated/rearranged/reinterpreted to account for the desired
>conclusion.

"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane).  The only proper
conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion.  If I sit in this room (which
has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking space is
blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the first parking
space.  If one does not actually examine the parking space, one is not in a
position either to confirm or to deny my statement.  The ONLY correct
response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the statement, because
to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no blue car in the first
parking space."  Since this statement is not supported by evidence either,
the situation is quite symmetrical.  Neither statement can be claimed to be
true; therefore neither can be claimed to be false.  All that can be said is
"there is no evidence."

>> In contrast, Rich is asserting that in the face of near total absence of
>> evidence and investigation, he can claim that conscious identity is purely
>> in the body.  Now, maybe ten years from now, he will have some basis for
>> this claim, but right now, he has none.

>It boils down to this:  which would be more reasonable to believe?  That
>mind is part of the physical body, or that something else that allows your
>conclusions to fall into place (that's all the "evidence" you have) exist,
>despite the fact that you cannot describe its mechanisms or construction or
>provide any evidence to support it?  The latter is nothing if not shoddy
>analysis and wishful thinking.

Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science.  You have no
evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in
the light of competing analogies with existing systems.  My competing
hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly
capable of expression in other media."  The only reason to choose on or the
other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence
neither confirms nor denies either.

>>>  But if perchance you're not, what would it mean to have a disembodied
>>>mind or brain without exactly the same input and output devices (the rest
>>>of the body)?  The experience would be completely different, it would be
>>>a different person.

>> Would it?  How do you know?  Have you been disembodied lately?  Why
>> wouldn't it be the experience of a disembodied person?  Are physical
>> sensations really so important to the mind?  Is there any objective
>> evidence on which to base the claim?  Why is this paragraph composed
>> entirely of questions?  Isn't it because we have nothing but hypotheses?
>>> Or perhaps because we have nothing but questions about the nature of
>> consciousness?  Does anyone really know anything?
>
>I sometimes wonder.  The point is, to assume that physical sensations are
>not important (huh?) to the mind, that the mind can be disembodied without
>regard to its physical composition, is to assert a non-physical (whatever
>that is supposed to mean) component of the person's existence, a "soul",
>as it were.  I don't know why this paragraph is composed entirely of
>declarative sentences, but I expect it has something to do with Charles'
>lack of substance in his assertions, which are merely stretching out and
>contorting to reach a desired conclusion.

So what?  If you figure out how to load a person's mind into a computer
simulation of the brain, and set up so that there are no "physical inputs"--
no, back off a stage.  If you block all the sensory inputs to a person's
brain, does he suddenly become a different person?  What if you feed in
other inputs?  What if you somehow add a whole new kind of processing to the
brain?  Why isn't he the same person as before, who now has a new sensory
input to play with?

One of the principles of science is that the truth or falsity of a statement
should be independent of its subjective significance.  Rich is rather
blatantly ignoring this in his attacks on "mind as information".  Whether or
not my hypothesis is true is utterly independent on whether or not it is
useful for it to be true to anyone.  If we deny this principle, on the other
hand, then it works just as strongly against Rich, since his hypothesis is
obviously useful to his emotional attacks upon religion, and since his
competing hypothesis is similarly untested.

Charley Wingate