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From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Aristotle on language
Message-ID: <1554@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 11-Sep-85 22:16:35 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1554
Posted: Wed Sep 11 22:16:35 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 14-Sep-85 06:04:49 EDT
References: <303@frog.UUCP>
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 46

In article <303@frog.UUCP> frog!tdh writes:

>From Metaphysics, Book 4 (note especially the fourth
>sentence):

>"Firstly, then, this much is clearly true: that the phrase
>`to be' or `not to be' means something definite, so that not
>everything can be both in a given state and not in a given
>state.  Then, we would allow that `man' means one thing only
>-- let it be `two-footed animal'.  What I mean when I say
>that something `means one thing' is this:  if man is such
>and such, then for anything that is a man that is what being
>a man will be.  Nor does it make any difference if someone
>says that a word means more than one thing, provided the
>meanings are limited in number;  for each different account
>could be given a different name.  I refer to cases where,
>for instance, one might say that `man' meant not one but
>many things, and that `two-footed animal' was the account of
>one of them, but that there were many others, though they
>were limited in number;  then one could apply a particular
>name to each different account.  If, however, this were not
>the case, and one were to say that a word had an infinite
>number of meanings, then plainly there could be no account
>of anything; for to mean no single thing is to mean nothing;
>and if words mean nothing, there is an end to discussion
>between people and, indeed, really to reflection with
>oneself.  For it is not possible to think without thinking
>of some single thing; and if it is possible to think of this
>single thing, it must be given a single name."

One might want to argue that this might be true in the realm of *terms*, but
with regard to ordinary language it is known to be FALSE.  Translators are
constantly faced with the problem that, for many words, it is not in fact
possible to separate the "meanings" of a word as Aristotle demands.  It is
generally more accurate to speak of words covering *areas* of meaning.  If
one is interested in investigating the common usage of such a word, the
problem becomes one of determining where the boundaries of the area lie, and
then -- possibly -- to attempt to subdivide it.  If one is not so
interested, then one can simply define a meaning and be done-- and one
immediately is denied any analogy to the use of the word anywhere else,
unless one either goes through the meaning-determination process just
described, or unless it can be determined that another work uses the same
definition.  Without either of these, it is quite likely that the other is
in fact talking about something different.

Charley Wingate