Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site spar.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!bonnie!akgua!whuxlm!harpo!decvax!decwrl!spar!ellis From: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Sc--nce Attack (self-awareness) Message-ID: <516@spar.UUCP> Date: Fri, 13-Sep-85 07:46:50 EDT Article-I.D.: spar.516 Posted: Fri Sep 13 07:46:50 1985 Date-Received: Sat, 14-Sep-85 17:07:50 EDT References: <45200016@hpfcms.UUCP> <1605@pyuxd.UUCP> <491@spar.UUCP> <1635@pyuxd.UUCP> <1128@ames.UUCP> <1667@pyuxd.UUCP> Reply-To: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Organization: Schlumberger Palo Alto Research, CA Lines: 64 >> I think you missed the catch in the question. In order to equate >> conscious awareness to any physical mechanism(s), you'd have to be able >> to distinguish between actual self awareness and a perfect counterfeit >> of it. Suppose I build a computer which can act *exactly* as though it >> is self-aware. Suppose, further, that I give you complete access to the >> machine's internals, and complete documentation, plus a staff of experts >> to help you understand its operation. You would soon understand quite >> well how the machine managed to act as if it were self-aware, and might >> even jump to the conclusion that the machine was *not* self-aware, since >> you could follow the chain of events from stimulus to response in perfect >> detail, and no procedure called "self-awareness" was in the chain anywhere. >> [Kenn Barry] > >Why would I do that? Can you define the way in which this is a "counterfeit" >and not the "real thing". [Rich Rosen] Kenn made no suppositions whatsoever about the machine's awareness. Rather, he is asking "How can we tell if a machine that perfectly simulates human awareness actually possesses awareness?" >>... >Or maybe we are just "simulating it perfectly" ourselves. Can you define the >difference? ---- >> For all I really *know*, I am the only self-aware creature in the universe; >> all you other folks are just mindless automatons. >How did you know? Self-awareness is direct experience of self, just as pain is direct experience of bodily or psychic harm. Self-aware entities have feelings, incorrigible knowledge of one's own private internal world. Such knowledge differs from objective knowledge in several ways -- it is directly experienced and totally certain. In the same way that imaginary pain is, nonetheless, pain, so imaginary awareness is still awareness. I would gladly `torture' a car, for example, by running the engine far beyond its proper operating level until broke down, if that were somehow to my benefit -- say, if somebody paid me. But to torture a cat would result in intense guilt and nightmares for the rest of my life -- because I believe that cats are aware beings and `really' feel pain, unlike cars. Anthropomorphism, you say? No doubt about it. Subjective delusion or not, the question has been put to you, Rich: Can you describe what objective evidence there might be for conscious awareness? I am convinced that you cannot. >> So, how could you *ever* determine, scientifically, whether my >> machine was truly self-aware, or only simulated self-awareness? >Again, aren't you just creating a bogus differential between "simulated" >self awareness and "real" selfawareness? What is the difference? An entity with real self-awareness knows of its own existence. An entity with simulated self-awareness does not know of its own existence; however, the aware beings around it think it is self-aware. -michael