Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Sc--nce Attack (self-awareness) Message-ID: <1698@pyuxd.UUCP> Date: Sat, 14-Sep-85 15:36:40 EDT Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1698 Posted: Sat Sep 14 15:36:40 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 15-Sep-85 00:28:37 EDT References: <45200016@hpfcms.UUCP> <1605@pyuxd.UUCP> <491@spar.UUCP> <1635@pyuxd.UUCP> <1128@ames.UUCP> <1667@pyuxd.UUCP> <516@spar.UUCP> Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week Lines: 86 >>> I think you missed the catch in the question. In order to equate >>> conscious awareness to any physical mechanism(s), you'd have to be able >>> to distinguish between actual self awareness and a perfect counterfeit >>> of it. Suppose I build a computer which can act *exactly* as though it >>> is self-aware. Suppose, further, that I give you complete access to the >>> machine's internals, and complete documentation, plus a staff of experts >>> to help you understand its operation. You would soon understand quite >>> well how the machine managed to act as if it were self-aware, and might >>> even jump to the conclusion that the machine was *not* self-aware, since >>> you could follow the chain of events from stimulus to response in perfect >>> detail, and no procedure called "self-awareness" was in the chain anywhere. >>> [Kenn Barry] >>Why would I do that? Can you define the way in which this is a "counterfeit" >>and not the "real thing". [Rich Rosen] > Kenn made no suppositions whatsoever about the machine's awareness. > Rather, he is asking "How can we tell if a machine that perfectly > simulates human awareness actually possesses awareness?" Define a "simulation" of awareness. >>Or maybe we are just "simulating it perfectly" ourselves. Can you define the >>difference? > Self-awareness is direct experience of self, just as pain is direct > experience of bodily or psychic harm. > > Self-aware entities have feelings, incorrigible knowledge of one's own > private internal world. Such knowledge differs from objective knowledge > in several ways -- it is directly experienced and totally certain. In > the same way that imaginary pain is, nonetheless, pain, so imaginary > awareness is still awareness. Ever hear of phantom pains? Where an amputee feels pain in a leg that isn't there? Totally certain?? As with Laura, you cannot just put the word "knowledge" after subjective because you feel like it. > I would gladly `torture' a car, for example, by running the engine far > beyond its proper operating level until broke down, if that were somehow > to my benefit -- say, if somebody paid me. But to torture a cat would > result in intense guilt and nightmares for the rest of my life -- > because I believe that cats are aware beings and `really' feel pain, > unlike cars. You can also observe the way cats react, as though aware of what is going on around them. Oh, didn't you know that a cat is a perfect simulation of self-awareness. Now, about your maltreating a car: that is truly despicable, Michael. Don't you know that cars are self-aware! What's that, they have no self monitoring mechanism to react to and "feel" what is happening to them? Sorry, I guess you were right about the car. > Subjective delusion or not, the question has been put to you, Rich: > Can you describe what objective evidence there might be for > conscious awareness? The way in which living beings of sufficient complexity react to surrounding environments and experiences, indicates that they modify their choices and actions in a sufficiently complex way as to have the complex self-monitoring analytical systems that you call conscious awareness. > I am convinced that you cannot. But I just did. I'm sure you will find problems with my attempt, because I admit it is not complete. But it represents a significant jumping off point. >>> So, how could you *ever* determine, scientifically, whether my >>> machine was truly self-aware, or only simulated self-awareness? >>Again, aren't you just creating a bogus differential between "simulated" >>self awareness and "real" selfawareness? What is the difference? > An entity with real self-awareness knows of its own existence. Great. Does that mean operating system interactive monitor/control systems that know of their own existence in a running machine are self-aware? > An entity with simulated self-awareness does not know of its own > existence; however, the aware beings around it think it is self-aware. Think about what a simulation is, Michael. Within the reference frame of the simulation system in question, it is "real". What is the reference frame of such a simulation of selfawareness? -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr