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From: mike@whuxl.UUCP (BALDWIN)
Newsgroups: net.unix-wizards
Subject: /tmp problem
Message-ID: <698@whuxl.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 3-Sep-85 11:12:06 EDT
Article-I.D.: whuxl.698
Posted: Tue Sep  3 11:12:06 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 4-Sep-85 07:11:45 EDT
References: <1149@brl-tgr.ARPA>
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories, Whippany
Lines: 17

> Now, another security/integrity problem on UNIX I would like to hear
> a discussion on: /tmp. Let's face it, it's a problem (anyone can do
> an 'rm /tmp/*', or fill it with junk, or usually read many files on
> it.) How about considering a temporary file type (maybe by making /tmp
> a device?) with some special rules (delete on last close, no name in
> the visible file space except to root etc.) Of course any design should
> be ignorable (transparently work the old way at sites that don't need it,
> like my UNIX/PC.)

2.8BSD, and maybe 2.9, used the sticky bit on a directory to mean that
a file in that directory could only be removed by the owner of that file
or directory.  This fixes the "rm /tmp/*" problem.  Supposedly this will
be in 4.3BSD.
-- 
						Michael Baldwin
						AT&T Bell Labs
						harpo!whuxl!mike