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Path: utzoo!watmath!water!watdcsu!dmcanzi
From: dmcanzi@watdcsu.UUCP (David Canzi)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: A Note From Left Field re. self-awareness
Message-ID: <1670@watdcsu.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 15-Sep-85 02:31:56 EDT
Article-I.D.: watdcsu.1670
Posted: Sun Sep 15 02:31:56 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 15-Sep-85 12:01:32 EDT
References: <45200016@hpfcms.UUCP> <1605@pyuxd.UUCP> <491@spar.UUCP> <1635@pyuxd.UUCP> <1128@ames.UUCP>
Reply-To: dmcanzi@watdcsu.UUCP (David Canzi)
Organization: U of Waterloo, Ontario
Lines: 57
Summary: Sometimes, the truth comes from left field.

In article <1128@ames.UUCP> barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) writes:
>                                                     In order to equate
>conscious awareness to any physical mechanism(s), you'd have to be able
>to distinguish between actual self awareness and a perfect counterfeit
>of it. Suppose I build a computer which can act *exactly* as though it
>is self-aware. Suppose, further, that I give you complete access to the
>machine's internals, and complete documentation, ...

>                                            ... This would still leave
>you in ignorance of whether the machine actually had awareness, or only
>simulated it perfectly. ...

>	This is the big catch. As long as "self-awareness" isn't a link
>in any causal chains, then self-awareness *by* *definition* produces
>no measurable effects, and can't be detected scientifically.

>	So, how could you *ever* determine, scientifically, whether my
>machine was truly self-aware, or only simulated self-awareness?

Because the word 'self-awareness' is cumbersome, I'll make the
following remarks about awareness.  The same remarks will apply to
self-awareness.

The structure of language has a strong influence on how we think.  How
might we be influenced by the term 'awareness' being a noun?  We tend
to think of awareness as a thing, with some kind of existence of its
own.  It is only because of this that a statement like "awareness is
not a link in any causal chains" can appear to make any kind of sense.

Let's see what happens if we make awareness a verb.  We define it in
such a way that when we might have otherwise said that a brain has
awareness, we instead say that the brain is awarenessing.  Statements
about causal effect of awareness, or on awareness, become statements
about causal effects on the brain (which alter the way it awarenesses),
and of the brain (where controlling output devices, ie. muscles is
part of awarenessing.)

If we have a definition of awareness, ie. a description of how to
awareness in terms of simpler activities, we can check to see if a
machine awarenesses.  In fact, it's easier to check if a computer is
awarenessing than it is with a brain,  because you can trace the
computer's program.

You non-mechanists are only capable of tying mechanists into verbal
knots, because most mechanists haven't awarenessed the effect on their
thinking of using the word 'awareness' as a noun.

(I owe the inspiration for the above to the book "Teaching as a
Subversive Activity" by Postman and Weingartner.  Much interesting
stuff in there even if you're not interested in education.)
-- 
David Canzi

ACCUSE, v. t. To affirm another's guilt or unworth; most commonly as a
justification of ourselves for having wronged him.  (Ambrose Bierce)

Corrupt Xref line!!!  7190 --> net.politics(1..7177)


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