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From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking
Message-ID: <1593@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 15-Sep-85 15:49:41 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1593
Posted: Sun Sep 15 15:49:41 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 18-Sep-85 03:15:16 EDT
References: <1552@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1696@pyuxd.UUCP>
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 150

In article <1696@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:

>> No, no, no.  The question is NOT whether or not the thing is physically
>> represented-- if you can even talk about physically representing it, then
>> quite obviously the object in question is NOT the representation.  When I
>> take an Aretha Franklin song and copy it from my record to my cassette
>> tape, it remains the same song. [WINGATE]

>Wasn't this the topic of Hofstadter's "A Conversation with Einstein's Brain"?
>The notion of copying the configuration of Einstein's brain onto sheets of
>paper, and following rules similar to physical laws to determine the "state"
>of the next page.  This would include provisions for input and output to
>allow some sort of interaction.  But it would be very important that the
>methods of input/output remain the same or equivalent!  If you had Einstein's
>brain there (in paper or other form), wouldn't it be sure to say "Hey,
>I can't see!" if you did not provide for visual input somehow?  And, more
>importantly, if you did not provide for it in an equivalent way?  Would a
>video camera (or two, for binocular vision) do the trick?  What if Einstein
>had an astigmatism, or some uniqueness about the way he saw things (we'd
>all agree that he did, at least metaphorically)?  Would a different set of
>input/output interfaces (not just the sensory organ,s but the ENTIRE BODY!)
>suffice?  Would they work?  Would they produce the same person?

I don't find this argument convincing, since it seems to be implying that
I'm two different people depending on whether or not I have my glasses on.


>>>  Absence of evidence is a good reason to discard a notion as being
>>>wishful thinking.  That IS most certainly an objective basis for
>>>criticism:  absence of evidence indicates either a willingness to accept
>>>bad evidence to draw conclusions (is THAT what you would support?) or a
>>>series of preconceptions in which certain conclusions are desired and
>>>evidence fabricated/rearranged/reinterpreted to account for the desired
>>>conclusion.

>> "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane).  The only
>> proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion.  If I sit in this
>> room (which has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking
>> space is blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the
>> first parking space.  If one does not actually examine the parking space,
>> one is not in a position either to confirm or to deny my statement.
>> The ONLY correct response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the
>> statement, because to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no
>> blue car in the first parking space."  Since this statement is not
>> supported by evidence either, the situation is quite symmetrical.
>> Neither statement can be claimed to be true; therefore neither can be
>> claimed to be false.  All that can be said is "there is no evidence."

>What if there's no parking lot outside?

Doesn't matter if no one has checked to see if there is a parking lot outside.

>  Absence of evidence may not be
>evidence of absence, but if you carry that to its logical conclusion, you
>must believe in everything.  Remember, Charles, you say that the only proper
>conclusion is to draw no conclusion.  But clearly you have come to a
>conclusion.  How did that happen?

Well, the first staement is simple nonsense.  As for the second statement,
this whole discussion taking place in the milieu of YOUR system.  I am NOT
arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or rather, I am not arguing for
objective evidence for it).  I am simply arguing that there are no objective
objections to it (i.e., that there is no counter-evidence).  My knowledge of
resurrection is NOT objectively justified, as you claim, but since this is
not what is disputed here by me, you have no reason to object.  I, on the
other hand, have plenty of reason to object when your claims are not backed
up with solid evidence,as is quite the case here; I expect you to play by
your own rules when you expect everyone else to play by them.

>>>It boils down to this:  which would be more reasonable to believe?  That
>>>mind is part of the physical body, or that something else that allows your
>>>conclusions to fall into place (that's all the "evidence" you have) exist,
>>>despite the fact that you cannot describe its mechanisms or construction or
>>>provide any evidence to support it?  The latter is nothing if not shoddy
>>>analysis and wishful thinking.

>> Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science.  You have no
>> evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in
>> the light of competing analogies with existing systems.  My competing
>> hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly
>> capable of expression in other media."  The only reason to choose on or the
>> other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence
>> neither confirms nor denies either.

>But the points I made above (Einstein's brain section) raise important points
>regarding the nature of the input/output interfaces of your reconstructed
>brain which you seem to blithely ignore.

Well, the next section quite obviously deals with that very question, so the
objection you raise is hardly valid.  In any case, you are beginning to deal
with the highly subjective question of the nature of consciousness.
Hofstadter can do little more than raise questions, just as I can, since
there is a near total lack of any OBJECTIVE evidence about consciousness.
The whole question concerning the input devices is really taking about
subjective changes in the model, and my response was (quite naturally)
subjective to the extent that it's based upon my observations of my
consciousness, an experimental subject which I alone have access to.

>>>> Would it?  How do you know?  Have you been disembodied lately?  Why
>>>> wouldn't it be the experience of a disembodied person?  Are physical
>>>> sensations really so important to the mind?  Is there any objective
>>>> evidence on which to base the claim?  Why is this paragraph composed
>>>> entirely of questions?  Isn't it because we have nothing but hypotheses?
>>>> Or perhaps because we have nothing but questions about the nature of
>>>> consciousness?  Does anyone really know anything?

>>>I sometimes wonder.  The point is, to assume that physical sensations are
>>>not important (huh?) to the mind, that the mind can be disembodied without
>>>regard to its physical composition, is to assert a non-physical (whatever
>>>that is supposed to mean) component of the person's existence, a "soul",
>>>as it were.  I don't know why this paragraph is composed entirely of
>>>declarative sentences, but I expect it has something to do with Charles'
>>>lack of substance in his assertions, which are merely stretching out and
>>>contorting to reach a desired conclusion.

>> So what?  If you figure out how to load a person's mind into a computer
>> simulation of the brain, and set up so that there are no "physical
>> inputs"-- no, back off a stage.  If you block all the sensory inputs
>> to a person's brain, does he suddenly become a different person?  What
>> if you feed in other inputs?  What if you somehow add a whole new kind
>> of processing to the brain?  Why isn't he the same person as before,
>> who now has a new sensory input to play with?

>Ever read/see "Johnny Got His Gun"?  I've only seen the film, but a quick
>summary of it is that a WWI soldier has his (don't read further if you're
>eating) entire face "scooped" out by an explosion of some sort.  He cannot
>hear, see, smell, taste, speak, because all the means of doing so no longer
>exist in his body.  Can you imagine what that might be like?  Just beginning
>to try to do so makes me shake.

You are ratifying my point, unless you want to argue that the old person
died, and was replaced by a new defective model.

>> One of the principles of science is that the truth or falsity of a
>> statement should be independent of its subjective significance.
>>  Rich is rather blatantly ignoring this in his attacks on "mind as
>> information".  Whether or not my hypothesis is true is utterly
>> independent on whether or not it is useful for it to be true to anyone.
>> If we deny this principle, on the other hand, then it works just as
>> strongly against Rich, since his hypothesis is obviously useful to
>> his emotional attacks upon religion, and since his
>> competing hypothesis is similarly untested.

>The difference here, which Charles just skips over, is that it is not a
>question of subjectivity, it is a question of what will happen with this
>reconstructed mind in its new form, in a very objective sense.

And the only possible answer is, "we don't know."

Charley Wingate


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