Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking Message-ID: <1722@pyuxd.UUCP> Date: Tue, 17-Sep-85 16:06:40 EDT Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1722 Posted: Tue Sep 17 16:06:40 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 18-Sep-85 04:23:20 EDT References: <1552@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1696@pyuxd.UUCP> <1593@umcp-cs.UUCP> Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week Lines: 163 >>Wasn't this the topic of Hofstadter's "A Conversation with Einstein's Brain"? >>The notion of copying the configuration of Einstein's brain onto sheets of >>paper, and following rules similar to physical laws to determine the "state" >>of the next page. This would include provisions for input and output to >>allow some sort of interaction. But it would be very important that the >>methods of input/output remain the same or equivalent! If you had Einstein's >>brain there (in paper or other form), wouldn't it be sure to say "Hey, >>I can't see!" if you did not provide for visual input somehow? And, more >>importantly, if you did not provide for it in an equivalent way? Would a >>video camera (or two, for binocular vision) do the trick? What if Einstein >>had an astigmatism, or some uniqueness about the way he saw things (we'd >>all agree that he did, at least metaphorically)? Would a different set of >>input/output interfaces (not just the sensory organ,s but the ENTIRE BODY!) >>suffice? Would they work? Would they produce the same person? [ROSEN] > I don't find this argument convincing, since it seems to be implying that > I'm two different people depending on whether or not I have my glasses on. > [WINGATE] What a curt all encompassing dismissal! It's not implying that at all. The "you" that we all know and love would be experiencing the world in a fixed set of ways: without glasses (with poor perception), with glasses (better perception but with the added sensation of glasses on his nose which affect field of vision), or even with contact lenses (perhaps less distractive but still within that fixed set). Moreover, we are not talking about such trivialities as wearing glasses. Tell me, Charlie, what does blue look like? Objectively? I'm not looking for an answer describing the wavelength of light, now, the question is does blue look at certain way in an objective sense? Or is the individual human brain responsible for a distinct interpretation of what blue looks like? We can show scientifically that blue is called blue by every person without colorblindness and with knowledge of colors. But how do you know that sticking your brain into another body will result in the same "feelings" of "blue"? And how will that affect you? We have no idea of the answers to any of these questions, but it seems very reasonable from the evidence to conclude the the individual nature of a person's input/output sensory system is important in determining "personhood". >>>"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane). The only >>>proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion. If I sit in this >>>room (which has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking >>>space is blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the >>>first parking space. If one does not actually examine the parking space, >>>one is not in a position either to confirm or to deny my statement. >>>The ONLY correct response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the >>>statement, because to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no >>>blue car in the first parking space." Since this statement is not >>>supported by evidence either, the situation is quite symmetrical. >>>Neither statement can be claimed to be true; therefore neither can be >>>claimed to be false. All that can be said is "there is no evidence." >>What if there's no parking lot outside? > Doesn't matter if no one has checked to see if there is a parking lot outside. But why are you so sure that there is one out there at all, then? >> Absence of evidence may not be >>evidence of absence, but if you carry that to its logical conclusion, you >>must believe in everything. Remember, Charles, you say that the only proper >>conclusion is to draw no conclusion. But clearly you have come to a >>conclusion. How did that happen? > Well, the first staement is simple nonsense. The easiest way to dismiss something you can't debunk is to call it nonsense. If absence of evidence is not a reason not to hold a belief about something's existence, then you logically must believe in the existence of every imaginable thing. > As for the second statement, this whole discussion taking place in the milieu > of YOUR system. I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or > rather, I am not arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing > that there are no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no > counter-evidence). My knowledge of resurrection is NOT objectively justified, > as you claim, but since this is not what is disputed here by me, you have no > reason to object. I, on the other hand, have plenty of reason to object when > your claims are not backed up with solid evidence,as is quite the case > here; I expect you to play by your own rules when you expect everyone else > to play by them. That's a crock of shit. And here's why. (See how this works?) MY system? We are talking about evidence and proof here, Charles. If you cannot produce any, does that mean you back out and say "Well, I wasn't out to prove my point of view (perhaps because I know I can't), but I'm under no obligation to play under your rules because my rules don't require such things as evidence and proof". If you are interested in showing us the basic differences in criteria used to believe in a given system (like rules of evidence, analysis, etc.), perhaps one or the other of us can elaborate on those differences, and maybe one system of belief or the other can be shown to be flawed. But methinks that you are a grownup intelligent person and you normally use to same sets of criteria that the rest of us use (what you call "my" system). Which means you are making some special case for this particular belief, in order to "get" to a particular conclusion that you want. >>>>It boils down to this: which would be more reasonable to believe? That >>>>mind is part of the physical body, or that something else that allows your >>>>conclusions to fall into place (that's all the "evidence" you have) exist, >>>>despite the fact that you cannot describe its mechanisms or construction or >>>>provide any evidence to support it? The latter is nothing if not shoddy >>>>analysis and wishful thinking. >>> Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science. You have no >>> evidence, so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in >>> the light of competing analogies with existing systems. My competing >>> hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is possibly >>> capable of expression in other media." The only reason to choose on or the >>> other at this point is purely subjective convenience, since the evidence >>> neither confirms nor denies either. >>But the points I made above (Einstein's brain section) raise important points >>regarding the nature of the input/output interfaces of your reconstructed >>brain which you seem to blithely ignore. > Well, the next section quite obviously deals with that very question, so the > objection you raise is hardly valid. In any case, you are beginning to deal > > with the highly subjective question of the nature of consciousness. > Hofstadter can do little more than raise questions, just as I can, since > there is a near total lack of any OBJECTIVE evidence about consciousness. > The whole question concerning the input devices is really taking about > subjective changes in the model, and my response was (quite naturally) > subjective to the extent that it's based upon my observations of my > consciousness, an experimental subject which I alone have access to. And which you are not necessarily right about. Do you deny that people often do or feel things contrary to the way they really are, even inside of them? It is for this reason that we cannot accpet something as shoddy as subjectivity here. >>>So what? If you figure out how to load a person's mind into a computer >>>simulation of the brain, and set up so that there are no "physical >>>inputs"-- no, back off a stage. If you block all the sensory inputs >>>to a person's brain, does he suddenly become a different person? What >>>if you feed in other inputs? What if you somehow add a whole new kind >>>of processing to the brain? Why isn't he the same person as before, >>>who now has a new sensory input to play with? >>Ever read/see "Johnny Got His Gun"? I've only seen the film, but a quick >>summary of it is that a WWI soldier has his (don't read further if you're >>eating) entire face "scooped" out by an explosion of some sort. He cannot >>hear, see, smell, taste, speak, because all the means of doing so no longer >>exist in his body. Can you imagine what that might be like? Just beginning >>to try to do so makes me shake. > You are ratifying my point, unless you want to argue that the old person > died, and was replaced by a new defective model. Your point was that you were claiming that sensations may not have any bearing on personhood. In the example above, the young soldier has lost ALL personhood, and exists only as a disembodied (practically) brain. How this "ratifies" your point is beyond me. >>The difference here, which Charles just skips over, is that it is not a >>question of subjectivity, it is a question of what will happen with this >>reconstructed mind in its new form, in a very objective sense. > And the only possible answer is, "we don't know." But we have very good reason to ask about the practicalities of such a reconstruction, which you seem unwilling to do. -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr Brought to you by Super Global Mega Corp .com