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From: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek )
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory,net.philosophy
Subject: Logic, fact, preference, and social order
Message-ID: <234@umich.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 17-Sep-85 15:49:12 EDT
Article-I.D.: umich.234
Posted: Tue Sep 17 15:49:12 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 19-Sep-85 05:26:50 EDT
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Organization: University of Michigan, EECS Dept., Ann Arbor, MI
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Xref: watmath net.politics.theory:1105 net.philosophy:2647


Nat Howard (nrh@inmet.UUCP) writes:
>>... you might personally experience coercion as so galling as to 
>>negate in your own mind any positive result it might bring about, but there 
>>is no *logic* in such a perspective.  Just preference.
>>						Baba

>Agreed. ...
>...  I know of no postulates, anywhere, that have any basis in logic or fact.

>As you say, and as I said, "logic" cannot be the basis for what you 
>prefer.  I'm real curious to see if Paul Torek can come up with any
>social order that has a basis in "logic or fact".

Logic can't be the basis for what you prefer, but fact can.  Facts about
what's good for you can be a basis for non-moral preferences ("moral" used
here in the narrow sense of evaluations of ways of treating others).  More
generally (it gets fun now):  whether a particular, conrete action is right
or wrong is an empirical fact about it, as are how much time it takes and
how many calories it expends.  For example (an example very much to the point),
whether it is right for me to support a given "social order" comes to
whether I would do so if I considered it rationally and with knowledge of
relevant information.

Relevant information includes (and as far as I can tell only includes) facts
about benefits/harms to myself and others flowing from the social system
under consideration.  Effects on others will be weighted, relative to effects
on myself, according as I have reasons for considering them similarly or
differently.  Some assignments of weights would be rationally indefensible;
for examples, giving no weight to others, or giving no weight to oneself.
(Either assignment would be self-defeating, given that caring about others
improves one's own life and vice versa.  Furthermore, neither position could
be agreed on by a rational community, for reasons which I hope are not hard
to see.)

A moral viewpoint is downright irrational if (I do not say iff) it fulfills
both of the following conditions:  it has no basis in logic or fact; a 
principle that does have such basis can conflict with it.  "Prisoners-
Dilemma" type situations show that when two or more people have different 
objectives, coercion can sometimes make all parties better off.  Since it is
compellingly rational that something should be done when it benefits
everyone and harms no one, any principle that would rule out coercion in
all such "Prisoners-Dilemma" situations MUST be incorrect.  UNLESS of course,
it has some independent basis in logic or fact -- and if you think so,
then dammit, SUPPLY IT!

One more point and then I'll rest.  If Nat Howard thinks it all comes down
to subjective, nonrational preferences, and knows (as he ought, in outline)
my values, why is he bothering trying to convince me to favor his favored
social order?  Is he engaging in ideological mystification -- pretending
that I have *reason* to change my mind, in hopes I won't catch on?  When
someone says there is no rational support for one set of values or another,
yet expects me to accept his thesis for reasons, why should I take the trouble
of concentrating on the issue and testing my opinions?  Why should I not
say, "I don't feel like thinking very hard, and I don't like the noises this
two-legged animal is making -- I think I'll walk away"?!

--Paul V Torek    				C. I. Lewis Fan Club


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