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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: the logic behind free will
Message-ID: <1735@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 19-Sep-85 21:03:40 EDT
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1735
Posted: Thu Sep 19 21:03:40 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 21-Sep-85 06:02:25 EDT
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> 	Rich, let's follow a syllogistic form:
> 
> Major Premise: All elements of the universe are deterministic
> Minor Premise: All minds are included in the set of elements in the universe
> Conclusion:    All minds are deterministic.
> 
> 	A nifty feat of deductive reasoning, eh?
> 
> 	Unfortunately, the Major Premise was derived from inductive
> reasoning. You only have evidence to support a strong correlation.
> This analysis was performed from an objective perspective. I say 
> unfortunately because you have only acquired confidence, not proof. [WILLIAMS]

Fine, but you miss two things.  1) You have think you have found some exception
to the "rule" of determinism (say, for example, quantum phenomena), but it is
only wishful thinking (and assuming your conclusions) to believe that some
unrelated phenomenon affects the "mind" in the way that you seem to want it
to, to achieve the effect you want.  Aside from the apparent inability of
antideterminists to define mechanisms of indeterminism, all you have left
is your wishful thinking and working backwards from your conclusion to
"support" your claim.  2)  See below...  3) There is no third thing.

> 	Now for the next:
> Major Premise: Determinism requires predictability
> Minor Premise: All minds are unpredictable
> Conclusion:    All minds are not deterministic.
> 
> 	Perhaps I've got the premises mixed around, perhaps it should
> actually go like this:
> 
> Major Premise: All minds are unpredictable
> Minor Premise: Determinism requires predictability
> Conclusion:    All minds are not deterministic.
> 
> 	I decided to realign it so that the Major Premise was derived
> from inductive reasoning. It is perhaps a better illustration of
> how deductive analysis *HAS* to base it's premises on inductive logic.

Back to (2) from above.  The incredible (and all too common) fallacy here
is the anthropocentric notion that determinism (mechanisms of cause and
effect) MUST imply predictabilty (i.e., human ability to understand the
mechanism and predict from it).  It's amazing how many of us jump to the
conclusion that, because WE, the allpowerful humans, can't understand
something or describe its mechanisms, it MUST be unexplainable, unpredictable,
or part of some "other" (supernatural, acausal) realm.

> 	A lot of your argument stems from a " What if " approach. " What
> if " we were able to measure all the influences? We can't. " What if "
> we were able to build a molecular copier ( for you reincarnation buffs ) ?

It seems that your approach is a sort of reverse:  "We can't, therefore it
ain't".

> 	The difference between the two is perspective. The first is objective,
> and the second is subjective. I can not accurately predict what you will
> do from one moment to the next. That is the inductive evidence for the
> Major Premise.

Again, because YOU (or apparently any person with current tools of perception)
cannot predict what I will do, you conclude that the mechanism is
"indeterministic", unpredictable.  I hold what sounds to me like a much more
rational position:  that people, like so many other things in the universe,
are complex, and that just because we do not understand all the forces
involved does not mean that those same forces that apply to everything else
do not apply in that thing we like to think is so different (out of an
egocentric anthropocentrism):  the human mind.  To assume otherwise solely
for the purpose of "retaining" something called free will is clearly nothing
but working backwards from your conclusions:  "How can I continue to feel
free if this is so?  Answer:  assume the mind is different, that different
forces control it, solely to "keep" that conclusion "valid".

> 	In short, you *CAN* assert that there is no objective free will,
> partially because objectivity depends on determinism, but you *CAN'T*
> say that there is NO free will, because there *IS* subjective free will.

But you can (and we all have) shown how shoddy subjective belief is as a 
guage of what really is going on.  The mechanisms are certainly there that
make us FEEL as if a "me", a force of will, is "causing" the willing of
actions.  That seems to me to be nothing more than the self-monitoring
functions of the brain in action.  No, of course, I don't have an
explanation of the mechanism, but it sounds much saner to work from the
assumption that things in the brain are no different in basic physical
function than anything else, than to make up hypotheses that are derived
from working backwards from a desired conclusion.  To do the latter is
not only unscientific (I know that doesn't impress some people at all
when you use a word like "unscientific"---it might hit home if you say
that that means "flimsy methodologically"), it is rooted in wishful
thinking:  I want this conclusion, therefore let me choose axioms that
allow me to reach it.
-- 
"to be nobody but yourself in a world which is doing its best night and day
 to make you like everybody else means to fight the hardest battle any human
 being can fight and never stop fighting."  - e. e. cummings
	Rich Rosen	ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr


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