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Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
From: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking
Message-ID: <664@mmintl.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 16-Sep-85 21:01:02 EDT
Article-I.D.: mmintl.664
Posted: Mon Sep 16 21:01:02 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 21-Sep-85 07:57:59 EDT
References: <1522@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1668@pyuxd.UUCP> <1552@umcp-cs.UUCP> <701@utastro.UUCP>
Reply-To: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams)
Organization: Multimate International, E. Hartford, CT
Lines: 51
Summary: 


In article <701@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes:
>> 
>> No, no, no.  The question is NOT whether or not the thing is physically
>> represented-- if you can even talk about physically representing it, then
>> quite obviously the object in question is NOT the representation.  When I
>> take an Aretha Franklin song and copy it from my record to my cassette tape,
>> it remains the same song.
>> 
>Then if you are murdered, but a clone of yours survives, you continue to
>exist? Charley A, though now in a coffin still lives and wont be resurrected?
>(How can one be resurrected if one hasn't died?)
>The murderer can cite as evidence that no murder has taken place the fact
>that Charley is still hanging in there in the form of Charley B?

I think you are making the mistake of assuming that "shares identity with"
is an equivalence relation.  Just because a copy of you shares identity with
the you as of and before the copy was made (which the current you also shares
identity with) does not mean that it shares identity with you.  In order for a
murder not to have taken place, the copy must have been made at or after the
time of the murder.  Again, a *perfect* copy is not required, since a perfect
copy would be dead.  The boundary between a copy good enough to share
identity and one not good enough is fuzzy, like all real world boundaries.

>The point of all this is to demonstrate the absurdity of confusing "same"
>in the sense of "identical copy" and "same" as a statement of "identity".
>Your reference to the above song fails to make this distinction.

If someone else sings the song, it is still the same song.

>How many times have you been introduced to someone that extended his
>hand and shook the nearest table rather than your hand? If never, then
>you might take this as evidence that people dont as a rule doubt that
>your identity resides in your body.

Indeed, there are no reliable reported instances of people's identities
being seperated from their bodies.  People don't as a rule doubt that
your identity, de facto, resides in your body.  That doesn't mean that
they believe that it necessarily resides in your body.

>Hmmm! What is the subjective significance of resurrection? Could it possibly
>be influencing your ability to tell the truth? Nah, 'course not, y'all are
>talkin' 'bout religion here anyways.

I can't speak for Charley, but I for one do not believe in resurrection.
I am an atheist, not in the sense that I believe there cannot be a god,
but that I find the evidence insufficient.  (Among more complex
considerations, which this is not the place to go into.)  I just think
that the kind of resurrection he talks about is not a contradiction.

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108


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