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From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking
Message-ID: <1630@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 19-Sep-85 09:46:34 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1630
Posted: Thu Sep 19 09:46:34 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 21-Sep-85 10:46:30 EDT
References: <1593@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1722@pyuxd.UUCP>
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 202

In article <1722@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:
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Wasn't this the topic of Hofstadter's "A Conversation with Einstein's Brain"?
The notion of copying the configuration of Einstein's brain onto sheets of
paper, and following rules similar to physical laws to determine the "state"
of the next page.  This would include provisions for input and output to
allow some sort of interaction.  But it would be very important that the
methods of input/output remain the same or equivalent!  If you had Einstein's
brain there (in paper or other form), wouldn't it be sure to say "Hey,
I can't see!" if you did not provide for visual input somehow?  And, more
importantly, if you did not provide for it in an equivalent way?  Would a
video camera (or two, for binocular vision) do the trick?  What if Einstein
had an astigmatism, or some uniqueness about the way he saw things (we'd
all agree that he did, at least metaphorically)?  Would a different set of
input/output interfaces (not just the sensory organ,s but the ENTIRE BODY!)
suffice?  Would they work?  Would they produce the same person? [ROSEN]
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>> I don't find this argument convincing, since it seems to be implying that
>> I'm two different people depending on whether or not I have my glasses on.
>> [WINGATE]

>What a curt all encompassing dismissal!  It's not implying that at all.  The
>"you" that we all know and love would be experiencing the world in a fixed
>set of ways:  without glasses (with poor perception), with glasses (better
>perception but with the added sensation of glasses on his nose which affect
>field of vision), or even with contact lenses (perhaps less distractive
>but still within that fixed set).  Moreover, we are not talking about such
>trivialities as wearing glasses.

Ah, but on your own words it is.  Above you speculated on Eistein having
astigmatism.  Well, I have astigmatism, which is fully corrected when I have
my glasses on.  I can modify my sensory inputs in lots of ways.  In all of
these, however, as far as I can determine there is no change in my "self"
other than in the ordinary way that people change as a result of their
perceptions through time.

>>>>So what?  If you figure out how to load a person's mind into a computer
>>>>simulation of the brain, and set up so that there are no "physical
>>>>inputs"-- no, back off a stage.  If you block all the sensory inputs
>>>>to a person's brain, does he suddenly become a different person?  What
>>>>if you feed in other inputs?  What if you somehow add a whole new kind
>>>>of processing to the brain?  Why isn't he the same person as before,
>>>>who now has a new sensory input to play with?

>>>Ever read/see "Johnny Got His Gun"?  I've only seen the film, but a quick
>>>summary of it is that a WWI soldier has his (don't read further if you're
>>>eating) entire face "scooped" out by an explosion of some sort.  He cannot
>>>hear, see, smell, taste, speak, because all the means of doing so no longer
>>>exist in his body.

>> You are ratifying my point, unless you want to argue that the old person
>> died, and was replaced by a new defective model.

>Your point was that you were claiming that sensations may not have any
>bearing on personhood.  In the example above, the young soldier has lost ALL
>personhood, and exists only as a disembodied (practically) brain.  How this
>"ratifies" your point is beyond me.

Because that is NOT what I said.  My point is that modifications to the
sensory inputs are not special.  They do not instantly change the person;
their effect occurs temporally in the same fashion that all other EXPERIENCE
changes people.  A person is changed by blindness, but maintains his
identity.  He is the same person as before, only now he is blind.

  Tell me, Charlie, what does blue look like?
>Objectively?  I'm not looking for an answer describing the wavelength of
>light, now, the question is does blue look at certain way in an objective
>sense?  Or is the individual human brain responsible for a distinct
>interpretation of what blue looks like?  We can show scientifically that blue
>is called blue by every person without colorblindness and with knowledge
>of colors.  But how do you know that sticking your brain into another
>body will result in the same "feelings" of "blue"?  And how will that affect
>you?  We have no idea of the answers to any of these questions, but it
>seems very reasonable from the evidence to conclude the the individual nature
>of a person's input/output sensory system is important in determining
>"personhood".

Yes, but it does so in the same way that living in Paris rather than in
Pittsburgh changes a person.  If a person ceases to experience blue and
starts to experience "grue" instead, it is still "he" that experiences it.
Changes in sensory inputs can only manifest themselves as changes in
experience, unless the senory apparatus is so intimately tied into the rest
of the brain that one effects the other.  But if you are modelling the whole
brain, you have taken care of all that.

>>>>"Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" (Haldane).  The only
>>>>proper conclusion is that you can draw no conclusion.  If I sit in this
>>>>room (which has no windows) and assert that "the car in the first parking
>>>>space is blue," it is indeed possible for there to be a blue car in the
>>>>first parking space.  If one does not actually examine the parking space,
>>>>one is not in a position either to confirm or to deny my statement.
>>>>The ONLY correct response is "there is no evidence"; one cannot DENY the
>>>>statement, because to do so is to make the assertion that "there is no
>>>>blue car in the first parking space."  Since this statement is not
>>>>supported by evidence either, the situation is quite symmetrical.
>>>>Neither statement can be claimed to be true; therefore neither can be
>>>>claimed to be false.  All that can be said is "there is no evidence."

>>>What if there's no parking lot outside?

>> Doesn't matter if no one has checked to see if there is a parking lot
>> outside.

>But why are you so sure that there is one out there at all, then?

Have you been possessed by the ghost of Bunyan, that you can only talk in
allegories?

>>>  Absence of evidence may not be
>>>evidence of absence, but if you carry that to its logical conclusion, you
>>>must believe in everything.  Remember, Charles, you say that the only
>>>proper conclusion is to draw no conclusion.  But clearly you have come to a
>>>conclusion.  How did that happen?

>> Well, the first staement is simple nonsense.

>The easiest way to dismiss something you can't debunk is to call it nonsense.
>If absence of evidence is not a reason not to hold a belief about something's
>existence, then you logically must believe in the existence of every
>imaginable thing.

That's because you erroneously think that the only two possibilities on any
topic are either total belief of total disbelief.

>> As for the second statement, this whole discussion taking place in the
>> milieu of YOUR system.  I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes
>> place (or rather, I am not arguing for objective evidence for it).  I am
>> simply arguing that there are no objective objections to it (i.e., that
>> there is no counter-evidence).  My knowledge of resurrection is NOT
>> objectively justified, as you claim, but since this is not what
>> is disputed here by me, you have no reason to object.  I, on the other
>> hand, have plenty of reason to object when your claims are not backed
>> up with solid evidence,as is quite the case here; I expect you to play
>> by your own rules when you expect everyone else to play by them.

>That's a crock of shit.  And here's why.  (See how this works?)  MY system?  
>We are talking about evidence and proof here, Charles.  If you cannot produce
>any, does that mean you back out and say  "Well, I wasn't out to prove my
>point of view (perhaps because I know I can't), but I'm under no obligation
>to play under your rules because my rules don't require such things as
>evidence and proof".  If you are interested in showing us the basic
>differences in criteria used to believe in a given system (like rules of
>evidence, analysis, etc.), perhaps one or the other of us can elaborate
>on those differences, and maybe one system of belief or the other can be
>shown to be flawed.  But methinks that you are a grownup intelligent
>person and you normally use to same sets of criteria that the rest of
>us use (what you call "my" system).  Which means you are making some
>special case for this particular belief, in order to "get" to a particular
>conclusion that you want.

Can you not distiguish between demonstrating that some thing is possible,
and that it actually is?  And by the way, your claim that everybody else
uses your system (objective science, no?) for everything is so patently
false that it is hard to begin criticizing it.  In most everyday decisions,
it is NECESSARY to guess, to draw conclusions on insufficient evidence.

>>>>>It boils down to this:  which would be more reasonable to believe?

>>>> Sorry, Rich, reasonableness is not objective and not science.  You have
>>>> no evidence,
>>>> so there is no reason to choose one over the other, especially in
>>>> the light of competing analogies with existing systems.  My competing
>>>> hypothesis is that "the mind is *represented* in the body, and is
>>>> possibly capable of expression in other media."  The only reason to
>>>> choose on or the other at this point is purely subjective convenience,
>>>> since the evidence neither confirms nor denies either.

>>  In any case, you are beginning to deal
>> with the highly subjective question of the nature of consciousness.
>> Hofstadter can do little more than raise questions, just as I can, since
>> there is a near total lack of any OBJECTIVE evidence about consciousness.
>> The whole question concerning the input devices is really taking about
>> subjective changes in the model, and my response was (quite naturally)
>> subjective to the extent that it's based upon my observations of my
>> consciousness, an experimental subject which I alone have access to.

>And which you are not necessarily right about.  Do you deny that people often
>do or feel things contrary to the way they really are, even inside of them?
>It is for this reason that we cannot accpet something as shoddy as
>subjectivity here.

Since you are talking about a subjective thing (namely personal identity)
you have already accepted subjectivity.  If Hofstadter's argument is
correct, then there should be a discontinuity when I take off my glasses (or
somebody blindfolds me, or whatever) which is plain and obvious.  What I in
fact observe is that my experiences are different.  I don't see any good
reason to accept his arguments, since the experiential explanation seems to
work and there's no real reason to add on the the complication.

>>>The difference here, which Charles just skips over, is that it is not a
>>>question of subjectivity, it is a question of what will happen with this
>>>reconstructed mind in its new form, in a very objective sense.

>> And the only possible answer is, "we don't know."

>But we have very good reason to ask about the practicalities of such a
>reconstruction, which you seem unwilling to do.

As I have been asserting, it seems quite pratical to me.

Charley Wingate


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