Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site spar.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!ucbvax!decvax!decwrl!spar!ellis From: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: External Influences Message-ID: <532@spar.UUCP> Date: Fri, 20-Sep-85 09:41:29 EDT Article-I.D.: spar.532 Posted: Fri Sep 20 09:41:29 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 22-Sep-85 05:48:04 EDT References: <3518@decwrl.UUCP> <1451@pyuxd.UUCP> <661@psivax.UUCP> Reply-To: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Organization: Schlumberger Palo Alto Research, CA Lines: 136 >>>... on the other hand, if you are going to allow memories of past events to >>>count as external factors, you have given away the whole argument. [Frank?] >> Sorry again -- I'll try once more... >> What remains of past experiences has been incorporated into one's >> memory, habits, etc... They were only external influences when they >> crossed from external to internal. >> Exactly where they `cross the boundary' and become integrated into >> the person is arbitrary, though I suggested later in the same >> article that this point occurs at the moment of one first >> becomes aware of the experience. >> Anyway, external or not, pleasant memories, knowledge, skills, good >> habits, etc, increase one's freedom by opening the mind to healthy and >> varied interests. [ME] >I wouldn't call it "freedom". What is increased is our flexibility in >action, that which makes us different from supposedly lower animals. What >Torek and I have referred to as rational evaluative analysis of stored >knowledge constructs (possibly not even at a conscious level). [Rich] I wouldn't call it free will either; however, those who stress rationality as the highest possible virtue would be entirely justified in selecting r-e-a as their definition of free will. >The moment one first becomes aware is an arbitrary point indeed, because the >stored experience may have an effect on your decision making without your >being aware of it at a conscious level. Fine! As long as the effect is to increase my freedom, I'm eager to incorporate such an experience into myself. Most experiences do, in fact, widen my ability to respond or initiate action creatively. It's the unfortunate traumas (usually resulting from lack of experience) that can be constraining. Tragically, some misfortunates suffer so many of these that their freedom is forever broken.. >But, back to the original point, >calling it freedom sounds Orwellian to me, because clearly we are "free" >only to do what our experiences and mind constructs lead us to do. This may >be perceived as a "conscious choice" if the monitoring brain happens to be >monitoring that process (i.e., is conscious of it), but... I challenge you to prove this highly dubious assertion!! At most, the empirical evidence shows that past experiences only partially restrict my behavior -- and QM downright contradicts strict behaviorism. Furthermore, I am frequently quite successful at NOT monitoring my behavior -- except when I really need to. BTW, any lawn mower engine (or even electron, for that matter) arguably makes `decisions' that are not fully determined by antecedent causes, yet display primitive intelligence in their `choice' of action -- if relative independence from antecedent causes is paramount, there are entities possessing free will all over the place. >> In fact, LACK of past experiences -- parental neglect, poor education, >> insufficient human contact, boredom, etc -- is probably as constraining to >> personal freedom as traumatic or bitter experience. >But there's no difference at all. One case constrains you to do one set of >things, the other constrains you to do another. You mean a person whose development was so blighted that they cannot relate with other aware beings (even in written form) has as much freedom as a person who can enjoy friendships, careers, literature, or other life-opening experiences that come from human interactions? If so, your concept of freedom has little to do with the ordinary meaning of the word, my friend. >> Finally, the strict Behaviorist belief that past experience totally >> determines one's actions is NOT fact. > >So, what is "fact" here? If "strict" behaviorism is not true, what are you >assuming to be true. I assume that by "strict behaviorism" you mean that >all our behaviors are determined by things in our brains, which were >accumulated as a result of past experiences, which were... If not this, >what? Only highly causal entities like digital computers and billiard balls approach strictly deterministic behavior (and even they display high-level random behavior when they break). Whitenoise phenomena whose high-level behavior is of quantum or analog nature are in principle random -- like Brownian motion or noise between radio stations, admittedly boring, but nonetheless not precisely determined by past behavior -- we can predict how such things will behave with mere statistics. Even the most perfect vacuum theoretically possible (in which electromagnetic radiation is totally minmized) possess such statistically random behavior. Then we have more interesting phenomena possessing high-level deterministic nonlinear behavior that magnifies whatever fluctuations are present at the bifurcation points -- the n-body problem is in this category, and the ultimate outcome is in general theoretically unpredictable because the amount of accuracy in knowledge of the initial conditions rapidly encounters quantum limits for long-range prediction. In this case, antecedent conditions determine everything except the intermittent critical decisions, where chaos reigns. At best, we can categorize the possible outcomes and attach a probability to each class. The most interesting case is dissipative structures, where the chaos of nonlinear thermodynamics (possibly augmented by noncausal quantum connections) is driven by an energy source and evolves into progressively higher levels of order -- living and growing things. Here, antecedent causes are but a mere background that, only in exceptional cases, have noticeable effect on the integrity of such highly nondeterministic and autonomous entities. Science hardly understands intelligent life, of course. Somehow animals resonate with surrounding patterns so well that they mirror the surrounding world, anticipating future events more than reacting to past ones. My earlier quote from Bergson seems appropriate here: Free will is the breathing manifestation and unpredictable creativity of evolution: Evolution is truly creative, like the work of an artist. An impulse to action, as undefined want, exists beforehand, but until the want is satisfied, it is impossible to know how nature will satisfy it. For example, we may suppose some vague desire in sightless animals to be able to be aware of objects before they were in contact with them. This led to efforts which finally which finally resulted in the creation of eyes. Sight could not have been imagined beforehand. For this reason, evolution [even within an individual] is unpredictable, and determinism cannot refute advocates of free will. [History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell] Yet another whimsical definition of free will for you, Rich: Autonomous behavior determined by future events SMASH CAUSALITY!!! -michael Brought to you by Super Global Mega Corp .com