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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: More Theistic Wishful Thinking
Message-ID: <1767@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 22-Sep-85 20:03:18 EDT
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1767
Posted: Sun Sep 22 20:03:18 1985
Date-Received: Mon, 23-Sep-85 02:58:33 EDT
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>>> I don't find this argument convincing, since it seems to be implying that
>>> I'm two different people depending on whether or not I have my glasses on.
>>> [WINGATE]

>>What a curt all encompassing dismissal!  It's not implying that at all.  The
>>"you" that we all know and love would be experiencing the world in a fixed
>>set of ways:  without glasses (with poor perception), with glasses (better
>>perception but with the added sensation of glasses on his nose which affect
>>field of vision), or even with contact lenses (perhaps less distractive
>>but still within that fixed set).  Moreover, we are not talking about such
>>trivialities as wearing glasses.

> Ah, but on your own words it is.  Above you speculated on Eistein having
> astigmatism.  Well, I have astigmatism, which is fully corrected when I have
> my glasses on.  I can modify my sensory inputs in lots of ways.  In all of
> these, however, as far as I can determine there is no change in my "self"
> other than in the ordinary way that people change as a result of their
> perceptions through time.

You didn't read a word of that paragraph of mine, did you, Charles?  Not only
did I indicate that you with astigmatism and glasses have a fixed range of
perceptive possibilities, but you ignored the part about why this facet
of perception is trivial by comparison.  (i.e., my questions about the
the way the color blue objectively looks---that you have no guarantees,
that your mechanisms of perception will be accurately reproduced in another
body)  It appears that is not worth arguing with you if you intend to leave
out all the sections you simply don't want to address while not even reading
the sections you do include.  (I found these comments inserted at some
later spot in your article after further reading:  you still failed to
address the points raised.)

>>>>Ever read/see "Johnny Got His Gun"?  I've only seen the film, but a quick
>>>>summary of it is that a WWI soldier has his (don't read further if you're
>>>>eating) entire face "scooped" out by an explosion of some sort.  He cannot
>>>>hear, see, smell, taste, speak, because all the means of doing so no longer
>>>>exist in his body.

>>>You are ratifying my point, unless you want to argue that the old person
>>>died, and was replaced by a new defective model.

>>Your point was that you were claiming that sensations may not have any
>>bearing on personhood.  In the example above, the young soldier has lost ALL
>>personhood, and exists only as a disembodied (practically) brain.  How this
>>"ratifies" your point is beyond me.

> Because that is NOT what I said.  My point is that modifications to the
> sensory inputs are not special.  They do not instantly change the person;
> their effect occurs temporally in the same fashion that all other EXPERIENCE
> changes people.  A person is changed by blindness, but maintains his
> identity.  He is the same person as before, only now he is blind.

OK, fine.  Tell that to the soldier.  (If you find a way of doing so.)

>>But why are you so sure that there is one out there at all, then?

> Have you been possessed by the ghost of Bunyan, that you can only talk in
> allegories?

Have you been possessed by the Spirit of Cantovargo, that you can only
answer questions by asking other questions having nothing to do with the
original topic?

>>>>  Absence of evidence may not be
>>>>evidence of absence, but if you carry that to its logical conclusion, you
>>>>must believe in everything.  Remember, Charles, you say that the only
>>>>proper conclusion is to draw no conclusion.  But clearly you have come to a
>>>>conclusion.  How did that happen?

>>>Well, the first staement is simple nonsense.

>>The easiest way to dismiss something you can't debunk is to call it nonsense.
>>If absence of evidence is not a reason not to hold a belief about something's
>>existence, then you logically must believe in the existence of every
>>imaginable thing.

> That's because you erroneously think that the only two possibilities on any
> topic are either total belief of total disbelief.

I see, things can partially exist and partially not exist.  "Fuzzy existence"?

>>We are talking about evidence and proof here, Charles.  If you cannot produce
>>any, does that mean you back out and say  "Well, I wasn't out to prove my
>>point of view (perhaps because I know I can't), but I'm under no obligation
>>to play under your rules because my rules don't require such things as
>>evidence and proof".  If you are interested in showing us the basic
>>differences in criteria used to believe in a given system (like rules of
>>evidence, analysis, etc.), perhaps one or the other of us can elaborate
>>on those differences, and maybe one system of belief or the other can be
>>shown to be flawed.  But methinks that you are a grownup intelligent
>>person and you normally use to same sets of criteria that the rest of
>>us use (what you call "my" system).  Which means you are making some
>>special case for this particular belief, in order to "get" to a particular
>>conclusion that you want.

> Can you not distiguish between demonstrating that some thing is possible,
> and that it actually is?

That's funny, that's just what I was going to ask you...

> And by the way, your claim that everybody else
> uses your system (objective science, no?) for everything is so patently
> false that it is hard to begin criticizing it.  In most everyday decisions,
> it is NECESSARY to guess, to draw conclusions on insufficient evidence.

Conclusions that have been successfully so many times in the past (after
real examinatin) that they seem obvious.  In doing that, we all risk being
very wrong, but we do it only after we have been thoroughly convinced
of the likelihood that an assumed conclusion is true.  Agreed, not
very scientific (and increasing the likelihood of being very wrong),
but more rooted in such things than you would have us believe.

>>> In any case, you are beginning to deal
>>>with the highly subjective question of the nature of consciousness.
>>>Hofstadter can do little more than raise questions, just as I can, since
>>>there is a near total lack of any OBJECTIVE evidence about consciousness.
>>>The whole question concerning the input devices is really taking about
>>>subjective changes in the model, and my response was (quite naturally)
>>>subjective to the extent that it's based upon my observations of my
>>>consciousness, an experimental subject which I alone have access to.

>>And which you are not necessarily right about.  Do you deny that people often
>>do or feel things contrary to the way they really are, even inside of them?
>>It is for this reason that we cannot accpet something as shoddy as
>>subjectivity here.

> Since you are talking about a subjective thing (namely personal identity)
> you have already accepted subjectivity.  If Hofstadter's argument is
> correct, then there should be a discontinuity when I take off my glasses (or
> somebody blindfolds me, or whatever) which is plain and obvious.

Since you obviously haven't read the essay in question, don't try to say
what "Hofstadter's argument" was.  I offered no excerpts, and what you say
is not at all what Hofstadter was saying.  I suggest you do read it if you
plant to comment on it.

> What I in
> fact observe is that my experiences are different.  I don't see any good
> reason to accept his arguments, since the experiential explanation seems to
> work and there's no real reason to add on the the complication.

Again, you blithely ignore everything I said about people's own incorrectness
in their own subjective judgments about their own feelings, even.  Do you
plan to go on like this for long?

>>>>The difference here, which Charles just skips over, is that it is not a
>>>>question of subjectivity, it is a question of what will happen with this
>>>>reconstructed mind in its new form, in a very objective sense.

>>> And the only possible answer is, "we don't know."

>>But we have very good reason to ask about the practicalities of such a
>>reconstruction, which you seem unwilling to do.

> As I have been asserting, it seems quite pratical to me.

Fine.  Your other beliefs also seem quite practical to you.  Perhaps this
is another argument against subjectivity as evidence.  :-?
-- 
Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus.
						Rich Rosen   pyuxd!rlr


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