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From: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek )
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: support for areligious moral codes
Message-ID: <244@umich.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 31-Dec-69 18:59:59 EDT
Article-I.D.: umich.244
Posted: Wed Dec 31 18:59:59 1969
Date-Received: Wed, 25-Sep-85 03:29:45 EDT
References: <623@hou2g.UUCP> <5884@cbscc.UUCP> <1154@mhuxt.UUCP> <5906@cbscc.UUCP> <233@umich.UUCP> <5933@cbscc.UUCP> <241@umich.UUCP> <5953@cbscc.UUCP>
Reply-To: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek )
Organization: University of Michigan, EECS Dept., Ann Arbor, MI
Lines: 72
Summary: 

In article <5953@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes:
>In article <241@umich.UUCP> torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes:
>>[...] Now all of the above merits more detail; but I would rather recommend
>>a few good books on the subjects than type all year.  But it should at least
>>be crystal clear that if others don't follow at least a "minimally decent" 
>>(specific examples:  no rape or murder allowed) behavior-pattern toward 
>>others, you and I will suffer. [...] [This] IS 
>>ALREADY SUFFICIENT REASON to compel others to obey a moral code.
>
>You are right in that it merits more detail and you can recommend books if
>you like.  But, concerning point (b) above, what is the basis for the belief
>that certain norms are valid for all rational agents?  

It is implied by the idea that there is a fact of the matter about what we
ought to do; an idea that can be rejected only at the price of reductio ad
absurdum.  See S. Darwall, *Impartial Reason*, and C. I. Lewis (that's "I" as
in "Irving"), *Values and Imperatives*.

>Fine, we may compel others to obey a certain moral code because we may [...]
>get hurt if we don't.  But why is our perspective more important
>than the perspective than the one we are constraining to obey?  So we may be
>hurt; that is sufficeint reason for self defense, but not for legislation.
>The one we are trying to constrain has a different perspective, and I don't
>think sympathy is sufficient to enforce ours upon him.

Sure it is.  As long as our preferences as to the outcome, including the
coercion of the aggressor, are rational -- and they are -- we have every
reason and right to act on them.  We have no obligation to respect "his 
perspective" when he is disrespecting the "perspective" of his victim.

>>To quote a famous philosopher:  "Yes, that's my implication.  But you've
>>shifted the burden of proof ...".  The burden's on YOU to show how
>>religious codes "do provide the transcendent authority" i.e. provide 
>>reasons for an individual to be moral *over and above* the reasons ("if
>>any", if you insist there are none) human reason provides.  Prove that
>>you're not "in the same boat" as we agnostics are in!
>>
>My point is not that religious codes can supply independent reasons.  I
>fully agree that they only provide answers within their own framwork.  

That's not my point.  It's not just that we have no compelling evidence
for the religious framework itself -- true as that is -- but that *even
after we accept a religious framework* we have *no more (and no less)
justification for morality than we had before.*

>This is the way the score looks to me:  Religiously based moral codes
>cannot produce independent reasons for obeying them, but can produce
>dependant reasons.  Areligious moral codes can produce neither independant
>or dependant reasons.

You haven't given evidence for either of these assertions.  (You at least
made an ATTEMPT at demonstrating your point about areligious codes -- the
remark about "enforcing our perspective" -- but the attempt fails.)

>  So, Paul, I think it is up to you agnostics to
>prove that you *are* in the same boat with us religious believers.

No, it's up to you to show that we're not in the same boat, by showing how
a religious framework provides "dependent reasons".

>... the argument that the public implications of a religious moral code
>may be ignored solely on the basis of it's being religious is unfounded.

Whoa there, don't get me confused with Sonntag.  I don't argue that 
religious codes should be barred from expression in public laws (the old
"imposing morality" or "imposing religious morality" argument).  In my
idea of a democracy, laws don't get ruled unconstitutional just because
they agree with a religious morality.  I just hope the public wouldn't
*vote* for those laws in the first place unless (like laws against murder)
they can (also) be justified from an areligious perspective.

--Paul V Torek, throwing back the red herrings.		torek@umich


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