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Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
From: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: External Influences
Message-ID: <678@mmintl.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 20-Sep-85 18:02:51 EDT
Article-I.D.: mmintl.678
Posted: Fri Sep 20 18:02:51 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 25-Sep-85 07:51:59 EDT
References: <3518@decwrl.UUCP> <1451@pyuxd.UUCP> <661@psivax.UUCP>
Reply-To: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams)
Organization: Multimate International, E. Hartford, CT
Lines: 62
Summary: 


In article <1725@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:
>>>Yes, one can get a consistent definition of free will in this way [by
>>>considering "external influences" to refer to those *currently* influencing 
>>>objects which are external to the person --pvt].  But you don't want it.  
>>>It obliges to grant that my computer, which is a running a program I
>>>entered and commanded it to run some time ago, is exhibiting free will.
>>>[ADAMS]
>
>> Nay, there's a difference.  An act of "free will" is caused by a *conscious
>> mind*.  (By the way, I've thought about T. Dave Hudson's argument that
>> free will should be *defined* via the notion of activity caused by a
>> conscious mind; and that r-e-a should not be built into the definition of
>> free will but should be part of the explanation of it, as one of the 
>> conditions for it.  (I hope I represent his views accurately.)  Mr. Hudson,
>> take a bow:  you've convinced me (no easy feat! :->).) [TOREK]

I thought that was my definition.  If Mr. Hudson proposed the same thing,
I didn't see it.  (Which is quite possible, since our disks keep getting
full and we lose mail.)

>Great.  An act of free will is causes by a conscious mind.  (Never mind the
>fact that it has nothing to do with the definition, but Eric Blair said
>redefining words would be the status quo by just around last year...)

I believe the situation is as follows.  There is a common use of the term
free will, which is not well defined.  There have been a number of attempts
to define the term through the years, in a way that conforms to the common
usage.  The most common one philosophically is that free will is acausal
action (not *completely* acausal, just not *completely* deterministic).  I
have argued that in light of modern physics, this should be modified to
"acausal and non-random" (that is, having a (primitive) component which is
neither deterministic nor random).  There is no evidence that free will,
in this sense, exists; and I believe the burden of proof lies on the side
of proving it.  (This does mean that it doesn't exist, just that its non-
existence is the simpler assumption.)

The second most common definition, historically, is some variant on "free
will is doing what is right", or "free will is doing what God says to do".
I have heard no arguments for this class of definition here, so I will
not bother trying to refute it.

So, if free will is not either of these things, what is it?  I think I agree
with my earlier posting, and Paul Torek, and Dave Hudson (if he said it),
that free will is the action of a conscious mind which is (partly) free from
current external influence.

>And how do you now define a conscious mind, as opposed to something else?

A good question.  I don't really know how to define a conscious mind.  I do
know of a good many cases where I know a conscious mind is present, and a
good many others where I am reasonably certain it is not.  Thus I know it
is a real object.  I suspect more scientific research will be required before
I could attempt a definition.  Ask me when the first artificial intelligence
is functional.

>Does a cat have a conscious mind?

This is one of the cases where I'm not sure.  When (if) I find out, I will
be able to tell you whether it has free will.

Frank Adams                           ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka
Multimate International    52 Oakland Ave North    E. Hartford, CT 06108


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