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Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!decwrl!williams@kirk.DEC (John Williams 223-3402)
From: williams@kirk.DEC (John Williams 223-3402)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Absolute duality
Message-ID: <539@decwrl.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 23-Sep-85 11:51:49 EDT
Article-I.D.: decwrl.539
Posted: Mon Sep 23 11:51:49 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 25-Sep-85 12:45:21 EDT
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>> 	Rich, let's follow a syllogistic form:
>> 
>> Major Premise: All elements of the universe are deterministic
>> Minor Premise: All minds are included in the set of elements in the universe
>> Conclusion:    All minds are deterministic.
>> 
>> 	A nifty feat of deductive reasoning, eh?
>> 
>> 	Unfortunately, the Major Premise was derived from inductive
>> reasoning. You only have evidence to support a strong correlation.
>> This analysis was performed from an objective perspective. I say 
>> unfortunately because you have only acquired confidence, not proof.
>> [WILLIAMS]
 
> Fine, but you miss two things.  1) You have think you have found
> some exception to the "rule" of determinism (say, for example,
> quantum phenomena), but it is only wishful thinking (and assuming
> your conclusions) to believe that some unrelated phenomenon
> affects the "mind" in the way that you seem to want it to, to
> achieve the effect you want.  Aside from the apparent inability
> of antideterminists to define mechanisms of indeterminism, all
> you have left is your wishful thinking and working backwards from
> your conclusion to "support" your claim.  2)  See below...  3)
> There is no third thing. [ROSEN]

	No way! An exception to the " RULE " is everything! How 
can you state a certainty based on inductive logic when the 
exception *has* been shown to exist? Your determinism is based on 
one major set of conditions: that events behave statistically 
consistent. I think the wishful thinking can be attributed only 
to yourself in this instance.

	I, myself, subscribe to the hidden variables theory, but 
it is just that: theory. There is no way to " observe " absolute
determinism. We can not rule out that possibility. Even given 
absolute hard determinism, we have no knowledge of the origin, 
meaning that quantum events will always " appear " random. The 
best we can hope for in understanding the " hidden " variables is 
an explanation that will allow us to determine the probability 
distribution for certain events. I ask you now, what is the 
difference between hidden variable probability distribution 
equations and a real underlying random process? There is no 
answer, it is unobservable. The only difference in application is 
the terminology.

	It illustrates the difference between two perspectives, 
both being applied differently for solving different types of 
problems. Your definition is useful in some cases, yet is 
cumbersome in others. It depends on what type of phenomenon you 
are trying to explain. I really don't see any reason to eliminate 
the useful term " free will ".
 
>> 	Now for the next:
>> Major Premise: Determinism requires predictability
>> Minor Premise: All minds are unpredictable
>> Conclusion:    All minds are not deterministic.
>> 
>> 	Perhaps I've got the premises mixed around, perhaps it should
>> actually go like this:
>> 
>> Major Premise: All minds are unpredictable
>> Minor Premise: Determinism requires predictability
>> Conclusion:    All minds are not deterministic.
>> 
>> 	I decided to realign it so that the Major Premise was derived
>> from inductive reasoning. It is perhaps a better illustration of
>> how deductive analysis *HAS* to base it's premises on inductive logic.
 
> Back to (2) from above.  The incredible (and all too common)
> fallacy here is the anthropocentric notion that determinism
> (mechanisms of cause and effect) MUST imply predictabilty (i.e.,
> human ability to understand the mechanism and predict from it). 
> It's amazing how many of us jump to the conclusion that, because
> WE, the allpowerful humans, can't understand something or
> describe its mechanisms, it MUST be unexplainable, unpredictable,
> or part of some "other" (supernatural, acausal) realm. 

	No. Will you tell me the exact difference between the 
hidden variables theory and the many worlds theory? Academic. It 
doesn't matter what it " really " is, our observations will 
remain the same. The only practical difference is the way the 
equations are constructed and how directly the conclusions are 
derived.
 
>> 	A lot of your argument stems from a " What if " approach. " What
>> if " we were able to measure all the influences? We can't. " What if "
>> we were able to build a molecular copier ( for you reincarnation buffs ) ?
 
> It seems that your approach is a sort of reverse:  "We can't, therefore it
> ain't".

	How about " We can't ", therefore it's superfluous. It 
does not matter what theory I use as long as the results are 
accurate. I can set up an experiment to test for free will, and I 
can come up with convincing evidence.
 
>> 	The difference between the two is perspective. The first is objective,
>> and the second is subjective. I can not accurately predict what you will
>> do from one moment to the next. That is the inductive evidence for the
>> Major Premise.
 
> Again, because YOU (or apparently any person with current tools
> of perception) cannot predict what I will do, you conclude that
> the mechanism is "indeterministic", unpredictable.  I hold what
> sounds to me like a much more rational position:  that people,
> like so many other things in the universe, are complex, and that
> just because we do not understand all the forces involved does
> not mean that those same forces that apply to everything else do
> not apply in that thing we like to think is so different (out of
> an egocentric anthropocentrism):  the human mind.  To assume
> otherwise solely for the purpose of "retaining" something called
> free will is clearly nothing but working backwards from your
> conclusions:  "How can I continue to feel free if this is so? 
> Answer:  assume the mind is different, that different forces
> control it, solely to "keep" that conclusion "valid". 

	You do not wish to treat the mind as a black box, and I 
commend you for that. Unfortunately, however, at some level you 
will always be faced with the black box model. This is 
inescapable. You are inevitably faced with the problem of 
explaining something you can not directly observe.
 
>> 	In short, you *CAN* assert that there is no objective free will,
>> partially because objectivity depends on determinism, but you *CAN'T*
>> say that there is NO free will, because there *IS* subjective free will.
 
> But you can (and we all have) shown how shoddy subjective belief
> is as a guage of what really is going on.  The mechanisms are
> certainly there that make us FEEL as if a "me", a force of will,
> is "causing" the willing of actions.  That seems to me to be
> nothing more than the self-monitoring functions of the brain in
> action.  No, of course, I don't have an explanation of the
> mechanism, but it sounds much saner to work from the assumption
> that things in the brain are no different in basic physical
> function than anything else, than to make up hypotheses that are
> derived from working backwards from a desired conclusion.  To do
> the latter is not only unscientific (I know that doesn't impress
> some people at all when you use a word like "unscientific"---it
> might hit home if you say that that means "flimsy
> methodologically"), it is rooted in wishful thinking:  I want
> this conclusion, therefore let me choose axioms that allow me to
> reach it. 

	Excuse me, but most relevent modern physical theories 
include the status of an observer. I know of nothing more 
subjective. It is in fact the discovery of the significant 
influence of the observer in modern theories that has caused 
increased support for free will.

							John.


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