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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.religion,net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Free will: The Definition
Message-ID: <1779@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 25-Sep-85 00:36:29 EDT
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1779
Posted: Wed Sep 25 00:36:29 1985
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> Well, in my Webster's, there are TWO definitions.  The first is the same as
> Rich gives, with the significant addition of the phrase "within limitations
> or with respect to some matter"; it allows for partial freedom.  The second,
> however, is the notorious "choice creatively determined by conscious
> subject" definition.  [WINGATE]

As used in the sentence "I choose to do this of my own free will", meaning
something very different from the "free will" discussed in a philosophical
sense.

>    "How do we explain the phenomenon that people appear to make free
>     choices?" [using free in the sense of "not determined by outside stimuli"]
> 
> My answer:
>      "Perhaps they come from random processes internal to the brain."
> 
> Paul's answer:
>      "They are the creative result of consciousness." [I will freely admit
>       that I make no claims to the correctness of this statement in
>       representing Paul's thought.]
> 
> Rich's answer:
>      "It is an illusion.  All responses are determined by some set of
>       previous stimuli."

Given that I tend to agree that you may have misconstrued Paul's definition,
and given that you are essentially correct about mine, I will concentrate
on questions about yours.

The notion of free will involves some sort of choice-making mechanism that is
free, unencumbered by constraints.  Obviously my definition is very strict
(hey, why not?) about the type of constraints.  In addition, free will is
often tied, especially in a religious sense, to notions of responsibility.
"This wasn't determined by fixed things, this was your choice, thus you
are responsible and should take the consequences..."  In fact, you have
repeatedly mentioned (in the past) that the notion of a morality without
acknowledgment of responsibility is repugnant to you.

Given all this, what "responsibility" does quantum randomness offer to
the choice-making agent, be it a "soul" (which you of course don't believe
in) or the mind/body complex itself.  Does it offer information, knowledge,
assistance in making a "proper" decision?  Or does it just throw a banana
peel on the floor for you to trip on, at random moments?  If anything, this
is less freedom, not more.  It implies dependencies, not only on fixed
deterministic factors, but on random uncontrolled elements as well.  I can
see no way whatsoever that this could ever be construed as "free will".
In fact, I'd say it relieves us of more responsibilities than it would impose
on us for our actions.
-- 
"There!  I've run rings 'round you logically!"
"Oh, intercourse the penguin!"			Rich Rosen    ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr


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