Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site utastro.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ihnp4!qantel!dual!lll-crg!mordor!ut-sally!utastro!padraig From: padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking Message-ID: <755@utastro.UUCP> Date: Wed, 31-Dec-69 18:59:59 EDT Article-I.D.: utastro.755 Posted: Wed Dec 31 18:59:59 1969 Date-Received: Sun, 29-Sep-85 05:49:21 EDT References: <1522@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1668@pyuxd.UUCP> <1552@umcp-cs.UUCP> <701@utastro.UUCP> <664@mmintl.UUCP> <739@utastro.UUCP> <680@mmintl.UUCP> Organization: U. Texas, Astronomy, Austin, TX Lines: 38 > > [Not food] > > In article <739@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: > >All of this indicates that the word "identity" is being used in at least > >two different ways here; one as a statement of likeness, and another as > >a statement of "selfness". > > No, what I am dealing with is the perception by the person of identity with > the earlier person, and the perception by those around them that this is > the same person. What is this mystical concept of "selfness"? Does it > maybe mean "having the same soul"? > > Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka > Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108 I thought this was made pretty clear in the "assembly line" analogy. I do not really want to get into deep definitions on "selfness" but I think the need to use it in the context of assigning unique identity to similar objects is evident for Charley's case. I say this because the alternative presents even more difficulties as indicated by the identical twin homicide story. What all this seems to point to, from my perspective, is that quantities like location, and time, serve to provide a working criterion for determining "selfness" in every-day problems. These quantities however are externals from the traditional set of aspects that define identity i.e. the statement "you will be resurrected" is meaningless since everything would have to be reconstructed so that the "externals" are satisfied. The matter transfer scenario presents problems for identity if duplicates are produced. I think it is garbage to try to say that the duplicates are indeed one and the same as the person that entered in the sense that they both have the same "selfness" as the original person. The duplicates are "copies" of the original, but are not "the" original. Destruction of the original by death does not make the copies, or any one of them the same as the original, except of course one claims that the soul exists and survives to be resurrected. Padraig Houlahan. Brought to you by Super Global Mega Corp .com