Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site spar.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!decwrl!spar!ellis From: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking Message-ID: <549@spar.UUCP> Date: Sun, 29-Sep-85 12:04:58 EDT Article-I.D.: spar.549 Posted: Sun Sep 29 12:04:58 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 2-Oct-85 21:04:44 EDT References: <1522@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1668@pyuxd.UUCP> Reply-To: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Organization: Schlumberger Palo Alto Research, CA Lines: 163 Keywords: Satyagraha >> >All of this indicates that the word "identity" is being used in at least >> >two different ways here; one as a statement of likeness, and another as >> >a statement of "selfness". >> >> No, what I am dealing with is the perception by the person of identity with >> the earlier person, and the perception by those around them that this is >> the same person. What is this mystical concept of "selfness"? Does it >> maybe mean "having the same soul"? [Frank Adams] > >scenario presents problems for identity if duplicates are produced. I think >it is garbage to try to say that the duplicates are indeed one and the same >as the person that entered in the sense that they both have the same >"selfness" as the original person. > >The duplicates are "copies" of the original, but >are not "the" original. [Padraig] What does it mean when we say two descriptors represent the "same" entity? As far as I can tell, any given descriptor implicitly carries with it a "universal set" in which it "exists", and the rules of that universe determine the equivalence relations used to decide identity. For example, are all instances of zero identical, or is each zero different from the next? Usually, zero is a mathematical entity. In math numbers are entities that exist only as universals. So there is only one zero, mathematically, I suppose. Or is there? Is the notion of zero as the origin of the complex plane the "same" as the zero of integers? We CAN choose to call them the same IF WE PREFER, as an equivalence relation, by the natural mapping of the reals into the complex plane. Then there is computer science. Every zero in your computer's memory is in a different location. Are they the "same"? That depends on the context of the conversation. If, by the "same", we mean that, should a C program execute "if (a==b) they_are_the_same()", then yes. It is the context of the discourse that decides. Then there is the quasi-physical world. Is this zero -> 0 <- THAT ONE RIGHT THERE the "same" as the one I am looking at while I write this? And when your terminal scrolls it up one line, is it still the same? What if you reread this article? Do we decide that every time anyone reads this article on any DrivelNet site anywhere, that it is "same"? Also note that the each technical specialist will insist that their view is `deeper' than anybody else's. For example, who cares whether I wrote (i = 0; printf(i, "d")) or (printf ("0")), it's still the same zero on the screen to anybody who reads it. The guy who wrote "printf" might feel differently, though, and the hardware designers would likewise have their opinions, if any. Was it the "same" zero? If each is different, was there a first ascii `0'? And are ascii `0's different from ebcdic or apl `0's?). It depends on your point of view. Songs and computer programs are much like that zero up there -- they only "exist" as copies -- unless we agree that there is something magical about their first instantiation. Do we? Was there a first instantiation of the Damned's "Feel Alright", from which all else were copies? Or are they all really copies of Iggy's "1970"? Sameness here involves mental abstraction -- ie: what we mentally ignore, so that our focus cannot distinguish differences. So-called intelligence tests are supposedly based on one's ability to ignore meaningless noise and thereby perceive deeper identity. What about electrons? They are (by theoretical dogma*) absolutely identical. If they weren't, the universe would break (*). Does that mean they are the "same"? Still, we can trace individual electrons in physics laboratories. Most people would agree each electron is a different entity. Or would they? When an electron meets with others about an atom's nucleus, it appears to lose its identity, merging back into communal electron-ness. Subsequently we can pry an electron away from the atom. Is it the "same" one that earlier fused into the atom? Crazed metaphysicists see understandinging as simply forcing the truth of Mach's principle (a radical version of Occam's razor asserting that "Nature does not twice express itself"), which drove Einstein to general relativity, starting with the assumption that gravitional and inertial mass REALLY ARE the same. In this case, all isomorphisms somehow entail identity. Less immaterially, nearly everyone will agree that pieces of hard and relatively unchanging matter are the "same", like your zero key. Of course, between now (0) and now (0) I have slightly modified my zero key by adding michael oil and wearing a bit of the plastic off. But we are all convinced that the majority of its molecules are still the same, and it still functions with identically respect to my terminal regardless of such waer. Is that zero key still the "same" object? If I smash my head through my terminal's screen, will my zero key still be the "same"? After all, it will become relatively useless at that point (unless I have a detachable keyboard). Will it not be both the "same" (seen as a collection of matter) and not the same (seen as a functional relationship), depending on the sense of speech? If essence consists of formal relationships, then do not even untouched things change as the external world goes its way? What do we assume when we perceive sameness of internal structure? The intuitive sense of causation tells us that when two `identical' things of sufficent complexity occur, that something lurks behind the scene -- that an earlier pattern `caused' (ie: was propagated thru spacetime) a forked identity. If we encountered frogs on Mars, we would surely assume that somebody brought them there from earth. Plop! In hops Igorina, the neighborhood frog -- is she the "same" as she was last night? After all, she has replaced many of her molecules since then. What about the creek which nurtured her? It changes its matter as the water flows. Here, we speak of confluences of causal chains as entities carrying identity regardless of the composing matter. Do we consider ourselves to be the "same" as we were moments or years ago? Well that depends -- we have obviously changed. Much flamage in the free will debate has come from this point. Am I == what I was (modulo (a)causal intervening modifications)? >Destruction of the original by death does not make >the copies, or any one of them the same as the original, except of course >one claims that the soul exists and survives to be resurrected.[Padraig] As to resurrection of individual persons, we can only speculate (or offer subjective (and unverifiable) testimony). Recall that most mystical sources deny the material aspect of self, which is in accord with the notion of self, not as a heap of matter, perhaps closer to the formal relationships among one's parts. I suppose then that the `soul' here would be a repository for such information while dead. To the extent that causality is the only conceivable ordering mechanism for information (even with `noncausal' interactions, information cannot be transmitted except causally), it is scientically impossible to cause a person's identity between instantiations without saving an offline backup somewhere, like in a `soul'. Of course, that presupposes a causal mechanism for writing it to offline storage in the first place. Death, no doubt, is nature's final core dump... Somehow, all these causal concerns fail to capture the non-physicality of mysticism -- which is admittedly as close to religion as Vi Subversa is to the Iron Bitch. Clearly, if one identifies oneself with one's matter, rebirth is kaka. Information is one level up, but is that removed enough? If it is not transitted causally (physically), then we clearly must accept scientific heresies (like formative causation, or an omnipotent omniscient deity) for soulless re-instantiation. What characterizes cosmic notions, such as Gandhi's Satyagraha or the categorical imperative anyway? Surely not that you will CAUSE actions elsewhere to occur. All one CAUSES is one's own actions -- and if, in that act, one resonates with higher patterns elsewhere, that knowledge is only seen from a loftier perspective. Anyway, this is only a problem if you believe that there is any absolute principle according to which things "really exist" in the first place. I do not see how such an absolute principle can be made meaningful except by faith. Agnostically, there cannot be any such thing. The propositions are elucidatory in this way: one who understands them finally will recognize them as senseless, when one has climbed out through them, on them, over them. One must so to speak throw away the ladder, after one has climbed up on it. - Wittgenstein, "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus" -michael Brought to you by Super Global Mega Corp .com