Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP
Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr
From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Science & Philosophy vs Rosenism
Message-ID: <1843@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 4-Oct-85 16:39:07 EDT
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1843
Posted: Fri Oct  4 16:39:07 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 5-Oct-85 07:14:20 EDT
References: <1495@pyuxd.UUCP> <2197@pucc-h> <1510@pyuxd.UUCP>
Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week
Lines: 50

>>Free will means the ability
>>to act independently of physical constraints, whether from the surrounding
>>environment, or the insides of one's own body.  Think about what religionists 
>>mean when they speak of "free will" to choose between right and wrong. Clearly
>>they are referring to an ability to make a choice regardless of one's physical
>>make-up:  choosing not to sin despite the physical desire to do so.  Can you
>>act contrary to your physical make-up without an external agent to do so for
>>you INDEPENDENT of your make-up? [Rich Rosen]

> Again, I must question the inclusion of "the insides of one's own body" as a 
> physical constraint on one's decisions.  If we assume pure materialism, any 
> decision not only *depends* on body-state, it *is* body state, like memory, 
> consciousness, and most of the other good things in life.  How can one talk
> about making decisions independently of everything that one experiences, 
> remembers, and *is*?  Acting contrary to one's physical desire is not
> at all the same thing as acting contrary to one's physical make-up. [BABA]

Then, at last, you understand the implicit self-contradiction that makes
free will impossible unless there is an external agent of some sort that
represents the "you", the "will", that is unencumbered by current physical
states.  Unfotunately, your "I must question the inclusion of..." statement
sounds an awful lot like someone saying "I must question the inclusion of
Einstein's relativity model in these equations because it makes our elegant
simple equations go 'poof!'".

> The concept of "free will" in moral philosophy can still be accommodated in 
> a materialist universe.  For instance, one can view it as an assumption of
> the primacy of internal state relative to external stimuli in determining 
> behavior.  "Sin" can be attached to an individual whose internal state leads 
> to "wrong" actions, while an individual performing the same actions
> unknowingly and unthinkingly (i.e. independently of such internal state)
> might not be "sinning".  

Oh, great, so now a person's internal state, which comes from the wide variety
of things many of which are beyond his/her control, if it leads them to
do "wrong", makes them a sinner!  I cannot express in words my revulsion to
such a philosophy, that people who do "wrong" because of what their brains
have come to be are "sinners" (and thus, I assume, "worthy" of some form
of punishment either from a deity or from human beings in power).  I know
certain people hold this philosophy near and dear to their hearts, but I think
this just goes to show that this is an example of building a system of
thought where you can take credit for whatever good happens to you while
blaming others for their "evil".  Work backwards from the goal of blaming
people and being able to punish them for being "bad", and you get this.
-- 
"I was walking down the street.  A man came up to me and asked me what was the
 capital of Bolivia.  I hesitated.  Three sailors jumped me.  The next thing I
 knew I was making chicken salad."
"I don't believe that for a minute.  Everyone knows the capital of Bolivia is
 La Paz."				Rich Rosen    pyuxd!rlr


Brought to you by Super Global Mega Corp .com