Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site umich.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!epsilon!mb2c!umich!torek From: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: support for areligious moral codes Message-ID: <258@umich.UUCP> Date: Sat, 5-Oct-85 16:08:17 EDT Article-I.D.: umich.258 Posted: Sat Oct 5 16:08:17 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 6-Oct-85 07:06:30 EDT References: <623@hou2g.UUCP> <5884@cbscc.UUCP> <1154@mhuxt.UUCP> Reply-To: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) Organization: University of Michigan, EECS Dept., Ann Arbor, MI Lines: 98 Summary: In article <5999@cbscc.UUCP> pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) writes: >I want to say to Mr. Torek that I don't apreciate you sucking this >discussion into net.philosophy so automatically and with out stating it Sorry. I thought my "Followup-To" line would be obvious, and I like to minimize the number of lines of text. >This is going to be my last effort anyway. Torek seems not to be >putting much into it himself, and the character of this newsgroup >hasn't changed since I last unsubscribed. Oh boy, I get the last word! >>>[...] what is the basis for the belief >>>that certain norms are valid for all rational agents? >> >>It is implied by the idea that there is a fact of the matter about what we >>ought to do; an idea that can be rejected only at the price of reductio ad >>absurdum. See S. Darwall, *Impartial Reason*, and C. I. Lewis (that's "I" as >>in "Irving"), *Values and Imperatives*. > >Maybe I'm just dense, or maybe you are being too vague (I'll give you >your pick of reasons), but what is the "fact of the matter" you are >talking about? Whatever it is that makes for truth in "ought" statements (I think what makes for truth is that the agent *would* do what it is said he ought to do, if he considered it rationally and with all relevant information). >>[...] As long as our preferences as to the outcome, including the >>coercion of the aggressor, are rational -- and they are -- we have every >>reason and right to act on them. We have no obligation to respect "his >>perspective" when he is disrespecting the "perspective" of his victim. > >So, is there no moral evil when a sadist inflicts his fancy on a masochist? As far as I can tell, both their preferences are irrational, so the resulting action would not be right. (Which is not to say it should be outlawed.) >Anyway, you have implicitly taken sides without really justifying which >side should be taken. Suppose it is the victim who is not honoring the >aggressor's perspective (by resisting, perhaps). We should take the victim's side because we rationally prefer that such cases of aggression not occur. WHAT MORE DO YOU WANT??! >>That's not my point. It's not just that we have no compelling evidence >>for the religious framework itself -- true as that is -- but that *even >>after we accept a religious framework* we have *no more (and no less) >>justification for morality than we had before.* > >The morality is inherent in the religious code obseved within it's own >framework. You have side-stepped my point. I am talking about the ground >for authority which is invested in a moral code, the transcendence by >which we are justified in compelling others to stand under that code. I find your words utterly impenetrable. What does "transcendence" or "authority" mean, and why is it significant? >>No, it's up to you to show that we're not in the same boat, by showing how >>a religious framework provides "dependent reasons". > >How can you divorce any moral code from the framework in which it exists. >Religions do have moral codes, I think that should be obvious. Accepting >the religious framework brings that moral code along with it. Moral >codes do not have to be derived (though they may be expounded upon and >applied differently) within a religious framework, they are part of that >framework itself. OK, in other words, there's no *derivation* of the morality from, say, religious principles. Rather, it's a package deal: if you don't accept the moral framework then by definition you haven't accepted the religion. Two can play this game. Define "Secular Humanism" in such a way that, if you don't accept the Rich Rosen Code Of Non-Interference, then by definition you aren't a Secular Humanist. The Code is part of the framework itself (along with other doctrines, such as atheism). So an areligious system CAN provide "dependent reasons" for morality, contrary to your earlier claim. > The transcendent quality of these code means that >we can have a law that is above human authority. Same goes for Secular Humanism and its Rich Rosen Code (if not, why not?). >>my idea of a democracy, laws don't get ruled unconstitutional just because >>they agree with a religious morality. I just hope the public wouldn't >>*vote* for those laws in the first place unless (like laws against murder) >>they can (also) be justified from an areligious perspective. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > ... which you haven't really done. I've given evidence that it can be justified: to wit, it accords with both self-interest and sympathy to favor such laws, and both are rational motivations (i.e. are coherent with reason and experience). You've given no contrary evidence, and in the absence of contrary evidence we may conclude that the nonreligious person should favor such laws. --Paul V Torek, still "in the same boat" torek@umich Brought to you by Super Global Mega Corp .com