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Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!allegra!princeton!astrovax!sjuvax!tmoody
From: tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody)
Newsgroups: net.bio
Subject: Suffering and CNS
Message-ID: <2375@sjuvax.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 13-Oct-85 10:19:49 EDT
Article-I.D.: sjuvax.2375
Posted: Sun Oct 13 10:19:49 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 16-Oct-85 04:13:24 EDT
Distribution: net
Organization: St. Joseph's University, Phila. PA.
Lines: 28

[]
Advocates of vegetarianism often appeal to a general moral principle
that proscribes the unnecessary infliction of suffering.  This
newsgroup, of course, is not the place to dispute the legitimacy of
that moral principle.  There are, however, some interesting biological
questions associated with the application of it.  In particular, do we
have very much understanding of how developed a central nervous system
an organism would have to have to be capable of suffering?

I am no biologist, but I imagine that the nervous systems of mammals
are sufficiently similar to permit the inference that the none are
spared the experience of intense pain.  But what about fish?  Are the
structures which are involved in pain in mammals even present in fish?
As I understand it, fish "brains" are quite rudimentary, amounting to
little more than a large ganglion.  Chickens, too, are widely killed
and consumed.  How "sophisticated" is the nervous system of a chicken,
compared to that of a mammal?

How plausible is the claim that any organism that can be classically
conditioned is necessarily capable of suffering?  In my view, the
moral dispute needs more empirical basis, which is why I am posting
this.


Todd Moody                 |  {allegra|astrovax|bpa|burdvax}!sjuvax!tmoody
Philosophy Department      |
St. Joseph's U.            |         "I couldn't fail to
Philadelphia, PA   19131   |          disagree with you less."