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From: tedrick@ucbernie.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy,net.math
Subject: Re: Sc--nce Attack (really on minds and computers)
Message-ID: <10699@ucbvax.ARPA>
Date: Fri, 18-Oct-85 03:35:03 EDT
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.10699
Posted: Fri Oct 18 03:35:03 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 19-Oct-85 07:15:08 EDT
References: <299@umich.UUCP>
Sender: usenet@ucbvax.ARPA
Reply-To: tedrick@ucbernie.UUCP (Tom Tedrick)
Distribution: net
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
Lines: 29
Keywords: Turing machines vs. the mind
Xref: watmath net.philosophy:2874 net.math:2383

In article <299@umich.UUCP> torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes:
>In article <10671@ucbvax.ARPA> tedrick (Tom Tedrick) writes:
>
>>>there are probably lots of complex mathematical theorems which are true
>>>but which no human will ever recognize as true.
>>
>>I don't understand your argument. I claim that the human mind
>>cannot be essentially a turing machine. If we assume that a
>>partcular mind is equivalant to a particular turing machine,
>>then we immediately get a contradiction, namely there exists
>>a statement recognizable as true by that human mind which is
>>not recognizable as true by that turing machine.
>
>Which one?  The statement that is not recognizable by the Turing
>machine may be *extremely* complex -- what makes you so damn sure
>you could recognize it as true?  Tell me, Tom, is it true that every
>even number greater than two is the sum of two primes?  What, you don't
>know?  Then you get the point -- I hope.

No, I don't get the point. The complexity of the statement is not
the issue. The issue is that humans seem to recognize that certain
formal systems are consistent, but that this consistency cannot
be proved within the system. This mysterious ability to recognize
such things being something lacking in deterministic machines,
I claim there is a distinction between the human mind and any
Turing machine.

Of course, I may be wrong in believing that these formal
systems are consistent.