Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site spar.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!decwrl!spar!ellis From: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Re: More Atheistic Wishful Thinking Message-ID: <576@spar.UUCP> Date: Tue, 8-Oct-85 07:11:15 EDT Article-I.D.: spar.576 Posted: Tue Oct 8 07:11:15 1985 Date-Received: Thu, 10-Oct-85 06:05:06 EDT References: <718@utastro.UUCP> <27500134@ISM780B.UUCP> Reply-To: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Organization: Schlumberger Palo Alto Research, CA Lines: 204 >[ellis] >Haldane's dictum sounds like a clear warning on the use Occam, which >can be misapplied by assuming a statement like.. > > George Washington sneezed on August 13, 1773 > >..is false. Must we conclude that George Washington did NOT, in fact sneeze >on August 13, 1773? > >[balter] >You are equating "assume" with "conclude". [ellis] OK, I will rephrase my question as you seem to suggest: Must we ASSUME that George Washington did NOT, in fact sneeze on August 13 1773? [balter] >We can *assume* that that for >which we have no evidence is not true, because such assumptions simplify >the modelling process (if there are little blue men in the center of the >Earth pulling levers that move the continents around, then plate tectonics >is not a correct model, but I don't think it is twisting the normal >use of language to say that we *assume* that such blue men do not exist). [ellis] I think that's overstating Occam. Only when we are forced to make an assumption, then we use Occam's principle. However, if little blue men were to occasionally transport you to Hades and cause earthquakes with their levers, you might think differently. Admittedly others would have reason to doubt you. [balter] >But we cannot *deny* such things, which is tantamount to *concluding* that >they are false (I have no proof that the little blue men do not exist; >they just don't seem necessary to explain anything). [ellis] I strongly disagree. I see Occam as tantamount to the wise old Zen saying `MU', which simply unasks the question. Do I `assume' that Goldbach's conjecture (that every even number > 2 is the sum of two primes?) is false in the absence of any proof? NOT AT ALL! Confusing `probably true' with `true' is one of the major sources of the intrinsic subjectivity of science! [balter] >I agree that Haldane's dictum can be used as a warning, but I think Wingate >is using it to justify the manufacture of models out of thin air. [ellis] Charles is hardly manufacturing anything; rather, he is subjecting his existing notions to logical scrutiny. Read again: I am NOT arguing at all the ressurection takes place (or rather, I am not arguing for objective evidence for it). I am simply arguing that there are no objective objections to it (i.e., that there is no counter-evidence). [Charles] >[balter] >Just like little blue men. No objective objections. Counter-evidence >is not required, only lack of necessity. When someone proposes a theory, >the burden is on the proposer to provide evidence for the theory; the >theory must answer some question left unanswered by current theory. >That is a fundamental rule of scientific method. Merely demonstrating >that the theory is not provably wrong is not sufficient for it to be >considered. That is the error that almost all crackpots make. [ellis] As scientific theories go, you have raised several valid points. There ARE scientific objections to blue men with levers AS A SCIENTIFIC THEORY. It conflicts with an established theory that explains a huge body of accumulated geological and biological facts and has additionally predicted new ones. And all indications are that the blue men can ultimately be conclusively denied. Is reincarnation being proposed as a scientific theory? NO. Does it in any way contradict or replace anything in science? NO. It is not even clear how it could be falsified on a purely scientifically basis, given that asserts that some aspect of a person can recur after death, although it may be verifiable. Re: crackpots.. Another error that crackpots make is attempting to invalidate theories about which they are incompetent to speak (ie- Velikovsky's flimsy attack on celestial mechanics). Another error crackpots make is their inability to convert their ideas into results of value to humanity. Is reincarnation a useful theory? I cannot answer, as I have not closely examined the appropriate religious and mystical evidence. I profess ignorance... >[balter] >Not unfair at all. You have just stated that Charles is cool because he >only doing those things which I just stated are the things done by yokels. [ellis] Yokels typically make assertions on which they are unqualified to speak. (We all do this, me included, BTW) >[ellis] >Now there is the issue of whether the commonly held belief in reincarnation >should be held in net.philosophy. If this were a point of interest to only >one particular faith, perhaps it should not be discussed here. But in fact, >positions on this issue are quite diverse both among members of the vanilla >faiths and among those who do not (BTW - I hold no view on this topic). > >[balter] >It isn't an issue of whether it is only "one particular faith"; it is a >matter of faith, not a philosophical issue, unless you can demonstrate the >*possible necessity* of reincarnation. Show some question in the real world >such that world_model_X does not answer it but world_model_X + reincarnation >does, and then it will be possible to discuss reincarnation beyond the level >of "some people believe in it and you can't prove them wrong". Otherwise, >it belongs in net.religion or net.sf_lovers. [ellis] How does faith in empirical induction differ from faith in reincarnation? They are both unprovable, but claimed by their respective advocates to be axioms of the highest possible meaning to humanity. Furthermore, philosophical speculation is invaluable for determining the merits of scientific versus nonscientific ideas, provided all concerned parties are willing to objectively and rationally sort out the axioms and definitions of their preferred systems. If science is so great, its superiority will stand up to such examination. Furthermore, it can prove most helpful to religionists who wish to update their faith or perceive mystical value in science's newest discoveries. BTW, the fact that scientific_world_model_X + reincarnation explains no more scientific facts than scientific_world_model_X only goes to show that science has yet to incorporate subjective experience in any real way. Reincarnation has no scientific meaning. So what? The question is, does it have PHILOSOPHICAL meaning? >[balter] >To ask whether I am the same person as I was >five minutes ago, or whether a teleported copy of a rock is the same rock, is >to ask for a refined definition of the word "same". It is *our choice* as to >whether they are the same; whether we want "same" to mean that or not. So >many of these discussions seem to stem from this fundamental error of >assuming our words are universals. If an electron disappears and one >with the same qualities shows up elsewhere simultaneously, are they the same? >Well, aside from the non-existence of simultaneity and the fact that they >differ enough in the quality of location that we were forced to ask the >question in the first place, how do you tell? What does it mean for them to >be the same? An electron is the same as itself, but beyond that it is all >linguistics. Saying "it disappeared from A and it showed up at B" and "one >disappeared from A and one just like it showed up at B" are equivalent >discriptions. They both adequately describe the observed phenomenon. But, >since sameness is not an observable or measureable quality, in fact is not a >quality at all, neither description is more "true" than the other. [ellis] OK, sameness is not a very scientific concept, as cleverly argue. But is it a philosophical concept? Subjectively, it most definitely is. I believe our sense of sameness in the face of change is due to the singular history of personal experience we each have, and our dream states reinforce this. Birth, deep sleep and death are the major discontinuities. It is most reasonable that a hardcore science advocate would deny any extension as unjustifiable. My more cautious mathematical background leaves me philosophically undecided, although as a practical matter I will live this life as though it were the only one I had. Clearly Hindus, Christians etc. have a different opinion. >[balter] >To reduce the mind to mere information is misleading. >I think the best analogy is mind to process (computer science sense), >brain to computer running a specific (powerful problem-solving) program, >and input to input. Of course a process is non-physical, just as a mind is, >but it isn't *separate* from the physical. You cannot extract out the >process; you can only repeat it. [ellis] I do not understand -- a computer CAN be halted, the desired memory locations transferred to alternate media, subsequently reloaded possibly on other hardware, and restarted where execution previously was stopped. If that's not extracting a process, then we have a clear language obstacle. A more successful approach, I would think, would be a direct assault on the basic nonsimilarity between digital and brain hardware. >[balter] >..And in any case, I cannot see what this has to do with religion; >there are plenty of religious people who have a mechanical view of >human consciousness. [ellis] For that metter, there are many in the scientific community who see fail to accept a mechanical view of the physical universe, humans included: "Mechanism in fact is at a complete loss to in front of such experimental "properties as identity and specificity of atomic aggregates... "We find definite "qualities" in the atomic world where we expected "quantitative differences.. "If matter is not the same as extension, mechanism collapses on this very "score, and the problem, and the problem of stability and structure of "matter, including extension itself, arises again in all its complexity. -- Enrico Cantore, "Atomic Order" -michael