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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Sc--nce Attack (self-awareness)
Message-ID: <1858@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 8-Oct-85 13:20:17 EDT
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1858
Posted: Tue Oct  8 13:20:17 1985
Date-Received: Fri, 11-Oct-85 07:12:30 EDT
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Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week
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>>>     Are we only external behavior? Why are we not also internal sensation?
>>>     Why do you deny what you experience? Skinnerism may be a useful
>>>     laboratory methodology, but is it the complete truth?[Ellis]

>>Or is the wishful mysticalism the complete truth?  Or something else?[Rosen]

> This is hardly an answer to the question.  [MOODY]

Nor is your statement.  But I was unaware that such rhetorical questions
(as mine are, too) required answers.

>>> 	As long as it only simulates the
>>> 	formal structure of the sequence of neural firings at synapses, it
>>> 	won't have simulated what matters about the brain, namely its causal
>>> 	properties, its ability to produce intentional states. [Searle, quoted
>>>     by Ellis]

>>How could that be?  Why isn't that property a part of the "sequence of neural
>>firings of synapses"? [Rosen]

> Read it again.  Searle is arguing that the "causal properties" of the brain
> are not obtained by merely simulating the FORMAL STRUCTURE of the neural
> activity.  By "formal structure", Searle means something quite precise.
> The formal structure of the brain is the Turing machine algorithm that
> it is instantiating.  This formal structure is what functionalists claim
> is the essence of mind; to be in a mental state is to instantiate a
> Turing program-type.  If you miss the "formal structure" part, that would
> lead you to a naive version of the Identity Thesis: mental states are
> just brain states.  This thesis entails, of course, that only brains
> (and not computers, for example) could have mental states.  If you
> believe that other systems could have mental states, then you are
> asserting that these other systems have something in common with brains,
> namely their formal structure.  Searle argues against both functionalism
> and the identity thesis (and dualism, as Ellis correctly pointed out).

It sounds mighty presumptive to assert that computers could not be designed
to accurately simulate all of this.  Why not?  Why do some people INSIST
with such vigor that there MUST be something about the brain that IS ipso
facto different that can NEVER be reproduced.  It's working backwards from
a conclusion, it's wishful thinking, it's totally unfounded in fact, it's
boldly and blatantly anthropocentric.

>>> 	No one would suppose that we could produce milk and sugar by running
>>> 	a computer simulation of the formal sequences in lactation and
>>> 	photosythesis; but where the mind is concerned, many people are
>>> 	willing to believe in such a miracle, because of ... a deep and
>>> 	abiding dualism: the mind they suppose is a matter of specific
>>> 	material causes in a way that milk and sugar are not.

>>Why is this a valid analogy?  If the right materials are used and the right
>>processes are achieved, those things can certainly be produced.  Why (again)
>>the brain/mind as exception to the rule? [Rosen]

> The whole point of functionalism is that mental states are substrate-
> independent; that they can be simulated -- AND HENCE INSTANTIATED --
> without respect to the physical ingredients of the system.  There
> are not, according to functionalists, supposed to be any "right
> materials" for minds.

First, I see no reason why others would put such a restriction on functionalism
as this.  Just as you would find it mighty hard to make a computer out of
swiss cheese (though certain companies that shall rename mainless make a good
go of it), certain materials are applicable to different tasks.  The question
is along the lines of "what would it mean to 'simulate' milk?"  If certain
actions occur owing to the material, can those actions be simulated?  I
say "why not?"

>>> 	To say that an agent is conscious of the conditions of satifaction
>>> 	of his conscious beliefs and desires is not to say that he has to
>>> 	have second order intenional states about his first order states of
>>> 	belief and desire. If it were, we would indeed get an infinite
>>> 	regress.  Rather, the consciousness of the conditions of
>>> 	satisfaction is part of the conscious belief or desire, since the
>>> 	intentional content is internal to the states in question. [Searle,
>>>     quoted by Ellis]

>>So, because this would represent an "infinite regress" (by this
>>interpretation), it simply cannot be? [Rosen]

> It would apparently require an infinite nesting of discrete states in
> a physical system, which is certainly unlikely.

Or recursion and self-referentiality.

>>>   The very fact that strict behaviorists deny mental states only magnifies
>>>   the issue. We can imagine Skinnerian robots exhibiting complex functions
>>>   without the need for internal states. This secondary phantom world does
>>>   not seem to be logically necessary. But it is not merely an artifice of
>>>   our culture -- every culture has evolved similar notions of an internal
>>>   noumenal world. [Ellis, I think]

>>So?  Every culture has had religions.  Every culture (up until recently)
>>has held slaves and made wars.  So?

> What is the point of this rejoinder?  Do you deny that there is such a
> thing as internal subjective experience?

The point is rather clear, I would think.  Just because every culture has
evolved similar notions does not make those notions valid.  (This sounds a
lot like arguing with those who insist that conformity is "intrinsic" because
every culture has valued it.)

>>"Given that common sense is [SUPPOSEDLY] common, why have a department devoted
>>to it? My answer would be quite simple:  In our lives we are continually
>>encountering strange new situations in which we have to figure out how to
>>apply what we already know. It is not enough to have common sense about known
>>situations; we need also to develop the art of extending common sense to apply
>>to apply to [NEW] situations. ... Common sense, once it starts to roll,
>>gathers more common sense, like a rolling snowball gathering ever more snow.
>>Or, to switch metaphors, if we apply common sense to itself over and over
>>again, we wind up building a skyscraper. The ground floor of this skyscraper
>>is the ordinary common sense we all have, and the rules for building new
>>floors are implicit in the ground floor itself. ...
>>Pretty soon, even though it has all been built up from common ingredients, the
>>structure of this extended common sense is quite arcane and elusive. We might
>>call ths quality represented by the upper floors of the skyscraper "rare
>>sense", but it is usually called [ARE YOU READY, ELLIS?] "science". And some
>>of the ideas and discoveries that have come out of this ... ability defy the
>>ground floor totally. The ideas of relativity and quantum mechanics are
>>anything but commonsensical, in the ground floor sense of the term!  They are
>>outcomes of common sense self-applied.  [DOES THIS MEAN, BY THE QUOTE ELLIS
>>USES ABOVE THAT HE WOULD THROW OUT THE ANTI-COMMONSENSICAL QM, THUS
>>EFFICIENTLY DISPOSING OF ALL HIS LITTLE THEORIES?]"
>>		---excerpted from "World Views in Collision:  The Skeptical
>>			Inquirer vs. the National Enquirer" by D. Hofstadter,
>>			SciAm 2/82, reproduced in Metamagical Themas
                        [quoted by Rosen]

> Don't forget that common sense is completely grounded in subjectivity -- 
> the way things *seem* to creatures such as ourselves.  "Common sense" is
> a term that we use to dignify our most entrenched prejudices about reality.
> Science indeed builds upon this most subjective foundation.  The problems
> emerge when the results at the top of the skyscraper *contradict* the
> "given" of common sense upon which the whole structure is built.  QM is a
> fine example of this, and so is Russell's Paradox.

Oh, really?  Is common sense really a series of prejudices about reality?
Or is it an examination of the things are, how certain things behave and how
other things may get in the way of accurate observation, and what should be
done about this (coupled with elementary logic)?

>>In fact, philosophers (it seems) sometimes build their own definitions of
>>semantics and language, so that they can, in a meta- sense, manipulate the
>>very "veracity" of their own axioms. [Rosen]

> As I've said before, the meanings of philosophically interesting terms, such
> as "free will" are not "given" in any univocal source.  These terms are used
> in various contexts to talk about subject matters that are of interest to
> people.  The philosopher's mission, should he decide to accept it, is to
> *discover* the definition(s) most consistent with the current state of
> knowledge.  You have been challenged many times to show that (you know,
> give an argument) that yours is the only legitimate definition of
> "free will."  You've yet to do so.

Mine.  The one *I* made up.  Yes, mine.  Rather than the ones that people in
this newsgroup (along with their choice philosophers) have made up in
opposition to what people have meant by the term in order to "get" a result
to "exist".  Do you remember when Paul Torek asked me to "prove" that there
was ANYONE, anyone at all in the world, who held "my" definition of free will
and understood the implications I claimed that definition had?  How ironic
that the first person (actually, the second) I spoke to said (without even
being asked directly) "but isn't free will the notion that your choice are
not determined by your chemistry, thus implying a soul of some sort?"  And
so did most other people I asked who cared to offer any opinion at all on
the subject.  No, popular consensus does not determine the facts about
physical reality, but popular consensus DOES most certainly determine the
meanings of words in language.  Are you claiming that "free will" is a
"technical" term, in the way that scientists might designate a technical
definition for the word "charm" (as related to quarks)?  Did the scientists
in so doing ALTER the existing popular definition of the word "charm"?  Take
the time to recognize that that is EXACTLY what you "philosophers" are trying
to do.  Language belongs to the people, not to select groups in ivory towers
who change meanings of words at their whim without regard for how words are
used by PEOPLE.

It's a good thing I am not where my copy of Annotated Alice is, otherwise
I'd waste time copying yet another set of interesting comments about the
HumptyDumpty tale that will be roundly ignored a second time.
-- 
Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen.
					Rich Rosen    pyuxd!rlr