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From: tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Sc--nce Attack (self-awareness)
Message-ID: <2372@sjuvax.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 12-Oct-85 00:23:20 EDT
Article-I.D.: sjuvax.2372
Posted: Sat Oct 12 00:23:20 1985
Date-Received: Mon, 14-Oct-85 03:39:30 EDT
References: <45200016@hpfcms.UUCP> <1605@pyuxd.UUCP>
Reply-To: tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody)
Organization: St. Joseph's University, Phila. PA.
Lines: 198
Summary: 

In article <1858@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:

As long as it only simulates the
formal structure of the sequence of neural firings at synapses, it
won't have simulated what matters about the brain, namely its causal
properties, its ability to produce intentional states. [Searle, quoted
by Ellis]

>>>How could that be?  Why isn't that property a part of the "sequence of neural
>>>firings of synapses"? [Rosen]
>
>> Read it again.  Searle is arguing that the "causal properties" of the brain
>> are not obtained by merely simulating the FORMAL STRUCTURE of the neural
>> activity.  By "formal structure", Searle means something quite precise.
>> The formal structure of the brain is the Turing machine algorithm that
>> it is instantiating.  This formal structure is what functionalists claim
>> is the essence of mind; to be in a mental state is to instantiate a
>> Turing program-type.  If you miss the "formal structure" part, that would
>> lead you to a naive version of the Identity Thesis: mental states are
>> just brain states.  This thesis entails, of course, that only brains
>> (and not computers, for example) could have mental states.  If you
>> believe that other systems could have mental states, then you are
>> asserting that these other systems have something in common with brains,
>> namely their formal structure.  Searle argues against both functionalism
>> and the identity thesis (and dualism, as Ellis correctly pointed out).
>
>It sounds mighty presumptive to assert that computers could not be designed
>to accurately simulate all of this.  Why not?  Why do some people INSIST
>with such vigor that there MUST be something about the brain that IS ipso
>facto different that can NEVER be reproduced.  It's working backwards from
>a conclusion, it's wishful thinking, it's totally unfounded in fact, it's
>boldly and blatantly anthropocentric.

First of all, Searle doesn't insist that mental states cannot be simulated;
nor did I claim that he did.  What Searle claims is that simulating the
formal structure of a brain is not a sufficient condition for a thing's
being a mind.  And he doesn't just claim it; he *argues* for the con-
clusion.  Clearly, you do not know Searle's work; that does not stop
you from ranting about his motivations.  Let me just explain this much
about Searle's argument: he distinguishes the brain's "causal powers"
from its "formal structure".  The causal powers of an entity include its
complete biological repertoire, contingent upon its status as an evolved
entity.  Searle's point is that mental states depend upon these causal
powers and are thus not brought about by a mere formal structure
simulation.  Searle has not claimed that there is something about the
brain that can never be reproduced.  He has only argued that by
simulating its formal structure you haven't done enough to get
what could be called a mind.

>>>> 	No one would suppose that we could produce milk and sugar by running
>>>> 	a computer simulation of the formal sequences in lactation and
>>>> 	photosythesis; but where the mind is concerned, many people are
>>>> 	willing to believe in such a miracle, because of ... a deep and
>>>> 	abiding dualism: the mind they suppose is a matter of specific
>>>> 	material causes in a way that milk and sugar are not.

>> The whole point of functionalism is that mental states are substrate-
>> independent; that they can be simulated -- AND HENCE INSTANTIATED --
>> without respect to the physical ingredients of the system.  There
>> are not, according to functionalists, supposed to be any "right
>> materials" for minds. [Moody]
>
>First, I see no reason why others would put such a restriction on functionalism
>as this.  Just as you would find it mighty hard to make a computer out of
>swiss cheese (though certain companies that shall rename mainless make a good
>go of it), certain materials are applicable to different tasks.  The question
>is along the lines of "what would it mean to 'simulate' milk?"  If certain
>actions occur owing to the material, can those actions be simulated?  I
>say "why not?" [Rosen]

This is not about engineering.  In principle, you can make a computer out
of swiss cheese.  In fact, its cholesterol content is probably comparable
to that of the human brain (don't worry, that's just a bit of irrelevant
trivia).  I think we understand each other on this point.

>>>> 	To say that an agent is conscious of the conditions of satifaction
>>>> 	of his conscious beliefs and desires is not to say that he has to
>>>> 	have second order intenional states about his first order states of
>>>> 	belief and desire. If it were, we would indeed get an infinite
>>>> 	regress.  Rather, the consciousness of the conditions of
>>>> 	satisfaction is part of the conscious belief or desire, since the
>>>> 	intentional content is internal to the states in question. [Searle,
>>>>     quoted by Ellis]
>
>>>So, because this would represent an "infinite regress" (by this
>>>interpretation), it simply cannot be? [Rosen]
>
>> It would apparently require an infinite nesting of discrete states in
>> a physical system, which is certainly unlikely.
>
>Or recursion and self-referentiality.

If you have a infinte nesting of feedback loops in a system, you have
more than just recursion or self-reference.  You've got problems.

>>>>   The very fact that strict behaviorists deny mental states only magnifies
>>>>   the issue. We can imagine Skinnerian robots exhibiting complex functions
>>>>   without the need for internal states. This secondary phantom world does
>>>>   not seem to be logically necessary. But it is not merely an artifice of
>>>>   our culture -- every culture has evolved similar notions of an internal
>>>>   noumenal world. [Ellis, I think]
>
>>>So?  Every culture has had religions.  Every culture (up until recently)
>>>has held slaves and made wars.  So? [Rosen]
>
>> What is the point of this rejoinder?  Do you deny that there is such a
>> thing as internal subjective experience? [Moody]
>
>The point is rather clear, I would think.  Just because every culture has
>evolved similar notions does not make those notions valid. [Rosen]

Yes, *that* point is clear.  But why do you bring it up?  Is it because
you deny that there is such a thing as subjective experience.  Ellis's
only point here is that the concept of an "inner" or "mental" life is
not simply a by-product of a particular culture.  Do you deny this? 

>> Don't forget that common sense is completely grounded in subjectivity -- 
>> the way things *seem* to creatures such as ourselves.  "Common sense" is
>> a term that we use to dignify our most entrenched prejudices about reality.
>> Science indeed builds upon this most subjective foundation.  The problems
>> emerge when the results at the top of the skyscraper *contradict* the
>> "given" of common sense upon which the whole structure is built.  QM is a
>> fine example of this, and so is Russell's Paradox. [Moody]
>
>Oh, really?  Is common sense really a series of prejudices about reality?
>Or is it an examination of the things are, how certain things behave and how
>other things may get in the way of accurate observation, and what should be
>done about this (coupled with elementary logic)? [Rosen]

Is this another rhetorical question?  Never mind; I'll answer it.  I
would say that common sense *is* a series of prejudices about reality.
I thank you for throwing in the word "series", as it helps to suggest
that common sense is not a static set of beliefs.  Somebody on this
net has a signature quote that is: "Common sense is what tells you
that a ten pound weight falls ten times faster than a one pound
weight."  The flatness of the earth was once common sense, as was the
axiomatizability of arithmetic (at least this was the common sense of
uncommon people: mathematicians).  Determinism is common sense.  When
scientific results contradict common sense (e.g., twin paradox), then
something must yield.  Frequently, it is common sense.  Hence, the
term "prejudice".

>>>In fact, philosophers (it seems) sometimes build their own definitions of
>>>semantics and language, so that they can, in a meta- sense, manipulate the
>>>very "veracity" of their own axioms. [Rosen]
>
>> As I've said before, the meanings of philosophically interesting terms, such
>> as "free will" are not "given" in any univocal source.  These terms are used
>> in various contexts to talk about subject matters that are of interest to
>> people.  The philosopher's mission, should he decide to accept it, is to
>> *discover* the definition(s) most consistent with the current state of
>> knowledge.  You have been challenged many times to show that (you know,
>> give an argument) that yours is the only legitimate definition of
>> "free will."  You've yet to do so. [Moody]
>
>Mine.  The one *I* made up.  Yes, mine.  Rather than the ones that people in
>this newsgroup (along with their choice philosophers) have made up in
>opposition to what people have meant by the term in order to "get" a result
>to "exist".  Do you remember when Paul Torek asked me to "prove" that there
>was ANYONE, anyone at all in the world, who held "my" definition of free will
>and understood the implications I claimed that definition had?  How ironic
>that the first person (actually, the second) I spoke to said (without even
>being asked directly) "but isn't free will the notion that your choice are
>not determined by your chemistry, thus implying a soul of some sort?"  And
>so did most other people I asked who cared to offer any opinion at all on
>the subject.  No, popular consensus does not determine the facts about
>physical reality, but popular consensus DOES most certainly determine the
>meanings of words in language.  Are you claiming that "free will" is a
>"technical" term, in the way that scientists might designate a technical
>definition for the word "charm" (as related to quarks)?  Did the scientists
>in so doing ALTER the existing popular definition of the word "charm"?  Take
>the time to recognize that that is EXACTLY what you "philosophers" are trying
>to do.  Language belongs to the people, not to select groups in ivory towers
>who change meanings of words at their whim without regard for how words are
>used by PEOPLE.[Rosen]

I have never doubted that YOURS (the one you use) is one historically
salient definition of "free will."  I deny that it is the *only* one.
Popular consensus detrmines some of the meanings of some words, I
agree.  But even there, you are on thin ice.  One very popular meaning
of "free will" is simply "absence of direct external coercion or
constraint" (as opposed to your "absence of *all* physical
determinants).  This is why it makes sense to ask "Did you resign of
your own free will, or were you forced to?"  Nobody who asks such a
question could have your definition in mind.  In addition, it is a
matter of record that Hume, Locke, Leibniz and Hobbes explicitly
rejected your kind of definition of "free will".  Does that make your
definition "wrong" and their definitions "right"?  No.  But it makes
your claim that yours is the only possible, meaningful or legitimate
definition wrong.  We philosophers -- and I wish I could count you
among us -- do not change language at our whim; we examine it in order
to learn better ways to talk about the world.


Todd Moody       {allegra|astrovax|bpa|burdvax}!sjuvax!tmoody
Philosophy Department
St. Joseph's U.
Philadelphia, PA   19131