Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.ARPA
Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ihnp4!ucbvax!ucbernie!tedrick
From: tedrick@ucbernie.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: Sc--nce Attack (self-awareness)
Message-ID: <10675@ucbvax.ARPA>
Date: Wed, 16-Oct-85 16:22:29 EDT
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.10675
Posted: Wed Oct 16 16:22:29 1985
Date-Received: Fri, 18-Oct-85 00:17:52 EDT
References: <1949@aecom.UUCP>
Sender: usenet@ucbvax.ARPA
Reply-To: tedrick@ucbernie.UUCP (Tom Tedrick)
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
Lines: 21

>> My understanding is that Godel's incompleteness theorems prove
>> (assuming the consistency of Arithmetic) that no Turing machine
>> can possibly simulate the human mind.
>
>What Godel's theorem says is that if one assumes Math to be 
>consistent, it must be incomplete. Thus, a Turing machine is
>either inconsistant or incomplete. Who ever said the brain is 
>consistant or complete? Why is it outside the realm of Turing 
>Machines?
>
>                            Micha Berger

I claim that if we make the consistency assumption, and assume
that the mind is equivalent to a Turing machine, we get a
contradiction in that there are true statements recognizable
by the mind which are not recognizable by the machine.
Maybe I'm wrong but if I am I hope someone can explain to
me why I am wrong.

   -Tom
    tedrick@ucbernie.ARPA