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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: Sc--nce Attack (self-awareness)
Message-ID: <1920@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 19-Oct-85 00:26:51 EDT
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Posted: Sat Oct 19 00:26:51 1985
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>>> My understanding is that Godel's incompleteness theorems prove
>>> (assuming the consistency of Arithmetic) that no Turing machine
>>> can possibly simulate the human mind. [TEDRICK]

>>What Godel's theorem says is that if one assumes Math to be 
>>consistent, it must be incomplete. Thus, a Turing machine is
>>either inconsistant or incomplete. Who ever said the brain is 
>>consistant or complete? Why is it outside the realm of Turing 
>>Machines? [BERGER]

> I claim that if we make the consistency assumption, and assume
> that the mind is equivalent to a Turing machine, we get a
> contradiction in that there are true statements recognizable
> by the mind which are not recognizable by the machine.
> Maybe I'm wrong but if I am I hope someone can explain to
> me why I am wrong. [TEDRICK]

I'll repeat this because it may not have gotten out the first time.
To keep it simple, ask a machine whether sentence 'G' is true, where
sentence G is "You will never say that this sentence, sentence 'G', is true."
The machine cannot answer it (any answer it gives will be incorrect).
A deathblow to the intelligence of machines!  Hurrah!  Great.  Now ask
the same thing of a human being.
-- 
Meanwhile, the Germans were engaging in their heavy cream experiments in
Finland, where the results kept coming out like Swiss cheese...
				Rich Rosen 	ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr