Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site scirtp.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!mcnc!rti-sel!scirtp!todd From: todd@scirtp.UUCP (Todd Jones) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Soviet Conventional Offensive Capability, an unConventional view Message-ID: <479@scirtp.UUCP> Date: Mon, 7-Oct-85 12:41:48 EDT Article-I.D.: scirtp.479 Posted: Mon Oct 7 12:41:48 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 9-Oct-85 03:45:26 EDT References: <1173@ames.UUCP> Distribution: net Organization: SCI Systems, Research Triangle Park, NC Lines: 112 Interesting thesis. I would like to make a few observations. > THESIS: Soviet conventional offensive capability is very small > > DATA: > > 1. After six years of failure the Soviets have not significantly increased > their force in Afganistan from about 100,000. I have read different reports that run the gamut from the Soviets efficiently crushing all Afgan "rebels" to the Soviets not being able to make any headway at all. I suspect the latter is closer to the truth since the Soviets could use the propaganda boost of their army being more than a match for Rambo. > 2. When the Wermacht invaded the USSR on 22 June 1941 the Red Army was > vastly superior in numbers of men, tanks, and aircraft. The Germans > went through the Red Army like a hot knife through butter. That was loooooong ago considering the advances in war technology. > 3. According to Aviation Week and Space Technology, the vast majority > of Russia's military budget is spent on defense. Interestingly, the > same article stated that only 3% of DOD's budget is spent on defense > of the US. Maybe so, but there is a huge grey line between defense and offense, especially when you consider the USSR spans the largest continental mass. The USSR, being motivated by paranoia more than anything, conceives of all offense as defense. > 4. There is some evidence that Russia did not invade Poland because mobilization > of the reserves failed. So many soldier went AWOL that the regime was > unable to punish them or put an invasion together. Note that this occured > (assuming it did in fact happen) while Soviet forces were engaged in > Afganistan. This seems dubious. What are your sources? Poland seemed to do a pretty good job of crushing dissent without Soviet assistance. Why should the Soviets appear like bullies if they don't have to? > 5. The Soviet Navy is divided by geography into four separate forces > that cannot support each other. This allowed a smaller Japanese Navy > to sink most of the Russian fleet around the turn of the century. Again, war technology is so different now, how can we compare events 45 years ago to capabilities of today? > RESONING: > > We are all familiar with the enormous physical resources of the Red Army. > As data point 2 above indicates, this does not necessarily imply a strong > military. > > This brings us to data point 1. Why doesn't Russia simply > send a couple million soldier into Afganstan and win? Perhaps they > are not capable of such an effort. They must keep large forces on the > Chinese boarder and more forces in Eastern Europe to protect against NATO. > Please don't give me a rap about NATO never attacking. Russia has > suffered three major invasions from Western Europe in the last two centuries, > Napoleon once and Germany twice. To leave that boarder weakly defended > would be idiotic. I doubt NATO would ever attack, but I concede the Soviets assume it's very possible. > Data point 4 suggests that, with the Afgan invasion > in progress, even Poland could not be subdued. Poland, under Soviet domination has enjoyed much greater freedom than citizens in the USSR have. It is bad press for the Soviets to invade, so why bother when they have to? I know, world opinion hasn't always detered them, but they seem more concerned with it now. > Data point 3 suggests that the Soviet military is primarily defensive. > > Data point 5 indicates that, if push came to shove, the shiny new > Russian Navy is mostly an expensive mass grave. If push comes to shove, the Soviets would be able to use non-conventional arms. > This evidence and logic suggests that the USSR has about 100,000 men > available for offensive operations; alternately, they can only supply > that many beyond their boarders. Contrast this to the half million we > supported in Vietnam. This suggests (loosely at best) that the Soviets are WILLING to deploy 100,000 troops offensively, beyond however many troops are poised on the border of whatever country they would hypothetically invade. If they have half a million troops (I think this might be near the range of pseudo-accuracy) on the Western edge of the Warsaw Pact, this would mean an offensive force of 600,000 could be mustered for an invasion. > If this data and logic are correct, the bogeyman of Soviet conventional > might DOD has used to get billions out of our pockets doesn't seem > quite so scary. Their ICBM fleet can, of course, kill us all. Sweet > dreams. This last paragraph is largely true, but for somewhat different reasons. If we can overkill the Soviets by a factor of 20 and they can overkill us by a factor of 30 (or whatever) who cares what their conventional forces can do? We'll all melt into little puddles in the end. ||||||| || || [ x-x ] Todd Jones \ L / {decvax,akgua}!mcnc!rti-sel!scirtp!todd | ^ | |___| SCI Systems Inc. doesn't necessarily agree with Todd.