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From: usenet@ucbvax.ARPA (USENET News Administration)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: Soviet Conventional Offensive Capability, an unConventional view
Message-ID: <10618@ucbvax.ARPA>
Date: Fri, 11-Oct-85 06:18:54 EDT
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.10618
Posted: Fri Oct 11 06:18:54 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 12-Oct-85 08:16:58 EDT
References: <1173@ames.UUCP> <10534@ucbvax.ARPA> <1182@ames.UUCP>
Reply-To: tedrick@ucbernie.UUCP (Tom Tedrick)
Distribution: net
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
Lines: 60

I can agree with most of what was said. A couple
of points seemed worth further discussion.

>>>The Soviet Navy is divided by geography into four separate forces
>>>that cannot support each other.  This allowed a smaller Japanese Navy
>>>to sink most of the Russian fleet around the turn of the century.
>> I seem to recall that an intelligence leak played a role there.
>A role perhaps, although the book I read on the conflict recently did
>not mention any leak.  A look at any map will illustrait my point quite
>well, geography gives Russia an incredible disadvantage in a naval conflict.

I would be interested in the name of the book you read
(so I can read it also).

I have done a lot of studying of intelligence leaks in WW1/WW2.
(an article should appear in the proceedings of Eurocrypt 85
 when they are finally published). Many authors have apparently
 underestimated the significance of intelligence leaks.
 The role of such leaks in the Russo-Japanese war might be worth
 investigating further. I only recall 2 references to this,
 both of which I encountered pretty much at random.
 Usually it takes a lot of reading to dig up information on
 such things (a 500 page book for a 1 paragraph reference or so  ...)

>However it is unwise to double your national debt, become a debtor nation,
>and run out of money in part because of $300 billion plus defense budgets 
>unless there is a real threat.  We have done all these things and they
>weaken us.

This is a very interesting point. It might seem true on
the face of it, but I wonder if money isn't essentially a convenient
fiction, and if the "real" power gained from budget busting "defense"
spending more than offsets any paper debts incurred. I think that the
relation between "real power" and nominal wealth isn't fully understood.

(However, don't say I didn't warn anyone if 4 or 5 years from now
the whole economic house of cards collapses. But I bet it will be due
to incompetent leaders who won't know how to handle massive debt,
inflation, etc. rather than an inevitable consequence of current
fiscal policies.)

>> The Soviets are very shrewd, patient and careful. They seem to
>> pick on the weakest points where they can achieve maximal gains
>> with minimal risks. 
>They also are very inefficient and fairly corrupt.  Their people do
>not speak a common language and there is widespread disaffection with
>the regime.  All of this reduces their offensive military ability.

Yes (although the Soviet capacity to mobilize resources 
in case of a threat should not be underestimated).
This brings up an interesting question. How does one deal
with such a regime? Obviously it is too risky to attack them.
My speculation is that we should try to de-escalate surface
tensions as much as possible, at the same time being as strong
as possible underneath, while emphasizing that we are not
a direct threat to them. This in the hope that by not "poking the bear
with a stick", it will "go into hibernation", and eventually
evolve into a country we can relate to with less conflict
(i.e. let them sink into inefficiency, corruption and inertia
without arousing them from their slumber by threatening them).