Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.ARPA Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!ucbvax!usenet From: usenet@ucbvax.ARPA (USENET News Administration) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Soviet Conventional Offensive Capability, an unConventional view Message-ID: <10619@ucbvax.ARPA> Date: Fri, 11-Oct-85 07:03:37 EDT Article-I.D.: ucbvax.10619 Posted: Fri Oct 11 07:03:37 1985 Date-Received: Sat, 12-Oct-85 08:17:17 EDT References: <1173@ames.UUCP> <12065@rochester.UUCP> <1183@ames.UUCP> Reply-To: tedrick@ucbernie.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) Distribution: net Organization: University of California, Berkeley Lines: 48 >Repeating data point 1, although the Red Army was much larger >by most measures than the Wermacht in WWI the Germans did very well for the >first two years. OK, you have hit upon one of my favorite topics. (Why were the Germans defeated in the east?) Often they were outnumbered on the order of 10 to 1 (very roughly) on the eastern front during the latter part of the war. Still, they had chances for a stalemate. The reasons they failed to achieve this are many. Hitler took away tactical and operational freedom from local commanders (the commander on the battlefield has direct perception of local conditions and should be free to react accordingly, in order to make optimal use of temporary opportunities, etc. Also lack of freedom to take initiative is demoralizing.) Hitler refused to allow construction of defensive positions in rear areas for unsound reasons. He forced the German forces to fight a static war instead of a war of movement (this despite the fact the Germany's strength was in mobile warfare, while the Soviets were strongest in the more brutal and primitive kinds of combat). Hitler was often too remote from the battlefield to make correct judgements. Defensive weapons (i.e. anti-tank guns) were neglected in favor of offensive weapons (tanks), in contradiction to the advice of Rommel, etc. But the real joker in the deck was the fact that the Soviets were given access (by the Western powers) to a great deal of the encrypted information that the Germans were transmitting, including nearly everything important such as orders, plans, troop strength, etc. Without this intelligence leak Germany might well have stalemated or beaten the Soviets. From the point of view of military theory, insufficient recognition of the value and correctness of the German methods of conducting mobile warfare has been one of the results. Also the ability of a numerically smaller force which is skilled in mobile mechanized warfare to defeat a much larger force not so skilled has been partially overlooked. (All this may be academic since the advent of Atomic weapons though.) 2 examples: at Stalingrad the Soviet plan of encirclement was created and executed with full knowledge of German plans, etc. Von Manstein's relief attempt was cut off due to Soviet knowledge of his orders. at Kursk, knowing the German plan for the attack months in advance, the Soviets constructed an extremely thorough defensive system a hundred miles deep, to break the force of the attack (this was the largest tank battle in history, and the last German attempt to take the initiative in the east).