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From: janw@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Logic, fact, preference, and social
Message-ID: <28200162@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 8-Oct-85 21:37:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200162
Posted: Tue Oct  8 21:37:00 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 12-Oct-85 05:38:38 EDT
References: <234@umich.UUCP>
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Nf-From: inmet!janw    Oct  8 21:37:00 1985


> [torek@umich]
> ... My point is that libertarianism is
> unacceptable to any rational person.  The reason for this is that sometimes
> libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's
> dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when
> everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when coercion
> is used, and nobody's preference is irrational.

No, given the premise, conclusion does not follow. The fact  that
following  a  principle  (in  this  case  non-coercion) sometimes
yields a sub-optimal solution in particular situations does *not*
make  that  principle  unacceptable to any rational person. A ra-
tional person would  consider  the  alternatives:  (1)  following
another  principle - which might sometimes yield even worse solu-
tions or (2)  calculating  benefits  case  by  case  -  which  is
uneconomical,  and also (very important) makes one susceptible to
irrational biases and temptations of the moment; a principle  em-
bodied in habit is a safeguard.

E.g., an alcoholic forgoes a sip of wine that could do him
good, sticking to a larger determination to stop drinking.
His principle is momentarily suboptimal but not irrational.

Now substitute coercion for alcohol and society for the
alcoholic.

In particular, some rational people support the First Amendment,
which could not stand your kind of test.

		Jan Wasilewsky