Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: $Revision: 1.6.2.16 $; site inmet.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!philabs!cmcl2!harvard!think!inmet!nrh From: nrh@inmet.UUCP Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Logic, fact, preference, and social Message-ID: <28200163@inmet.UUCP> Date: Tue, 8-Oct-85 22:46:00 EDT Article-I.D.: inmet.28200163 Posted: Tue Oct 8 22:46:00 1985 Date-Received: Sat, 12-Oct-85 05:38:56 EDT References: <234@umich.UUCP> Lines: 187 Nf-ID: #R:umich:-23400:inmet:28200163:000:10058 Nf-From: inmet!nrh Oct 8 22:46:00 1985 >/* Written 3:33 pm Sep 28, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */ >In article <28200105@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes: >>>[...] (it gets fun now): whether a particular, conrete action is right >>>or wrong is an empirical fact about it, as are how much time it takes and >>>how many calories it expends. For example ([one] very much to the point), >>>whether it is right for me to support a given "social order" comes to >>>whether I would do so if I considered it rationally and with knowledge of >>>relevant information. [TOREK] >> >>The idea that a "particular action" is right or wrong according to >>some objective metric comparable to calories consumed or how long it >>takes strikes me as suspect. The idea that such a thing could be >>empirical is ludicrous, unless you consider yourself able either to >>discount potential completely, or evaluate it accurately. For >>example, how could one know empirically whether it was right to abort >>a particular fetus? [NAT HOWARD] > >If the person would have aborted it had she considered it rationally and with >relevant information, then her act was right. We know what rational consider- >ation of an issue means, namely consideration free of irrational mistakes. >"Relevant information" is that information which tends to motivate the woman >in question -- and the question of what information tends to motivate her >is an *empirical* question. Finally, though we (and she) might not know >the facts on some of the relevant issues -- for example, suppose that whether >the fetus has a nervous system is relevant information for her, but due to >insufficient scientific investigation we don't know whether it has one -- >still, the information is *empircally discoverable in principle*. Excuse me. Time to open the dictionary: Empirical adj.... 1. Relying or based solely on experiment and observation rather than theory (the empirical method) 2. relying or based on practical experience without reference to scientific principles (an empirical remedy) I'm assuming that the reason you cite (for example) the idea that a fetus might have a nervous system as important is because it determines something of how human a fetus is. Without venturing too far into the grounds of net.abortion, consider: the REASON a pregnant woman would like to know that is to avoid killing what she might define as a person. One might find out empirically that a fetus has a nervous system, but finding out whether it is a person must be forever beyond empiricism (just like finding out whether a person is good must be forever beyond physics). >I conclude that whether a particular act is right or wrong turns on several >questions, each one of which is empirical. Therefore, whether the act is >right is also an empirical question. I think you've confused "empirical questions" with "empirical answers". There pregnant woman cannot learn empirically (that is, by experiment) if her fetus is a person. She certainly cannot learn empirically whether (say) the fetus would have been a good person if allowed to develop UNLESS DEVELOPMENT IS ALLOWED. Hence there is NO empirical ANSWER to her question (should she abort) possible unless she does not abort. Catch-22, and thus there is (assuming that she wishes to have the baby only if it would be a good person) NO empirical basis for judgement. Why? Because crucial questions (to her) may not be answered by empirical means. Is this so hard to accept? I do not argue that there are no grounds for wrestling with her conscience here, merely that no experiment she can perform will give answers to the questions I have put in this (hypothetical) woman's head. > >>>[...] Effects on others will be weighted, relative to effects >>>on myself, according as I have reasons for considering them similarly or >>>differently. Some assignments of weights would be rationally indefensible; >>>for examples, giving no weight to others, or giving no weight to oneself. >> >>Bingo! You've agreed with me. So long as the assignments of weights are >>indefensible (and I doubt very much if you can find any that don't have >>some indefensible basis), there can be no "rational basis" for evaluating >>a social system [...] > >I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible. Not all. Some. >Here's an assignment that isn't: my assignment of equal weights. Excuse me, but are you assigning equal weights to the effects an action has on others and to yourself? If so, what rational or factual basis do you have for such an assignment? (In short, defend your assignment of equal weights on rational grounds, particularly in light of your (presumed) inability to know the impacts on others as well as you know the impacts on yourself). Come to think of it, you might post that to net.philosophy with a pointer here. >>>A moral viewpoint is downright irrational if (I do not say iff) it fulfills >>>both of the following conditions: it has no basis in logic or fact; a >>>principle that does have such basis can conflict with it. "Prisoners- >>>Dilemma" type situations show that when two or more people have different >>>objectives, coercion can sometimes make all parties better off. Since it is >>>compellingly rational that something should be done when it benefits >>>everyone and harms no one, any principle that would rule out coercion in >>>all such "Prisoners-Dilemma" situations MUST be incorrect. [...] >> >>Let's consider the "prisoner's dilemma" problem. By adding the element >>of coercion, you've added a second factor to be figured in with the >>ostensible payoff. > >Yes, that's exactly why coercion should be used. > >>[... but] some folks would rather spend the additional years in prison >>rather than have a military type tell them how to get out of it. [...] >> your assumption is that the years spent in prison are >>absolutely more important than the degree of interference from outside. > >No. You misunderstand my point. My point is that libertarianism is >unacceptable to any rational person. The reason for this is that sometimes >libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's >dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when >everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when coercion >is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. Excuse me, we've agreed that the weightings of things can be non-rationally chosen, so this point is nothing new -- the libertarian prefers no coercion to himself or others to the avoidance of the negative effects of the free-rider situation. Is this rational? It need not be -- it is an expression of HIS choice of weightings, which, like yours, need have no rational basis to be valid. >>>One more point and then I'll rest. If Nat Howard thinks it all comes down >>>to subjective, nonrational preferences, and knows (as he ought, in outline) >>>my values, why is he bothering trying to convince me to favor his favored >>>social order? >> >>You've mistaken my purpose in posting. I'm not trying to convince you >>and you alone. I'm trying to make a position clear to whoever cares to >>listen. > >Fine, but nobody else is going to listen to you either, except the "already >converted", so to speak. Gosh! I'm devastated! :-) >>>Is he engaging in ideological mystification -- pretending >>>that I have *reason* to change my mind, in hopes I won't catch on? >> >>[...] that preferences are irrational does not imply that they >>cannot be changed by logic. Irrational preferences may RESPOND to >>logic, but may not be shaped entirely by them. > >You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational". Love is nonrational, >in that it is not evoked by reason, but it is not irrational, because it >is not *contrary to reason*. That a Montague should love a Capulet was surely contrary to reason, but it's also one of the great love stories of all time. That one should kill oneself WITHOUT CHECKING to see if one's love is dead is scarcely reasonable, but here we have Paul Torek, ruler in hand, telling us that "love is not *contrary to reason*". >When I argue that libertarianism is >irrational, I am arguing that it is *contrary to* reason. > >I take the above to mean that nonrational preferences may respond to >logic. Thus, in arguing with me, Huybensz, etc., you hope to get us >to "respond" to logic. I'm sorry, but this is still ideological >mystification: if our preferences are nonrational, then we have no >compelling reason to have them "respond" to logic; and it is uncomfortable >to change one's preferences, especially one's politics. Back to you: if your preferences are nonrational, you do not *NEED* any compelling reason to have them "respond" to logic. To need such a reason would imply that your basis for preferences *IS* rational, which contradicts the hypothesis. There may be ideological mist around here, but little mystification (at least at my end). On the other hand, if your preferences ARE rational, then rational arguments should suffice to change them regardless of your irrational choices, and again, there is a point to my posting. >>Excuse me, but it seems to me that you tried to argue this about >>the non-coercion principle: that it had no basis in fact or reason. >>My point was that such principles tend to be chosen on irrational grounds, >>and that I didn't know of ANY such principles that followed purely from >>reason, or history, so that such a criticism applies to all such principles, >>and therefore the statement was nugatory. > >That is indeed what one of my points was, and your reply would be a good >one, if it were true that all such principles must be chosen on nonrational >grounds. That, however, is not the case. Moreover, even if it were the >case, my point about "ideological mystification" would still have bite. Okay, Paul. I invite you here to publish the rational justification of just one of the fundamental rules you live by. Your choice of weights would not be a bad one.