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From: nrh@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Logic, fact, preference, and social
Message-ID: <28200169@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 15-Oct-85 22:58:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200169
Posted: Tue Oct 15 22:58:00 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 19-Oct-85 05:27:29 EDT
References: <234@umich.UUCP>
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Nf-ID: #R:umich:-23400:inmet:28200169:000:12294
Nf-From: inmet!nrh    Oct 15 22:58:00 1985


>
>>  Time to open the dictionary:
>>Empirical adj.... 1. Relying or based solely
>>on experiment and observation rather than theory (the empirical method) 
>>2. relying or based on practical experience without reference to 
>>scientific principles (an empirical remedy) [NAT HOWARD]
>
>My usage may be incorrect, but I meant "empirical" to mean based on obser-
>vation, however indirectly (thus one *would* be able to appeal to a
>scientific theory and still have an "empirical" answer).

Shall I take it that we agree that your choice of words was wrong?

>
>> [...]  Without venturing too far into the grounds of net.abortion,
>>consider: the REASON a pregnant woman would like to know [whether a fetus
>>has a nervous system] is to avoid killing what she might define as a person.
>
>I don't like the word "person" here, it's too slippery.  The point to grasp
>here is that she has to come up with some directly applicable criterion.  In
>mentioning a nervous system I imagined that the woman in question is motivated
>to avoid killing a living thing that has sensations, and that she knows the 
>empirical evidence linking minds with nervous systems.
>
>>One might find out empirically that a fetus has a nervous system, but
>>finding out whether it is a person must be forever beyond empiricism ...
>
>Perhaps, but that just shows that asking "is it a person" is asking the
>wrong question.  (See some of my net.abortion stuff on this point.)

My point was that it's silly to talk about empirical answers to questions
beyond empiricism.  Such questions INCLUDE but are not limited to
considerations of the potential goodness or badness of a choice of
action, or adoption of a principle, such as reason, for the 
judgement of principles.

>>I think you've confused "empirical questions" with "empirical answers".
>>There pregnant woman cannot learn empirically (that is, by experiment)
>>if her fetus is a person.  She certainly cannot learn empirically
>>whether (say) the fetus would have been a good person if allowed to 
>>develop UNLESS DEVELOPMENT IS ALLOWED.  Catch-22 [...]
>
>It's true that there may be catch-22's in such decisions.  What can one
>say -- life's tough.  If she worries whether her baby would be a Mozart
>or a Hitler (a la the silly abortion arguments that go "what if Mozart
>had been aborted?" "Oh yeah, well what if Hitler had been?" etc.), then
>I suppose she has to rely on sketchy evidence such as the releative
>frequencies of heroes and villains in the past.

Right!  But these only give her theoretical grounds for making HER 
decision, not empirical ones.

>>Because crucial questions (to her) may not be answered by 
>>empirical means.  Is this so hard to accept?  
>
>Taking "empirical" as your dictionary defines it, I'll accept that.
>
>>>I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible.  Not all.  Some.
>>>Here's an assignment that isn't:  my assignment of equal weights.
>
>>Excuse me, but are you assigning equal weights to the effects an action
>>has on others and to yourself?  If so, what rational or factual basis
>>do you have for such an assignment? 
>
>You're excused.  :-> :->
>I think you're shifting the burden of argument here -- it's on the one who
>claims that a set of weightings is contrary to reason.  I met that burden
>regarding the weighting schemes I criticized.

I didn't claim that it was "contrary to reason", or, if I did,  I did
so wrongly and here apologize: what I meant was that no such set of
weightings can have a basis in  reason, because they precede reason.
Just for example, once one chooses to be reasonable, FURTHER
weightings may be considered on the basis of reason, but the CHOICE to
be reasonable (as opposed to  being guided by emotion or by zen-like
inner awareness) has itself no basis in reason.

I make no claim that libertarianism, or any other "ism" has a "basis"
in fact or reason, merely that no other set of fundamental beliefs
did, so that criticizing libertarianism on this ground is uninteresting,
as any position my be criticized on this grounds.  Let me add, however,
that I find libertarianism quite appealing to reason (but acknowledge that
many do not).

As for shifting the burden of proof: you've made the claim that 
libertarianism has no basis in fact or reason.  I've agreed, pointing
out that NO philosophy can have a "basis" in such things.  
If you argue that YOUR philosophy DOES have a basis in such things,
let's hear it, but I'd rather not attempt to prove negatives, except
by counterexample.

Let's have no wriggling here:  you state above:
>>>I said *SOME* assignments are rationally indefensible.  Not all.  Some.
>>>Here's an assignment that isn't:  my assignment of equal weights.

Well?  Defend it!  I would argue that you are not allowed to use such 
concepts as "other people's lives have importance" without establishing
them BY REASON.

>>>libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's
>>>dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when
>>>everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when coercion
>>>is used, and nobody's preference is irrational.
>...
>> we've agreed that the weightings of things can be non-rationally chosen,
>> so this point is nothing new -- the libertarian prefers no coercion to
>> himself or others to the avoidance of the negative effects of the 
>>free-rider situation.  Is this rational?  It need not be -- [...]
>
>I haven't agreed about that.  I think such a preference is not just 
>nonrational, but irrational:  it has no basis in observable harm to the
>libertarian or anyone else, *and conflicts with preferences that DO*. 

What "observable harm" is done to someone who is shown a swastika? A
parade of Nazis? A mutilated corpse? A retouched photo purporting to show
his mother having sex with an elephant?  None at all, of course!  

Certainly they may pale, they may react violently, but no wounds
are in evidence and no force is applied.  You might ask such a person:
Would you prefer prison (for say) a day to being (gently) forced to see such
a thing?  Some folks would answer "yes".  Is this contrary to reason? No.
Why?  Because the postulates behind their lives, their not-rationally-chosen
postulates determine that they would rather be confined for a day under
one set of circumstances than for a minute under another.  To argue
that their choice is "contrary to reason" misses the point: among their
*POSTULATES* are elements which make them prefer the "non-rational" 
choice, and for you to dismiss their right to their preference as 
irrational (as in "and nobody's preference is irrational")  is to 
ignore half the game -- the set of preferences which are irrational
but inescapable, which are as firmly rooted as reason itself in someone's
mind.
 
>Remember the situation is as described above; i.e. everyone
>prefers the outcome that results when coercion is applied in the
>free-rider situation, except that the libertarian disapproves of the 
>means used.  But why is it any more sensible to categorically disapprove
>of coercive means than to categorically disapprove of any means that 
>involves the use of (say) screwdrivers?
>

Let us instead use an example of (not chosen at random) milk with 
meat, instead of screwdrivers. Does it make sense for some people
to refuse to use such a combination in their cuisine (the combination
is non-kosher, and forbidden by religious law to some Jews).

It may make no sense to an observer who may not communicate with these
people, but must not their preference be respected, even though there
is no obvious material benefit to them?  And perhaps a loss, due to 
the higher prices of other meats with respect to (another non-kosher
thing) pork?

>If I understand Nat he would answer: "it isn't, but one doesn't need any
>reason for such preferences, one just has them or not; it's all subjective."
>I don't agree.  If a person categorically disapproves of the use of 
>screwdrivers, he will miss out (and/or cause others to miss out) on some of
>the genuinely good things in life.  The absence of screwdriver-use is, in
>contrast, not a genuinely good thing.  In other words, I am saying that some
>preferences are more rational than others -- not just in relation to other
>preferences (cf. preference transitivity in decision theory), but on 
>their own account.

So should Jews eat pork?  Is the eschewing of pork "not a genuinely
good thing"?  In a situation in which everyone would benefit if they
ate pork, (say that everyone were starving and it were the only
high-energy food available, and their strength was desirable), should
they be forced to eat it even if they'd rather eat (say) millet and be
weak?

>>>Fine, but nobody else is going to listen to you either, except the "already
>>>converted", so to speak.
>
>>Gosh!  I'm devastated! :-)
>
>Really now.  I suppose one might argue for the hell of it, but I for one
>would rather hold up agreement among participants as an ideal.

I was "devastated" because I don't believe you, and because of what
sounded to me like a "Oh yeah?" tone to your sentence.
I like the idea of ultimate agreement, but it's not the ultimate good.
By participants, do you count the people who do NOT speak as well?

>>>You are confusing "irrational" with "nonrational".  Love is nonrational,
>>>in that it is not evoked by reason, but it is not irrational, because it
>>>is not *contrary to reason*.  
>
>>That a Montague should love a Capulet was surely contrary to reason, but
>>it's also one of the great love stories of all time.  That one should
>>kill oneself WITHOUT CHECKING to see if one's love is dead is scarcely
>>reasonable, but here we have Paul Torek, ruler in hand, telling us that
>>"love is not *contrary to reason*".  
>
>Gimme a break.  Obviously love played a role in such errors, but wiser
>people could have made wiser choices -- even while feeling just as power-
>ful feelings.  To make an analogy, consider the definition of courage not
>as absence of fear, but as keeping one's head in the face of fear.

Let's consider Romeo and Juliet as being strangers (with but mild good
intentions towards each other).  Can you imagine Romeo taking any
important step that was predicated on Juliet being dead without
examining the "corpse"?  Possible I suppose, but so unlikely.....

Take it one level up.  It was surely contrary to reason for Romeo and
Juliet to love one another.  Their families were enemies.  The situation
was not practical, and thus for them to love each other was surely not
in their best (material, obvious, "empirical") interest.

>>Back to you: if your preferences are nonrational, you do not *NEED* any
>>compelling reason to have them "respond" to logic.  To need such a
>>reason would imply that your basis for preferences *IS* rational, which
>>contradicts the hypothesis.  
>
>True, but, as I pointed out before, changing one's preferences is 
>uncomfortable.  So while you may not NEED a reason to have them respond to
>logic, you HAVE one to have your preferences NOT respond to logic -- on the
>(hypothetical) hypothesis that preferences are by nature nonrational.

My point was that my arguing with you is a rational act even if I believe
your preferences have no ultimate basis in logic.  Especially if you
BELIEVE your beliefs to be grounded in reason, reason may have an impact.
If I wish, (for reasons of my own) to convince you of something, I may
employ reason fruitfully to do this.  

That your irrational preference for your own beliefs (if your beliefs
are truly irrational) will work against me doesn't mean that some other
force (perhaps a desire to have an open mind and to stick with reason
where possible) will more than overcome it.

>>>... your reply would be a good
>>>one, if it were true that all such principles must be chosen on nonrational
>>>grounds.  That, however, is not the case.  Moreover, even if it were the
>>>case, my point about "ideological mystification" would still have bite.
>
>>Okay, Paul.  I invite you here to publish the rational justification of
>>just one of the fundamental rules you live by.  Your choice of weights
>>would not be a bad one.
>
>A fair challenge, I must admit.  OK, stay tuned to net.philosophy...
>"coming soon to a theater near you!"