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From: tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch)
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Logic, fact, preference, and social
Message-ID: <338@ubvax.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 17-Oct-85 19:35:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: ubvax.338
Posted: Thu Oct 17 19:35:00 1985
Date-Received: Mon, 21-Oct-85 07:11:19 EDT
References: <234@umich.UUCP> <28200162@inmet.UUCP>
Reply-To: tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch)
Organization: Ungermann-Bass, Inc., Santa Clara, Ca.
Lines: 58

In article <28200162@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes:
>The fact that
>following  a  principle  (in  this  case  non-coercion) sometimes
>yields a sub-optimal solution in particular situations does *not*
>make  that  principle  unacceptable to any rational person. A ra-
>tional person would  consider  the  alternatives:  (1)  following
>another  principle - which might sometimes yield even worse solu-
>tions or (2)  calculating  benefits  case  by  case  -  which  is
>uneconomical,  and also (very important) makes one susceptible to
>irrational biases and temptations of the moment; a principle  em-
>bodied in habit is a safeguard.

What is this -- the two options of rationality are blind adherence
to principle or paranoiac treat-everything-as-a-special-case?  So
choose blind adherence to principle?  I'd accept neither.

A "common-sense" approach is to establish principles of normal
behavior (such as non-coercion), and perception of situations to
discriminate normal from exceptional situations, for instance by
setting up thresholds within which normality is perceived to
be operating and outside of which normality has disappeared and
new rules should come into play.

Coming up with practical boundaries for normality and unusualness
is consistent with rational behavior.

>E.g., an alcoholic forgoes a sip of wine that could do him
>good, sticking to a larger determination to stop drinking.
>His principle is momentarily suboptimal but not irrational.
>
>Now substitute coercion for alcohol and society for the
>alcoholic.

But a particular condition distinguishes the alcoholic from the
regular mass of humanity -- the irrational inability to refuse a
second drink.  Unless we share this inability to set up degrees
of judgment, we need not avoid pragmatic judgments by hard-coding
principles.

>In particular, some rational people support the First Amendment,
>which could not stand your kind of test.
>
>		Jan Wasilewsky

This matches the alcoholic case:  the state has too many bureaucrats
who find it rational to censor expression, even though censorship is
destructive to the public sphere.  So the inability of the state
to refuse an opportunity to censor when it comes around requires
that it restrict its freedom via the First Amendment or similar
statutes.

But there are many cases not like First Amendment questions, where
what the bureaucrats find to be rational is also what citizens and
the public see to be rational, for instance, social welfare to keep
beggars off the street, or certification-regulation of medical degrees.

Tony Wuersch
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