Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: $Revision: 1.6.2.16 $; site inmet.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!epsilon!zeta!sabre!petrus!bellcore!decvax!cca!inmet!nrh From: nrh@inmet.UUCP Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Re: Logic, fact, preference [Part 1] Message-ID: <28200185@inmet.UUCP> Date: Mon, 21-Oct-85 20:59:00 EDT Article-I.D.: inmet.28200185 Posted: Mon Oct 21 20:59:00 1985 Date-Received: Thu, 24-Oct-85 20:35:14 EDT References: <306@umich.UUCP> Lines: 236 Nf-ID: #R:umich:-30600:inmet:28200185:000:13027 Nf-From: inmet!nrh Oct 21 20:59:00 1985 >/* Written 1:23 am Oct 19, 1985 by torek@umich in inmet:net.politics.t */ >/* ---------- "Re: Logic, fact, preference [Part 1" ---------- */ >... >>Just for example, once one chooses to be reasonable, FURTHER >>weightings may be considered on the basis of reason, but the CHOICE to >>be reasonable (as opposed to being guided by emotion or by zen-like >>inner awareness) has itself no basis in reason. > >This is one for net.philosophy, but: being reasonable is the only CHOICE >that can be made! In other, less flip, words: if one "chooses" the >other "alternatives" one has not made a CHOICE. The very representation >of unreason and reason as alternatives is itself a rational act governed >by the norms of reason; reason will be represented as the correct choice. A nearby Merriam-Webster defines "choice" as the "act of choosing", and "choose" as "1a: to select freely and after consideration", but (hold those cheers) ALSO as "2b: to have a preference for". I suggest to you that not all preferences are rational, (certainly NONE of those which precede a preference for reason) and therefore one is quite right to say that one may "choose" without making a rational determination. Thus a choice may be either reasoned, or simply perceived without reason. >It is therefore incorrect to say, as norm-nihilists like Sartre say, that >it is possible and necessary to make a pre-rational arbitrary choice of >reason or unreason. That's nice: I don't know how Sartre put it, but it's clear that the word "choice" may refer to a preference. Must a preference be rational? (Dictionary again: preference is the act of preferring, preferring may be choosing OR esteeming, and esteem as "regard highly". (this is ignoring circular paths)). Regard, in turn is to "recognize the worth of a person or thing", and "worth" is the "value of something measured by its qualities" and "value" as "something (as a principle or quality) intrinsically valuable or desirable". So you see, the meaning of "choice" may not be used to determine that a choice is always rational, because a (tortuous) path exists that comes down to desire. Need we go into how rational "desires" need to be, or will you accept that THEY may be wired in (and thus not reasoned)? >... >>>>>libertarianism would bar coercion in "free-rider" (= N-person prisoner's >>>>>dilemma, for game-theory-ignorant people like Nat) situations even when >>>>>everyone in the situation DOES prefer the outcome that results when >>>>>coercion is used, and nobody's preference is irrational. >>>... >>>> [But] the libertarian prefers no coercion to himself or others [over] >>>> the avoidance of the negative effects of the free-rider situation[!] >>> >>>... I think such a preference is not just >>>nonrational, but irrational: it has no basis in observable harm to the >>>libertarian or anyone else, *and conflicts with preferences that DO*. >> >>What "observable harm" is done to someone who is shown a swastika? A >>parade of Nazis? A mutilated corpse? A retouched photo purporting to show >>his mother having sex with an elephant? None at all, of course! > >Plenty, of course. By "observable" I include "observable to the person >in question" as well as more ordinary types of observation. Of course, >you could reply that in that sense, the libertarian can observe harm to >himself too -- he feels bad feelings when he is coerced. And you'd be >right. BUT -- and here's the rub -- *qua* bad feelings, that badness >may be *outweighed* by the good results of solving the free-rider problem. >So that on balance, even the libertarian is better off. Quite possible. It MAY happen, but you've opened the door, certainly things MAY happen the other way, and if Baba admits that *I* may be so affected by a coercion as to make it a net loss WHATEVER good is likely to be accomplished, you certainly must admit that the possibility exists for things happening the other way, and that therefore it does NOT follow that the "bad feelings" may be ignored. >Not only that, but the bad feelings associated with being coerced to do >one's share in the free-rider problem will disappear once one sees that >the coercion is not wrong. In a clear sense, the negative reaction one >has there is "extrinsic" -- not part of human nature. >Whereas, even though >the mere existence of a mutilated body is not wrong either, one's negative >reaction to it MAY be "intrinsic" -- i.e., hardwired. Not at ALL. The resentment of authority is a pretty deep part of human nature, although you could perhaps raise someone in a skinner box who didn't know about such things and thus couldn't fear or hate them. On the other hand, you could do the same with mutilated corpses et. al.. >>>Remember the situation is as described above; i.e. everyone >>>prefers the outcome that results when coercion is applied in the >>>free-rider situation, except that the libertarian disapproves of the >>>means used. But why is it any more sensible to categorically disapprove >>>of coercive means than to categorically disapprove of any means that >>>involves the use of (say) screwdrivers? >> >>Let us instead use an example of (not chosen at random) milk with >>meat, instead of screwdrivers. > >Let's not. Let's have you answer the screwdrivers example -- NO WRIGGLING! >I'll answer the "kosher" example -- but not INSTEAD of the screwdrivers >one, rather, IN ADDITION to it. Okay, let's talk about screwdrivers. I've no personal objection to using them. I wouldn't get mad if someone suggested, politely, that they be used to solve a problem. I wouldn't eschew their use. Were you to suggest their use in some problem, I wouldn't fight about it. On the other hand, were you to insist on their use to someone traumatized by screwdrivers (say some folks who had been tortured using screwdrivers) I'd say you were crazy. If you were to say, "but wait! what rational basis can these people have for their objection?" I'd say you were insensitive, that even if there were trivial gains for me were I to put screwdrivers in their toolboxes, I wouldn't do it, knowing what I know of them." Would you be right to insist? Even if their trauma is not the result of the RATIONAL side of human existence? I suggest that the fact that their fear and pain has its basis in the irrational side of their nature has nothing to do with how important it is, how much pain it would cause, or how correct it is to ignore that pain. Now let's talk buzz-saws. You see, the power of a state to coerce more nearly resembles a buzz-saw than a screwdriver. Why? Because the element of danger is largely absent with a screwdriver, but the buzz-saw fairly reeks of it. I suggest to you that it a preference NOT to use a buzz-saw if it can be sanely avoided is a Good Thing. Why? Because there is DANGER here. Because the buzz-saw is (in use) capable of VERY dangerous things. Now let us say that we understand the principles of operation of buzz-saws as little as we understand the operation of history and of politics. Perhaps you see my point already, but to make it clear, you would be a fool to use a buzz-saw without understanding (for example) which end is dangerous, what it would do if you were to push THAT button, or if the buzz-saw YOU were using was invisible, so that you couldn't tell how long it was. My own feeling is that we understand the state very little, and while great things could be accomplished (perhaps) if we understood it well, WE DO NOT! So we are fools, less than children, playing with buzz-saws. We understand that a force is available to us, but not how strong it is, how to turn it off, whether it can be safely used to cut (say) steel girders, concrete, wood, or vials of nitro. We do understand enough about it to know how (relatively, sometimes) how intense the force is, and we know (in limited ways) how to turn it off. The interesting thing is that the buzz-saw could make our lives better in theory, were we to understand its nature, so we have people who would have us cut anything with it. We also have people, like me, who say: "For goodness sake! Until you know what's going on, don't play with it! Sure, you managed to cut down that tree in ten minutes by blindly swinging it around, but you don't know if the same thing will happen if try to do the same things, and you don't know what will happen when you put it down. Turn it off and leave it alone". Were a similar danger to exist with screwdrivers (that is, were they very good at killing folks if used with poor understanding), I suspect it would be obvious that one shouldn't use them. Were everyone to use chainsaws KNOWING WHAT THEY'RE DOING, I'd have no objection (assuming they weren't out to kill me or something), but that IS NOT the situation. Until we aren't surprised by inflations and stagflations, until we know how to prevent war and corruption, until we can limit government to its place, it's a *VERY* dangerous thing to use, and to demand that it *NOT* be used without enough knowledge is only rational. >>Does it make sense for some people >>to refuse to use such a combination in their cuisine (the combination >>is non-kosher, and forbidden by religious law to some Jews). > >No, it does not. (How's that for a straightforward answer! Flame away, >religious people -- not just people who keep kosher, but anyone who follows >any comparable religious rule, be it Islamic, Christian, or Ubizmatist.) > >Turn up those flames -- I hate cold weather! > >>It may make no sense to an observer who may not communicate with these >>people, but must not their preference be respected, even though there >>is no obvious material benefit to them? > >YES, it must -- BUT THAT IS NOT THE ISSUE. The issue is does it make sense. >Even though it does not, it must be respected, DUE TO THE CONSEQUENCES that >would follow if it were not respected. > >"Aha", you are thinking, "but if preferences for kosher must be respected, >then so must preferences for non-coercion -- after all, how can Torek >separate the two cases?" Straightforward answer: simple -- the consequences >of disrespecting the libertarian preference are overwhelmingly good, whereas >the consequences of disrespecting kosher preferences are overwhelmingly bad. >[Notable exception: when religious rules would prevent saving a child's >life, they may be overruled -- cf. the court case that was in the news a >while back.] Tsk! So that one is permitted to say that if people object strongly enough to your imposition of "reason", then you should not impose reason? Fair enough! *I* object that strongly. You don't KNOW enough about government to keep the "positive" effects maximized and the negative effects minimized. In essence, your line is the same as everyone who wishes government to rule "for the good of the people". You've simply come up with somewhat better mechanisms for discovering the will of the people (not perfect ones -- else you wouldn't need to resort to the pragmatic concession above) but and wish to argue that they justify the use of force. This is like discovering where some trees are and being willing to use the invisible buzz-saw of unknown configuration. Dangerous. If it were just your limbs at stake, I certainly wouldn't kick, but you're proposing to involve ME in your little scheme, and ..... >>>If I understand Nat he would answer: "it isn't, but one doesn't need any >>>reason for such preferences, one just has them or not; it's all subjective." >>>I don't agree. If a person categorically disapproves of the use of >>>screwdrivers, he will miss out (and/or cause others to miss out) on some of >>>the genuinely good things in life. The absence of screwdriver-use is, in >>>contrast, not a genuinely good thing. In other words, I am saying that some >>>preferences are more rational than others -- not just in relation to other >>>preferences (cf. preference transitivity in decision theory), but on >>>their own account. >> >> In a situation in which everyone would benefit if they ate pork, (say >>that everyone were starving and it were the only high-energy food >>available, and their strength was desirable), should they be forced to >>eat it even if they'd rather eat (say) millet and be weak? > >No, because this *isn't* a situation in which everyone would benefit if >they ate pork -- unless they could be *convinced* that it was OK to eat. >(And if we care about them, we should certainly make some effort to convince.) It's a *GIVEN* that everyone would benefit if they ate pork (read my paragraph again). You're wriggling by trying to argue that they would protest enough to negate the advantage of their strength, but I've given you no grounds for such a supposition. It is their strength, not their agreement to use it, that is desirable in the (deliberately left unclarified) situation given. >Now, Nat, no wriggling -- what do you say about screwdrivers? I say that no finer drink ever existed :-). >