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From: levy@ttrdc.UUCP (Daniel R. Levy)
Newsgroups: net.crypt
Subject: Re: Cryptographic Signature Schemes
Message-ID: <599@ttrdc.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 23-Nov-85 02:05:01 EST
Article-I.D.: ttrdc.599
Posted: Sat Nov 23 02:05:01 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 24-Nov-85 05:46:03 EST
References: <10970@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> <576@ttrdc.UUCP> <332@snow.warwick.UUCP>
Organization: AT&T, Computer Systems Division, Skokie, IL
Lines: 23

In article <332@snow.warwick.UUCP>, rpt@warwick.UUCP (Richard Tomlinson) writes:
>In article <576@ttrdc.UUCP> levy@ttrdc.UUCP (Daniel R. Levy) writes:
>>Better yet, keep the documents themselves secret, like they are supposed to
>>be.
>
>I think you've missed the whole point of the original idea. Since the
>documents are forgeries, keeping documents secret would make no difference.
>But, if all secret documents are kept encrypted along with a secure
>signature then it would be possible to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
>the 'proof' that the KGB provide is forged.
>
>Richard.
>
This is presuming that the KGB is willing to provide the "original" which was
intercepted then deciphered as proof.  I doubt that they would; we all know
a petty detail like that also doesn't stop Russia's baldfaced lies.
-- 
 -------------------------------    Disclaimer:  The views contained herein are
|       dan levy | yvel nad      |  my own and are not at all those of my em-
|         an engihacker @        |  ployer or the administrator of any computer
| at&t computer systems division |  upon which I may hack.
|        skokie, illinois        |
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