Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site umcp-cs.UUCP Path: utzoo!decvax!tektronix!zehntel!dual!vecpyr!lll-lcc!lll-crg!seismo!umcp-cs!mangoe From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Conditioning for Reason Message-ID: <2213@umcp-cs.UUCP> Date: Thu, 14-Nov-85 02:04:33 EST Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.2213 Posted: Thu Nov 14 02:04:33 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 17-Nov-85 17:25:42 EST References: <2040@pyuxd.UUCP> <2153@umcp-cs.UUCP> <2120@pyuxd.UUCP> Distribution: na Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD Lines: 45 Rich Rosen has insisted that the mind is deterministic and that all behavior is therefore determined by conditioning. So let's consider what happens to reason under that assumption. Why should reason produce truth? Because there is an evolutionary advantage to it being true. But what about all the errors? Rich argues that argument and debate force out presumtions and other errors. This they certainly do-- to a certain extent. It's clear, for instance, that in some people the reasoning process is interfered with to produce erroneous answers. Sometimes these are indeed trapped by the argumentation process. Others, however, are protected. Assuming for the moment that there is some flaw in someone's reasoning which they do not see, there must be another flaw protecting it from counterarguments. Build up enough of these and you have a systematic error that is self-protecting. THere is reason to suspect that these do in fact exist. So why aren't they eliminated? I can only see three responses, and each of them means trouble for the truth of reasoning. Response 1: These systematic errors are in fact evolutionarily advantageous. This, it seems to me, knocks the wind out of the evolutionary argument for the truth of reason by showing a falsehood which is advantageous. Response 2: Systematic errors arise because the evolution towards reason is not complete. This paints a rather eschatological view of reason, and it presupposes a certain destiny which man must strive for. This may well be true, but it certainly is not a reasoned argument. Response 3: Abandon the evolutionary hypothesis, and claim a different basis for truth. Note that there are variations on these; for #1, for instance, one might argue that retention of other desirable qualities guarantees the retention of systematic errors. In any case, it appears that we are stuck with systematic errors, and therefore the reasoning of an individual cannot be trusted. So what new standard is there? Various forms of group concensus generally seem to have a problem in that they may simply be ratifying a common error. I will confess at this point that I don't have an answer. My hunch is that error is unavoidable. Any comments? Responses I have left out? Charley Wingate