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From: hfavr@mtuxo.UUCP (a.reed)
Newsgroups: net.politics,net.politics.theory
Subject: Freedom and ownership, round3
Message-ID: <1140@mtuxo.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 27-Nov-85 13:26:58 EST
Article-I.D.: mtuxo.1140
Posted: Wed Nov 27 13:26:58 1985
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In earlier articles, I proposed the following definitions:
OWNERSHIP is simply the right to use or trade the owned entity in any way
that does not invade, or threaten to invade, the person or property of
another.  
A person's PROPERTY is the ensemble of things over which the person
exercises ownership.

Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes, claims:

> These two definitions are mutually circular, i.e., they include each
> other in their definitions, and therefore tell us nothing except the
> relation between the two concepts.  If we put the two definitions
> together, we have (condensed):
>   OWNERSHIP is the right to use an entity in any way that does
>   not invade the aggregate of things over which another person
>   exercises OWNERSHIP.

The above definition of ownership is not circular, merely generative,
that is, it is a recursive definition whose first step is subsumed in
its second step. The recursion may be laid out as follows:

1.	When exercised for the first time in human history, OWNERSHIP
is the right to use an owned entity in any way that does not invade,
or threaten to invade, the person of another.  
2.	Once it has been exercised by somebody, OWNERSHIP becomes the
right to use or trade the owned entity in any way that does not invade,
or threaten to invade, the person or property of another; where PROPERTY
is the ensemble of things over which a person exercises ownership.

The claim made in my round 1 and round 2 articles is that at least one
important attribute of ownership (namely, that a previously unowned
entity becomes the property of the first person to use it) is implied by
any reasonable (that is, valid and usable) definition of the terms
defined in those articles. Hence, if Carnes is to challenge the argument
presented in those articles, he will have to challenge the
reasonableness of my definitions. On the other hand, I would be
surprised by a claim that generative or recursive definitions are
inherently either not valid or impossible to understand.

			Adam Reed (ihnp4!mtuxo!hfavr)