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From: mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor)
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Prisoners Dilemma Query
Message-ID: <1746@dciem.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 8-Dec-85 15:55:45 EST
Article-I.D.: dciem.1746
Posted: Sun Dec  8 15:55:45 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 8-Dec-85 20:11:02 EST
References: <11178@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Reply-To: mmt@dciem.UUCP (Martin Taylor)
Organization: D.C.I.E.M., Toronto, Canada
Lines: 25
Summary: 


>I would like to see some more discussion on the subject of
>the "Prisoners Dilemna". I just acquired the book,
>"The Evolution of Cooperation", by Prof. Robert Axelrod.
>It seems quite interesting.
>
>  -Tom

Look at the two or three articles by Hofstadter in his "Metamagical
Themas" in Scientific American a year or two ago.  He reported experiments
on the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game in an evolutionary context.
Without going into detail, the algorithm that survived best in a
free-for-all competition was one that always cooperated except when
confronted with an opponent who cheated the last time they met.

Incidentally, this relates to the "might makes right" question addressed
in a posting I just completed.  Under the circumstances of the game,
all participants had equal "might", but it was best never to use that
might first.  This corresponds to the Libertarian principle of "no first
use of force."  There might be some value in a discussion of this point.
-- 

Martin Taylor
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