Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site cbsck.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!cbsck!pmd From: pmd@cbsck.UUCP (Paul M. Dubuc) Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Reason gets no respect from Berman Message-ID: <1671@cbsck.UUCP> Date: Tue, 10-Dec-85 12:42:04 EST Article-I.D.: cbsck.1671 Posted: Tue Dec 10 12:42:04 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 11-Dec-85 22:26:50 EST References: <1538@hound.UUCP> Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories , Columbus Lines: 60 >In the case of deciding to be a mugger, there is an abundance of evidence >that he would be better off by living productively; but that would require >the effort of inducing that conclusion--of identifying that fact of reality >by integrating conceptual knowledge (based ultimately on sensory evidence)-- >i.e. of using reason. ... "an abundance of evidence"? From what is the evidence derived? Sure, muggers don't make it very well in our society, but it can be argued that that is only because society enforces a moral code that is against the muggers "reason" for mugging in the first place. If you're not careful, you end up assuming your conclusion as a basis by which to induce that conclusion in the mugger using reason. If you start with a blank slate (i.e. presuming that society does not inflict a bias for or against muggers) can you still maintain that there would be an "abundance of evidence" that the mugger should give up his trade and that reason alone could compel him to do so based on that evidence? >There is even a simpler path. The potential mugger could note that consistency >demands that he not treat others as he does not want to be treated; but >this would require that he value consistency--the specialty of reason. It would also require, as a more basic value, that he recognize that others have the same value and rights as he. If he happens to see himself as being more valuable than others; his own desires as more important, then he is not being inconsistent with his own values. How does reason compel one to believe that all humans have equal value? >I assume (as each of you implicitly does when you post) that there is >one ethical principle I share with each of you: the value of reason; but I am >amazed at the number among you who are potential muggers. As long as you >treat reason as a floating abstraction, you are in danger of sacrificing it >to some momentary desire. Reason isn't exactly a floating abstraction, but it does need to operate from certain precepts. Reason does not provide its own precepts. I value reason because it allows me to apply the precepts that I accept. (I think it is that best and most proven tool for the job). I don't value it in itself. In the same way, I value a hammer because it allows me to drive nails. Reason is a tool (like a hammer) that does not justify itself. Its value is justified by its usefulness in performing necessary tasks (e.g. doing ethics) according to our accepted precepts. Everyone has these precepts, whether or not they recognize them as such. The thing that I find hard to accept is the contention that precepts are the product of reason itself. The necessity to drive nails is not derived from a hammer. >When someone confesses "to me it is clear that the final judgments cannot >be justified by reason alone," how will he deal with me when his final judgment >conflicts with mine? Maybe we need to consider that we need something more than reason ... something to which our reason is anchored. If it's not there, then I guess we should just be "brave" and face up to it (i.e. just float). If we don't want to float then we better find an anchor for reason, because it doesn't anchor itself. >Bob Stubblefield -- Paul Dubuc cbsck!pmd \/-\ /\-/