Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: $Revision: 1.6.2.16 $; site inmet.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!mhuxt!houxm!vax135!cornell!uw-beaver!tektronix!hplabs!sdcrdcf!ucla-cs!ucbvax!decvax!cca!inmet!janw From: janw@inmet.UUCP Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Co-rationality is Nonsense Message-ID: <28200370@inmet.UUCP> Date: Mon, 2-Dec-85 23:53:00 EST Article-I.D.: inmet.28200370 Posted: Mon Dec 2 23:53:00 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 11-Dec-85 22:29:09 EST References: <1519@hound.UUCP> Lines: 113 Nf-ID: #R:hound:-151900:inmet:28200370:000:5695 Nf-From: inmet!janw Dec 2 23:53:00 1985 [Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh ] I am delighted to see an Objectivist (you are, aren't you?) ex- pound his views here. (It may have happened , before I started reading the net). The intent of my arguments is not to prove you wrong, but to understand you in a consistent way. >> "... the threatener may have a reason for his wish; >>*to him* it is not a whim, but based on reality. But he does not >>give his reasons to the victim. To the latter, the former's wish >>is a whim, and also a piece of primary reality on which to act - >>again, rationally. Thus, each has his own reality to which he >>adapts; but it is not the same. So, they are each rational but >>not *co-rational*. Does that make any sense to you ?" >No. There is only one reality. If there were multiple realities, >reason would be impotent. Which reality would my sense organs be >aware of? Which reality would we point to when we try to communicate >with each other? The first premise necessary for any thought or >human discourse is that there is only one reality. Oh, I wasn't suggesting "multiple reality" in any ontological sense. Just that, for each decision, there is a relevant *piece* of reality. E.g., in choosing a chess move, you can ignore the weather. This piece may be different for two interacting people. In which case, for A, the actions of B may be part of relevant reality, but not necessarily B's reasons for these actions. E.g., for a mugger, a victim's resistance is a fact to be reckoned with. But if he let himself consider the victim's *reasons* for resistance - then perhaps he would find it hard to go on. Such *partial* rationality is probably common for people who coerce other people. >When two people disagree over a fact of reality, at least one of them >is wrong. I claim that one who initiates force is irrational. First, >note that merely having a reason is not enough to establish a claim >of rationality. Is it rational to consume your seed corn? Is it >rational to snort cocaine? Is social security rational? My point >is that having the faculty of reason is given; but being rational-- >i.e., properly identifying facts of reality--is not. So far, agreed. Neither having the faculty of reason nor having *a* reason for one's actions is enough to be called rational. However, if the faculty of reason is *used* in determining which reason is sufficient for which action, then I suggest that estab- lishes the user as rational. That does not preclude his decision from being mistaken and/or morally wrong. "Properly identifying facts of reality" seems to imply infalli- bility, not merely rationality. In the common-sense meaning of the word, Napoleon, or Lenin, would be called rational because they kept *thinking* on their goals and means, analyzing them, and not acting on blind whims. I, and probably you, would call their actions both morally wrong and ul- timately mistaken. And the two *are* connected. But would you narrow the word "rational" to those who share your philosophy ? Was not Socrates rational ? >Now let's broaden the context. Jan asks why can't man be a rational >predator--treating other people as a natural resource? Why is he less >rational than a herder or hunter because his prey is human? >In other words, even if force is the opposite of reason in the narrow sense >used above (dealing with other humans), why do I hold that you are >irrational (that is violate the correct application of reason) if >you weigh all the alternatives and choose to treat people as if they were >not human? >The answer is in the nature of the human consciousness. The aspect I >am focusing on here is that you need to think in terms of principles >to keep your mind in order and to act on principles to keep your life >in order. Very good. This, I think, is the core of the matter. This could be called the principle principle, or the packaging principle. >I would hope that anyone who was serious about defending liberty would not >hold that it is rational for men to attempt to survive on the principle that >"might makes right." Agreed. Except that you make it sound as if it were a matter of allegiance, not just truth. "Might makes right" would destroy any society, free or non-free. Now your point would be completely made if it were established that no third alternative exists to the two principles: (1)"non-initiation of force or threat" (which you and I both prefer) and (2)"might makes right". Most aggressors, however, use some other principle that makes it possible for them to initiate force in some cases, but not in others. Such as, (3)"against non-members of the group" or (4)"if the law says so" or (5)"if customary in our group" or (6)"from superior to inferior" or (7)"against people who are not fully ra- tional" or (8)"for the greater benefit of the victim". E.g., a parent threatening a child makes use of the last four rules. State, in taxing us, relies on (4) and (8). Slave-traders used (3). My *estimate* is that (1) is, in the long run, the most ration- al. This is *part* of the reason I like it. *Survival*, however, has been successfully tried with the others, too. (Straight (2), if accepted by all members of society, would certainly ruin it. Therefore people acting on this principle usually preach some other. This makes (2) unstable). As for the will to defend liberty, it does not depend on viewing its enemies as totally irrational. If they were, they would be less dangerous, wouldn't they ? It is a *mixture* of rationality and irrationality that is most common in human conflicts. Jan Wasilewsky