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From: janw@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Re: Strange Bedfellows: and shoes
Message-ID: <28200379@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 9-Dec-85 23:37:00 EST
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200379
Posted: Mon Dec  9 23:37:00 1985
Date-Received: Mon, 16-Dec-85 19:37:28 EST
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Nf-From: inmet!janw    Dec  9 23:37:00 1985


[Gabor Fencsik {ihnp4,dual,lll-crg,hplabs,intelca}!qantel!gabor]
>In <28200323@inmet.UUCP> Jan Wasilewski writes:
>> The following is Gabor's criticism of libertarians and  Marxists,
>> respectively.
>>
>> >The democratic process will not do [for libertarians] as a  source
>> >of  legitimacy for the state: this is the translation of the slo-
>> >gan 'Taxation is Theft'.
>>
>> >Marx's ... assertion that 'human essence is the totality  of  so-
>> >cial  relations'  is,  as far as I can see, incompatible with any
>> >notion of inalienable rights.
>>
>> There seems to be an implicit contradiction here. Can  the  demo-
>> cratic  process,  in  your  view,  legitimize  alienation  of all
>> rights, or only of some rights; and if so, which ?
>
>The democratic process legitimizes the making of public policy.
>Taxation is an adjunct and precondition of public policy. Saying
>'Taxation is Theft' is an attack on the legitimacy of political power
>whether or not such legitimacy flows from the democratic process.
>This is the line of thought implicit in the first paragraph you quoted.
>Nothing was said about rights there, unless 'freedom from taxation' is
>regarded as a fundamental right or, alternatively, legitimacy is understood
>to mean 'a licence to abrogate rights'. But of course it means nothing of the
>sort. The striking thing about the democratic process is its ability to create
>new rights at an alarming rate. For example, the right of disabled children
>to 'mainstream' education, the right of schizophrenics to be released from
>mental hospitals and the rights flowing from affirmative action laws or the
>Freedom of Information Act have all been codified within the last ten years
>or so. It seems that the logic of the democratic process gravitates toward
>inventing more rights rather than abolishing existing ones (whatever one may
>think of the recent crop). So I cannot make sense of  your  ques-
>tion  without some pointers to the implicit contradiction you are
>hinting at.

My fault entirely.
Your point about democratic process creating rights is, I believe,
central to the general discussion; I would like to store it and
return to it. But it is peripheral to the particular question I raised.
You will, I expect, agree that the democratic process can abrogate rights as
well as create them. In some cases the abrogated rights can be
quite fundamental. 3 examples will suffice: (1) military draft;
(2) in post-WWII Britain people in basic industries were attached to
their jobs with no right to leave them; (3) "black codes" in
post-Civil war South deprived blacks of freedom of movement and
the right to own land.

Someone who believes in "inalienable rights" must, I believe, set
a boundary beyond which the democratic process cannot legitimate-
ly go. Adherents of the "taxation  is  theft"  principle  believe
that  here  is the boundary. Others do not go that far but assert
that at least individual income tax as it exists in USA  violates
fundamental  rights. It certainly abrogated *a* right; and it was
at least fundamental enough to call for a  constitutional  amend-
ment; and it was one of the few amendments restricting individual
rights.

If one believes in democratic process as the sole source of legi-
timacy  for rights or right restriction, one has no logical prob-
lem; if one believes *all* rights can be deduced from inalienable
rights, ditto. But recognizing *two* sources of legitimacy raises
the question of a demarcation line. In your response you seem  to
hint  that  what  is  *necessary* ("adjunct and precondition") to
public policy (and you think taxes are) should certainly fall  on
the  side  of  alienable  rights.  *Now*  there apparently are
*three* sources of legitimacy: will of the  people  (democratic
process); practical necessity; and inalienable rights. All this
is not unreasonable; and there may be no contradiction  here,  if
the three spheres don't overlap. If they do, there is.

My question is: how do *you* demarcate rights so that no
contradiction arises ?

                Jan Wasilewsky